Title
Manuel L. Quezon University Association vs. Manuel L. Quezon Educational Institution, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 82312
Decision Date
Apr 19, 1989
Faculty sued MLQU for unpaid salary differentials under P.D. 451; claims dismissed due to late appeal, prescription, and voluntary withdrawal of some members.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 82312)

Petition, Administrative Route, and Governing Legal Framework

On April 24, 1979, petitioners filed before the Regional Director of Region IV of the DOLE a complaint for unpaid salary differentials based on P.D. No. 451, docketed as LRC Case No. RX FSO-4-541-79 (Annex A). Petitioners claimed that the University failed to fully comply with P.D. No. 451 by giving only fifty centavos (P0.50) per lecture hour instead of at least P2.11 per lecture hour for school year 1974-1975 and at least P2.15 per lecture hour for school years 1975-1976 and 1977-1978. Pursuant to P.D. No. 451, the Bureau of Higher Education authorized the University to increase tuition fees by 15% for specified school years, with the condition that 60% of the increment be used to increase salaries of both faculty and non-faculty employees.

The procedural history included orders by (a) the Regional Director, (b) the Deputy Minister of Labor Leogardo, and (c) Undersecretary Dela Serna, whose Orders dated November 18, 1987 and February 17, 1988 formed the subject of the petition for certiorari. The principal statutes implicated were the Labor Code provisions on appeal (notably Article 223) and prescription periods applicable to labor money claims, as applied through Article 292 (now Article 291) of the Labor Code. The Court also discussed Article 1155 of the Civil Code on interruption of prescription.

Factual Background Under P.D. No. 451

Petitioners’ theory was that their “correct share” of the 60% tuition increment could be computed as stated in Annexes C and D of the union’s position paper. The record showed that, on October 22, 1979, twenty-five (25) complainants dropped out of the case, alleging lack of interest. Subsequently, on January 25, 1980, the MLQU Teachers and Allied Workers Union (NATAW), among others, intervened to join cause with the remaining complainants. The labor dispute thus proceeded with the remaining faculty members represented by the union and with the intervenor union aligning its interest with the claim for differential pay.

Regional Director’s Decision and Partial Dismissal on Prescription

On June 15, 1983, Director Pucan of the DOLE National Capital Region issued an order upholding the complainants’ substantive entitlement to salary differentials, but limited recovery by reason of prescription. He determined that claims accruing before April 24, 1976, and those of the intervenors accruing before January 25, 1977, were barred because they had accrued more than three (3) years before the filing of their complaints. Accordingly, he ordered the University to pay unprescribed differentials: P1.65 per lecture hour from April 24, 1976 to the end of school year 1975-1976 and from 1977-1978 for the individual complainants; and P1.65 per lecture hour from January 25, 1977 to the end of school year 1977-1978 for the intervenors belonging to NATAW. He dismissed the case as moot for the twenty-five (25) individual complainants who had moved to dismiss after dropping out.

Petitioners received the order on June 22, 1983 and filed a motion for reconsideration on July 25, 1983. The Deputy Minister later treated this filing as an appeal.

Deputy Minister’s First Dismissal of Appeal as Late, and Later Reinstatement

On December 12, 1984, Deputy Minister of Labor Leogardo dismissed the appeal for being filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period under Article 223 of the Labor Code. He declared the June 15, 1983 order final and unappealable. Petitioners then sought reconsideration of this ruling (their request being associated with Annex H).

However, on December 6, 1985, Deputy Minister Leogardo reversed himself by “somersaulting” the earlier stance. He reinstated the appeal and increased the amount of differentials awarded, ordering payment in the manner reflected in the decision: for the individual complainants, specified aggregate amounts described as salary differential per hour for periods beginning April 25, 1976 up to the end of school year 1975-1976 and 1976-1977, and for 1977-1978 and thereafter; for the intervenors, analogous aggregate amounts for periods beginning January 26, 1977 up to May 1977 and for 1977-1978 and thereafter, with an additional directive to adjust the salary rates based on the increased differentials.

Both the University and the complainants filed motions for reconsideration.

