G.R. No. L-15609 - Marcelo vs. Mencias

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-15609)

Facts and Procedural Antecedents in the Land Registration Case

On June 9, 1954, petitioner filed an application for registration in his name of Lots 1, 2, and 3 in Taguig, Rizal. The application was opposed by Leocadio Pagsisihan, who was later referred to as the predecessor-in-interest of respondent Clemente Pagsisihan. On February 28, 1955, the land registration court issued a decision in favor of petitioner but declared him the owner of only one of the three lots, denying the opposition as to that portion while declaring the other two lots (2 and 3) to be public lands. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, while the oppositor did not.

The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that petitioner was also the owner of the other two lots previously declared public lands. When that appellate judgment became final and executory, respondent judge issued an order for the issuance of a decree in petitioner’s favor, and certificates of title were issued for Lots 1, 2, and 3 in petitioner’s name.

The Writ of Possession and Respondent’s Continued Refusal

After respondent Clemente Pagsisihan refused to deliver possession of Lots 2 and 3, which he occupied, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. The petition was opposed by respondent Clemente Pagsisihan. On March 14, 1959, respondent judge granted the petition, reasoning that the writ of possession may issue not only against the person defeated in the land registration case but also against anyone occupying the land or the relevant portion during the registration proceeding. The judge relied on the doctrine reflected in Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298, and Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, 11 Phil. 391, among others.

Despite the writ of possession, respondent Clemente Pagsisihan refused to surrender possession of Lots 2 and 3 and to remove his house standing thereon. Petitioner then filed a separate petition seeking demolition as the means to make effective the possession already adjudicated to him.

Petition for Demolition: Denial for Lack of Jurisdiction

On May 2, 1959, respondent judge denied petitioner’s demolition petition. The denial was grounded solely on the view that, acting as a land registration court, it lacked jurisdiction or authority to order demolition in connection with execution stemming from its writ of possession.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on May 19, 1959, asserting that demolition is simply the coercive process needed to render effective the writ of possession already issued by the land registration court, and invoking jurisprudence such as Demorar vs. the Hon. Judge Ibanez, 51 Off. Gaz. No. 6, p. 2872, Pasay Estate Co., Ltd. vs. the Hon. Judge del Rosario, and Follosco vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-4991, March 23, 1953.

On June 8, 1959, respondent judge denied reconsideration. It reasoned that Section 13, Rule 39 pertains to ordinary actions for delivery or restitution of property and not to land registration proceedings, and it pointed to the perceived silence of the Land Registration Law on demolition. It further stated that, in the decisions cited by petitioner, what was actually involved was the issuance of a writ of possession, not demolition.

The Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petition presented the core question whether the land registration court had jurisdiction or authority to order demolition as an incident of, and complement to, the writ of possession that it had already issued in favor of the successful claimant.

Respondents did not file an answer. The Court treated the controversy as one squarely involving the proper application of the Rules of Court in execution measures under land registration cases.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling and Disposition

The Court held that respondent judge erred in denying petitioner’s petition for demolition. It set aside the orders dated May 2, 1959 and June 8, 1959 and remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings on petitioner’s demolition petition, directing that the resolution be made in accordance with Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court further ordered respondent Clemente Pagsisihan to pay the costs.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court anchored its ruling on Section 13, Rule 39, which provides that execution for delivery or restitution of property is enforced by placing the plaintiff in possession and that, while the officer must not normally destroy or remove improvements made by the judgment debtor, demolition may be undertaken by special order of the court upon petition of the plaintiff, after due hearing, and upon the defendant’s failure to remove improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. The Court rejected respondent judge’s premise that this rule applied only to ordinary civil actions and not to land registration proceedings. It held that the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to land registration cases in a suppletory character under Rule 132.

The Court emphasized the functional relationship between the writ of possession and demolition. It reasoned that if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding necessarily implies delivery of possession to the successful litigant, then a writ of demolition must likewise issue because demolition is the complement that renders the writ of possession effective; without demolition, the possession granted by the court would be undermined by the continued presence of the improvements.

