Title
Manotok vs. National Housing Authority
Case
G.R. No. L-55166
Decision Date
May 21, 1987
Supreme Court invalidated Presidential Decrees 1669 and 1670, ruling them unconstitutional for violating due process, just compensation, and equal protection in expropriating Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-55166)

Factual Background

On June 11, 1977 the President issued Letter of Instruction No. 555 instituting a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program and LOI No. 557 adopting slum improvement as national housing policy. Pursuant thereto, the Governor of Metro Manila issued Executive Order No. 6-77 on July 21, 1977 adopting a Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program and listing the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area as priority sites. A fire on March 18, 1978 devastated almost the entire Tambunting Estate. The President then designated the National Housing Authority (NHA) to negotiate acquisition of the Tambunting Estate, but negotiations failed. On December 22, 1978 the President issued Proclamation No. 1810 including sites identified for the ZIP, among them Tambunting and Sunog-Apog. On January 28, 1980 the President issued P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 declaring respectively the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area expropriated and designating the NHA as administrator with authority to take immediate possession, control, disposition, and demolition power, and to implement development plans.

Provisions of the Decrees

P.D. No. 1669 declared the Tambunting Estate expropriated, designated the NHA administrator, and provided in Section 6 that just compensation would be pegged at the market value determined by the City Assessor pursuant to P.D. No. 76, as amended by P.D. No. 1533, and that the assessor should consider existing conditions such as lack of improvements and squatting, which should depress expropriation cost; Section 6 further fixed a maximum aggregate compensation of SEVENTEEN MILLION PESOS (P17,000,000) payable in five equal annual installments.
P.D. No. 1670 declared the Estero de Sunog-Apog property expropriated, made the same NHA designations, instructed the City Assessor to consider similar existing conditions and pegged a maximum aggregate compensation of EIGHT MILLION PESOS (P8,000,000) payable in five equal annual installments.

Administrative Steps Taken and Owners’ Responses

On April 4, 1980 the NHA furnished certified copies of the decrees to the Register of Deeds of Manila, requesting cancellation of existing certificates of title and issuance of titles in the name of the Republic. The Register of Deeds requested owners' copies of titles to implement the request. On July 16, 1980 the NHA deposited with the Philippine National Bank two separate sums of P5,000,000, one of which included P3,400,000 representing the first annual installment for Tambunting pursuant to P.D. No. 1669, and the other included P1,600,000 representing the first annual installment for Sunog-Apog pursuant to P.D. No. 1670. The NHA informed owners they could withdraw their shares upon surrender of titles and warned it would take necessary legal steps if they failed to do so. Petitioner Elisa R. Manotok protested by letter on August 19, 1980, challenged the constitutionality of the fixed compensation amounts, and refused to surrender titles.

Trial and Intervention

Owners of the Tambunting Estate filed petitions seeking declaration of P.D. No. 1669 unconstitutional; owners of Sunog-Apog filed a similar petition against P.D. No. 1670. On September 27, 1982 lessees filed motions to intervene, alleging ownership of buildings and improvements on the expropriated lots and asserting real-party-in-interest status.

Petitioners’ Contentions

The petitioners contended, inter alia, that P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 were unconstitutional because they: (1) deprived owners of property without due process; (2) denied just compensation; (3) violated equal protection; (4) were vague, defective, and erroneous; and (5) designated properties that were not proper subjects for expropriation given their location and circumstances. They argued the decrees effected automatic expropriation without judicial or other adequate hearing, improperly vested valuation exclusively in the City Assessor, unlawfully fixed maximum compensation amounts, mislabeled occupied lots as squatter-occupied in derogation of owners’ and lessees’ rights, and foreclosed judicial review of NHA decisions.

Respondents’ Contentions

The Republic and the NHA, through the Solicitor-General, maintained that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and that when the legislature or the President properly exercises that power the questions of public use and necessity and the fixing of compensation become political determinations to which courts must defer unless clearly arbitrary. They argued that due process did not necessarily require judicial proceedings, that existing administrative appeal remedies such as appeals under P.D. No. 464 satisfied procedural safeguards, that the owners failed to declare market values in their tax statements, and that financial constraints justified payment of compensation in installments.

Issues Presented

The Court framed and examined whether P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and just compensation by: (a) effectuating immediate and automatic expropriation without notice and hearing or an appropriate proceeding under Rule 67, Rules of Court; (b) fixing a ceiling on just compensation and vesting valuation primarily in the City Assessor with prescribed factual assumptions; and (c) foreclosing judicial review and permitting administrative disposition in derogation of constitutional safeguards.

Constitutional and Doctrinal Principles Applied

The Court reiterated that eminent domain is inherent in the State but is limited by constitutional mandates: the taking must be for public use, just compensation must be paid, and due process must be observed. The Court cited precedents including Republic v. Juan, De Knecht v. Bautista, and United States authorities such as Dohany v. Rogers for the proposition that due process requires reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present claims, although not necessarily always by judicial proceeding. The Court emphasized that the necessity for the taking must be genuine and of a public character and that where a taking is challenged on due process grounds courts must inquire into the procedures used. The Court further invoked prior Philippine decisions governing valuation and timing for measuring just compensation, including J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, and National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, to underscore that just compensation must approximate market value at the time of taking and that valuations fixed administratively by assessors cannot foreclose owners from proving a higher value in an appropriate proceeding.

Court’s Analysis of Procedural Defects

The Court found the decrees constitutionally deficient because they effected an "automatic" taking upon promulgation, provided no hearing or proceeding by which owners could contest the expropriation or the amount of compensation, and required no deposit before taking. The decrees expressly insulated NHA decisions from judicial review, permitting only an appeal to the Office of the President, which the Court held was an impermissible restriction on judicial prerogative to adjudicate alleged violations of due process and equal protection. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that appeals under P.D. No. 464 substitute for expropriation proceedings under Rule 67, finding such administrative remedies inadequate to address the propriety of expropriation and the manner of payment of just compensation.

Court’s Analysis of Valuation and Just Compensation

The Court held that the decrees’ method of fixing just compensation was unconstitutional. Sections 6 of the decrees vested the City Assessor with exclusive authority to determine market value and instructed the assessor to assume conditions such as lack of improvements and squatting that would depress value. The Court ruled that such prescriptive administrative valuation deprives owners of the opportunity to prove a higher market value, and that assessments in tax documents cannot substitute for a judicial determination made after examination by expert commissioners and full opportunity to be heard. The Court reiterated that market value must be measured as of the time of the taking and that the government’s attempt to fix a 1978 cut-off year and cap compensation at amounts close to 1978 assessed values unlawfully limited owners’ rights because the taking actually occurred in 1980 with promulgation of the decrees. The Court invoked Garcia v. Court of Appeals to emphasize that all capabilities and uses of the property must be considered in valuation, not merely the condition asserted in the decree.

Court’s Assessment of Necessity, Public Use, and Particularized Selection

The Court scrutinized the decrees’ whereases and attendant findings and concluded there was no adequate showing why these particular properties were singled out for direct expropriation by presidential decree. The Court observed that, unlike legislative expropriations which are subject to public debate and record, the decrees offered no factual basis for the selection and thus exposed owners to arbitrary executive action. The Court also noted specific factual features that undermined the decrees’ premises: portions of Tambunting comprised valuable commercial frontage and buildings leased to businesses of substantial value; the Sunog-Apog area in evidence showed subdivision development, improvements, and municipal services inconsistent with the characterization of the area as

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