Undersecretary Dela Serna’s Annulment of the 1985 Order

In an Order dated November 18, 1987 (Annex K), Undersecretary Dela Serna annulled Deputy Minister Leogardo’s December 6, 1985 order. The Undersecretary held that the complainants’ motion for reconsideration of Director Pucan’s June 15, 1983 order had been filed out of time. As a result, the June 15, 1983 order had become final, and Deputy Minister Leogardo should not have entertained the complainants’ motion for reconsideration of his own earlier ruling and should not have modified the award through the reinstated appeal.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the Undersecretary denied the motion on February 17, 1988 (Annex M) for lack of merit.

Petitioners’ Grounds in the Certiorari Proceedings

In the petition for certiorari, petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of Undersecretary Dela Serna in four principal respects: first, in declaring the appeal from Director Pucan’s June 15, 1983 order out of time; second, in annulling Deputy Minister Leogardo’s December 6, 1985 order that increased pay differentials; third, in holding that claims for pay differentials for school year 1974-1975 and up to April 23, 1976 had prescribed despite petitioners’ written extrajudicial demands and acknowledgment by the University; and fourth, in excluding the twenty-five (25) faculty members who had similarly situated themselves in the case but were not included in the benefits.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Timeliness of Appeal Under Article 223

The Court rejected petitioners’ argument that their appeal was within the reglementary period. It relied on the record that petitioners received Director Pucan’s June 15, 1983 order on June 22, 1983. The Court measured compliance with the ten-day period provided by Article 223 of the Labor Code and found that the ten-day deadline expired on July 2, 1983. Petitioners’ first motion for extension was filed on July 8, 1983, which the Court characterized as filing six (6) days late. Petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed on July 25, 1983, which the Court found to be thirty-three (33) days after receipt of the Regional Director’s order.

The Court also addressed petitioners’ attempt to treat the ten-day period as consisting only of working days. It invoked its earlier rulings, including Vir-Jen Shipping & Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 115 SCRA 347, and reiterated by RJL Martinez Fishing Corp. vs. NLRC, 127 SCRA 454, and John Clement Consultants vs. NLRC, 157 SCRA 635. The Court reiterated that the ten-day appeal period under Article 223 contemplates calendar days, not working days. Accordingly, the appeal was untimely, and Undersecretary Dela Serna’s determination on that point was sustained.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Lack of Jurisdiction to Entertain a Late Appeal

On the second ground, the Court held that Undersecretary Dela Serna did not commit error in annulling Deputy Minister Leogardo’s December 6, 1985 order. The Court reasoned that once petitioners’ motion for partial reconsideration of the Regional Director’s June 15, 1983 order was filed late, the June 15, 1983 order became final and unappealable. The consequence of finality was decisive for jurisdiction: Deputy Minister Leogardo had no jurisdiction to entertain the late appeal. Because the authority to modify the Regional Director’s disposition depended on the existence of a timely review process, the Undersecretary’s conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking supported the annulment.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Prescription of Money Claims Under the Labor Code

The Court likewise rejected petitioners’ third ground on prescription. It treated petitioners’ incremental salary differential claims arising from employer-employee relations as labor money claims governed by the prescriptive period applicable under Article 292 (now Art. 291) of the Labor Code. It cited the Court’s earlier holding in Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Ople, G.R. No. 58870, April 15, 1988, which stated that the three-year period to file actions involving money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships applies equally to claims involving incremental proceeds from tuition fees under P.D. 451.

Petitioners argued that their prescription period was interrupted by a written extrajudicial demand and the University’s acknowledgment of the obligation. The Court recognized Article 1155 of the Civil Code as the legal source for interruption of prescription by filing before the court, written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. Still, the Court found that the relevant written demand and the president’s reply were both written on November 4, 1974 (as reflected in the record through Annex A and Annex A-1). It held that after those communications, the three-year prescriptive period resumed running and expired on November 4, 1977. It further ruled that the later complaint petitioners wrote to President Marcos on August 8, 1977 did not interrupt prescription because, under Article 1155, the claim must be filed “before the court,” or addressed to the debtor, the University. Therefore, to recover salary differentials for school years 1974-75 and 1975-76, petitioners should have filed their claims on or before November 4, 1977.

Since petitioners filed their complaint on April 24, 1979, the Court held that the claims for the earlier periods had already prescribed. It also rejected petitioners’ attempt to invoke the ten-year prescriptive period in Article 1144 of the Civil Code, explaining that the Civil Code limitation is a law of gener

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