The Court also rejected the view that a successful claimant must institute separate ordinary civil actions in other courts, such as forcible entry and detainer or recovery of possession, to obtain the benefits of the land registration judgment. It found that such a requirement would defeat the purpose of the land registration system and would lead to unnecessary multiplicity of suits, an outcome the Court considered inconsistent with the judicial system’s aversion to expensive and cumbersome litigation. In support, the Court relied on the doctrine expressed in Pasay Estate Co. vs. Del Rosario, which observed that requiring additional actions in other courts would compel further litigation to secure the fruits of victory already obtained in the land registration tribunal.

Further, the Court invoked Section 6, Rule 124, which states that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court of judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by that court or officer. It concluded that, by operation of Rule 132’s suppletory application and Rule 124’s authority on auxiliary processes, respondent judge had power to issue auxiliary writs including demolition, to give full effect to the jurisdiction already exercised in issuing the writ of possession.

Finally,

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-15609)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Rafael Marcelo filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court.
Hon. Eulogio Mencias was impleaded as the land registration judge.
Clemente Pagsisihan (and his predecessor-in-interest Leocadio Pagsisihan) opposed Marcelo’s land registration application and later refused delivery of possession of the lots adjudged to Marcelo.
The land registration court issued a writ of possession in Marcelo’s favor.
Marcelo subsequently petitioned for an order of demolition because Clemente Pagsisihan refused to remove his house on lots 2 and 3.
The land registration court denied the demolition petition for lack of jurisdiction, prompting Marcelo’s petition for certiorari and mandamus.
The Court granted the petition, set aside the assailed orders, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the demolition petition.

Key Factual Allegations

Marcelo applied on June 9, 1954 for registration in his name of three parcels (lots 1, 2, and 3) located at Taguig, Rizal.
The application was opposed by Leocadio Pagsisihan, father and predecessor-in-interest of Clemente Pagsisihan.
On February 28, 1955, the land registration court rendered judgment in Marcelo’s favor as to only one lot, while declaring the other two lots to be public lands.
Marcelo appealed to the Court of Appeals, while the oppositor did not appeal.
The Court of Appeals reversed the land registration court and held that Marcelo owned the two other lots previously declared public lands.
After the appellate judgment became final and executory, the land registration court issued an order for the issuance of the decree and a certificate of title in Marcelo’s name covering all adjudged lots.
Because Clemente Pagsisihan refused to deliver possession of lots 2 and 3 and refused to remove his house, Marcelo sought a writ of possession.
The writ of possession petition was opposed on the ground that the oppositor had died on August 28, 1958, yet the land registration court still granted the petition on March 14, 1959.
Despite issuance of the writ of possession, Clemente Pagsisihan refused to surrender possession and to remove the improvements.
Marcelo filed a petition for demolition on the premise that demolition was necessary to effectuate the writ of possession.
The land registration court denied demolition on May 2, 1959, holding it lacked jurisdiction to order demolition as a land registration court.
The land registration court denied reconsideration on June 8, 1959, reiterating that demolition was not covered in land registration proceedings and suggesting resort to separate actions in regular courts.

Issues Presented

The principal issue was whether the land registration court had jurisdiction or authority to order demolition of improvements as a consequence of a writ of possession issued by it in a land registration case.
A subsidiary issue concerned whether Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applied suppletorily to land registration proceedings under Rule 132, despite the land registration law being silent.
The case also involved the correctness of the land registration court’s view that the demolition remedy should be sought through ordinary civil actions such as forcible entry and detainer or recovery of possession.

Statutory and Rule-Based Framework

Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides the manner of enforcing execution for delivery or restitution of property and regulates destruction of improvements by allowing demolition only by special order of the court issued upon petition of the plaintiff, after due hearing, and upon the defendant’s failure to remove improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The Court held that provisions of the Rules of Court apply to land registration cases in a suppletory character under Rule 132.
Section 6, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court states that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court of a judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry such jurisdiction into effect may be employed, and if procedure is