Title
Manzano vs. Lazaro
Case
G.R. No. 173320
Decision Date
Apr 11, 2012
A campaign manager sued a winning vice-mayoral candidate for unpaid fees and a bonus under their contract. Courts ruled in favor of the manager, enforcing the contract and awarding payment with interest and attorney’s fees.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 173320)

Factual Background

Under the contract, respondent as the “Second Party” undertook multiple campaign-management responsibilities, including heading the organization machinery, hiring and firing required personnel, authorizing campaign expenditures, assisting in mobilization of resources, setting up administrative mechanisms to safeguard efficient and effective use of resources, taking responsibility for campaign headquarters furniture and fixtures, and developing programs to ensure the candidate’s winnability. Petitioner as the “First Party” undertook reciprocal responsibilities, including ensuring the provision of financial resources and other logistical requirements and compensating respondent as agreed.

Under Section III (Remuneration and Manner of Payment), respondent was entitled to a monthly rate of P70,000.00, payable in two equal tranches on the 15th and 30th of each month from February 16, 1998 up to May 15, 1998 for a total of three months. The contract also provided for a bonus pay of P200,000.00 if petitioner won the Vice-Mayoralty post.

Petitioner subsequently won as Vice-Mayor. Respondent learned through a transmittal letter dated June 16, 1998 that, for certain individuals’ last payroll including him, he would receive P15,000.00 with a remaining P20,000.00 to be forwarded only upon his final inventory of materials used during the campaign. Respondent delivered the campaign equipment and furniture to petitioner, and through a letter dated July 3, 1998, he informed petitioner that he had already turned over the equipment. Respondent then demanded payment of the P20,000.00 balance of his compensation and the P200,000.00 bonus.

Petitioner acknowledged respondent’s demand and the delivery of the campaign equipment in his letter dated July 17, 1998, but requested the liquidation of expenses incurred during the campaign. In his letter dated July 30, 1998, petitioner maintained that the preparation of an audited financial report was not respondent’s responsibility because respondent was not in charge of campaign funds; petitioner alleged that such function belonged to Robert Gomez and Soliman Cruz (Cruz), who allegedly acted as petitioner’s Director for Finance, with petitioner’s brother Angie Manzano (Angie) as auditor. Respondent replied that he had already turned over the required equipment and renewed his demand for the full amount of P220,000.00 (compensation balance plus bonus).

Cruz then wrote petitioner on July 30, 1998, clarifying that he had not volunteered respondent to prepare the liquidation of expenses. Cruz explained that petitioner’s request for liquidation was inconsistent with the campaign accounting role assigned to him and that respondent had nothing to do with campaign accounting records. Cruz also said that what was requested was a summary of transportation and other expenses intended to be filed with the COMELEC, and that, for expediency, he instructed that needed information be assembled and that respondent’s help be sought.

When petitioner refused payment, respondent filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against petitioner.

RTC Proceedings and Ruling

In the June 7, 2004 Decision, the RTC directed petitioner to pay respondent P220,000.00 representing professional service fee covering the May 1–15, 1998 period and the bonus stipulated in the contract, plus legal interest from July 3, 1998 until full payment, and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

The RTC reasoned that petitioner’s allegation that consent was vitiated could not justify refusal to pay the agreed remuneration absent any court ruling annulling the contract. It treated the contract as binding unless annulled. On petitioner’s claim of breach, the RTC noted that while the power to rescind reciprocal obligations is implied, it must be invoked judicially unless the contract provides otherwise, and it cannot be exercised unilaterally based solely on a party’s own judgment of breach.

The RTC also found petitioner’s breach allegation inconsistent with petitioner’s own conduct and writings, particularly petitioner’s last payroll transmittal in which he acknowledged the balance due respondent subject to respondent’s final inventory of campaign equipment. It concluded that petitioner’s arguments were a cover to evade payment after respondent complied with the condition relating to inventory. Finally, it awarded attorney’s fees on the ground that petitioner’s unjust refusal compelled respondent to litigate to protect his interest.

Issues Raised on Appeal and Contentions

Petitioner appealed to the CA, asserting that the CA focused only on the contract’s alleged voidability and petitioner’s ratification, while allegedly failing to consider respondent’s material breach and whether respondent was entitled to the P200,000.00 bonus despite such alleged breach. Petitioner also argued that respondent committed serious breaches by failing to perform duties as head of petitioner’s campaign organization, including alleged absence during campaign activities, failure to provide proper personnel, limited mobilization assistance, brief appearance during canvassing, and failure to provide poll watchers. Petitioner further claimed respondent misrepresented his expertise in establishing a political campaign machinery, thereby vitiating petitioner’s consent.

Respondent maintained, consistent with the RTC and CA findings, that respondent was entitled to the agreed compensation balance and bonus because petitioner’s defenses were unsupported and did not negate contractual entitlement.

CA Ruling

In its Decision dated February 28, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the RTC. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 21, 2006. Although the petition to the Supreme Court criticized the CA for allegedly limiting its discussion, the Supreme Court upheld the CA’s affirmance and treated petitioner’s principal arguments as factual issues largely resolved by the RTC and confirmed by the CA.

Supreme Court Treatment of the Petition

The Supreme Court denied the petition. It stressed that the petition raised matters largely dependent on factual determinations, and that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law are reviewable. It further held that factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, were generally binding.

The Court examined the contract’s remuneration and bonus provisions and applied the principle that contracts have the force of law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith. Because the contract’s three-month period had elapsed and petitioner won the Vice-Mayoralty election, respondent became entitled to both the full compensation and the bonus under the express terms of the contract.

However, the Supreme Court observed that petitioner still had not fully paid respondent’s compensation for the period from May 1 to May 15, 1998, where a P20,000.00 balance remained conditional upon respondent’s final inventory of campaign equipment. The Court treated the inventory obligation as the relevant condition reflected in the June 1998 last payroll remittance letter. It further noted that respondent complied by turning over the equipment and that petitioner, in his own correspondence, admitted receipt of the equipment and requested liquidation of expenses instead.

The Court addressed petitioner’s attempt to justify nonpayment by asserting respondent’s alleged failure to fulfill duties. It found that petitioner’s breach claim rested largely on uncorroborated and self-serving assertions that were contradicted by the record. The Court emphasized that petitioner had even paid respondent the salary for the three-month period, leaving only the P20,000.00 balance conditioned on the equipment inventory, which indicated that respondent performed his contracted responsibilities during the covered period.

The Supreme Court further found unpersuasive petitioner’s claim that respondent’s misrepresentation vitiated consent. It adopted the CA’s legal framework distinguishing that a contract whose consent is vitiated is voidable, not void. A voidable contract remains binding until annulled by a court of law, and it is susceptible of ratification. It invoked Art. 1390(2) to explain that voidable contracts produce legal effects unless annulled and that they may be ratified.

The Court agreed with the CA that petitioner’s actions amounted to implied ratification. It treated petitioner’s silence, failure to file an action to annul, and continued dealings with respondent—including giving respondent other election-related tasks—as circumstances showing acceptance and retention of the contract’s benefits. It also underscored that petitioner invoked vitiated consent only after respondent demanded payment of the stipulated amount, which supported the view that petitioner’s dissatisfaction was rooted in expectations rather than actual absence of consent at the time of contracting.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court treated the Professional Services Contract as the controlling source of rights and duties. Under Art. 1159, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith, and under Art. 1306, stipulations not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy remain binding. Since the co

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