G.R. No. L-62100 - Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-62100)

Key Dates

February 4, 1980: Immigration Commissioner issued memorandum asking not to clear petitioner for departure at SEC request.
March 1, 1982: Petitioner filed motions in trial courts for permission to leave the country.
March 9 and March 26, 1982: Trial court orders denying petitioner’s motion to leave.
May 27, 1982: Immigration Commissioner denied petitioner’s request to withdraw the memorandum.
October 5, 1982: Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s certiorari/mandamus petition.
April 14, 1983: Supreme Court gave due course to petition for review on certiorari.
August 15, 1984: Petitioner filed motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.
September 20, 1984: Supreme Court en banc denied the motion for leave pendente lite.
May 30, 1986: Supreme Court rendered decision dismissing the petition for review.

Facts

Following a run on brokerages, petitioner returned from the United States and sought, with co-stockholders, the appointment of a management committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc. and Trans-Insular Management, Inc.; SEC granted a management committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc. A Torrens title accepted by Manotoc Securities was suspected to be forged; six clients filed separate criminal complaints, leading to estafa informations filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Criminal Cases Nos. 45399, 45400, and 45542–45545). Petitioner was admitted to bail in an aggregate amount of P105,000, with FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. Petitioner sought permission from trial courts to travel to the United States for business; both trial judges denied his motions. The SEC requested immigration not to clear petitioner for departure; petitioner’s administrative request to recall that memorandum was denied. Petitioner’s certiorari and mandamus petition to the Court of Appeals was dismissed. Some of the criminal cases against petitioner were later dismissed as to him, but two charges remained pending with amended allegations describing him as a controlling/majority stockholder.

Procedural History

Petitioner’s initial motions to leave the country were denied by the trial courts. He sought relief by certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. Petitioner escalated to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. While the petition was pending, petitioner moved for leave to go abroad pendente lite; the Supreme Court en banc denied the motion. The Supreme Court then resolved the case on its merits, dismissing the petition for review and imposing costs against petitioner.

Legal Issue

Whether a person facing a criminal indictment and admitted to bail has an unrestricted constitutional right to travel abroad while the criminal proceedings are pending.

Applicable Law and Authorities Relied Upon

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court (definition and object of bail).
Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution: “The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.”
Precedent: People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Court of Appeals decision in People v. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) (distinguished).
Explanatory authorities cited: 6 American Jurisprudence (Rev. Ed.) on bail/bailments regarding the nature of recognizance and the rights/duties of sureties.

Holding

The Supreme Court held that a person admitted to bail does not have an unrestricted right to travel abroad while criminal proceedings are pending. A trial court has the authority to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines; denial of petitioner’s motion for permission to leave was not an abuse of judicial discretion. The petition for review was dismissed with costs against petitioner.

Reasoning — Nature and Purpose of Bail

Bail is security required for the release of a person in custody to ensure that the accused will appear whenever required by the court. Its object is to relieve the accused from imprisonment while keeping him amenable to the court’s orders and processes. Acceptance of bail necessarily imposes conditions on the accused, including availability to the court; such conditions are valid restrictions on the accused’s liberty, including travel.

Reasoning — Transfer of Custody and Practical Jurisdictional Limits

When a recognizance or bail bond is executed, custody effectively transfers from public officers to the principal and his sureties; such custody is regarded as a continuation of imprisonment. Sureties acquire authority to keep the principal amenable, including preventing the principal from leaving the state. If a principal were permitted to depart without sufficient reason or controls, court orders and processes could become nugatory because Philippine courts have no enforceable power beyond national territory. Thus, preventing travel can be necessary to preserve the court’s jurisdiction and the effectiveness of proceedings.

Reasoning — Surety Interests and Consent

The court must respect the interests of the surety: allowing the principal to leave without the surety’s assent may increase the surety’s risk and can operate as a discharge of the surety. Judicial permission to leave that is inconsistent with the bail conditions, and made without the assent of the sureties, may impair the sureties’ remedies and is therefore inappropriate. Judge Pronove’s expressed concern that sureties might claim discharge if the accused were permitted to leave exemplifies the rationale for requiring surety consent.

Distinguishing Precedent (Shepherd) and Requirements for Granting Leave

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-62100)

Procedural Posture and Principal Question

Petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court challenging the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari and mandamus petition.
Principal legal issue: whether a person facing criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail has an unrestricted right to travel abroad.
Relief sought by petitioner in lower courts and in the Court of Appeals: annulment of trial-court orders denying permission to leave the country, annulment of a Securities and Exchange Commission communication-request, and writs commanding the Immigration Commissioner and AVSECOM to clear him for departure.
Supreme Court docketing and action: petition given due course on April 14, 1983; resolution en banc on petitioner’s subsequent motion for leave pendente lite dated September 20, 1984; final decision rendered May 30, 1986 dismissing the petition with costs against petitioner.

Factual Background — Petitioner’s Business and Activities

Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr. identified as one of two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc., and of Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.
Petitioner had transferred management of Manotoc Securities, Inc. to professional managers and held no officer position therein; he acted as president of Trans-Insular Management, Inc.
During a run on brokerages triggered by another broker’s flight, petitioner returned from the United States and, with co-stockholders, filed petitions with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking appointment of management committees for both Manotoc Securities, Inc. and Trans-Insular Management, Inc.
SEC Case No. 001826 (In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners) was granted; a management committee was organized and appointed.

SEC Communication and Immigration Memorandum

While SEC Case No. 001826 was pending, the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration (Edmundo M. Reyes) not to clear petitioner for departure.
Commissioner Reyes issued a memorandum on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division indicating petitioner should not be cleared for departure.

Criminal Complaints, Indictments, and Bail

A Torrens title submitted to Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be fake; six clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and Raul Leveriza, Jr., alleging estafa.
Investigating fiscal filed corresponding criminal charges before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal: Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 (raffled to Judge Camilon), and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545 (raffled to Judge Pronove).
Petitioner was admitted to bail in the aggregate amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as surety.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court was cited defining bail as the security required and given for release of a person in custody to ensure appearance as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Motions for Permission to Leave the Country in the Trial Courts

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed in each trial court a "motion for permission to leave the country" stating his desire to go to the United States "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." [1]
The prosecution opposed the motion in each court; after hearings both trial judges denied petitioner’s motions.
Judge Camilon’s March 9, 1982 order:
- Quoted petitioner’s ground: his trip is "x x x relative to his business transactions and opportunities."
- Court’s rationale: "The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip."
- Disposition: "permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated." [2]
Judge Pronove’s March 26, 1982 order:
- Noted prosecution’s contention that surety companies could claim non-liability if the court permitted the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction and the accused failed to return.
- Disposition: "WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED." [3]

Petitioner’s Communications with Immigration and SEC

Petitioner wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting recall/withdrawal of the February 4, 1980 memorandum; request denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner also challenged the SEC communication requesting non-clearance before the Immigration Commissioner.

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus Before the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking annulment of trial courts’ orders (March 9 and 26, 1982) and the SEC communication-request denying leave to travel; he also sought writs directing Immigration Commissioner and AVSECOM to clear him.
On October 5, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. [5]
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review to the Supreme Court after the appellate decision.

Motion for Leave to Go Abroad Pendente Lite to the Supreme Court

While the petition for review was pending before the Supreme Court, petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.
Grounds stated: petitioner’s presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. was needed "in connection with the obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." [8]
Petitioner attached an August 9, 1984 letter from Marsden W. Miller, chief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., requesting petitioner’s presence to "meet the people and companies who wou