G.R. No. L-22761 - Malig vs. Bush

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-22761)

Factual Background

The plaintiffs alleged that they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, born of the common-law relationship of John T. Bush with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941. They asserted that, at the time of conception, John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez were not under any disability to marry each other; that the plaintiffs lived with their alleged father during his lifetime; and that he treated them as acknowledged natural children. They further claimed that at his death John T. Bush left real and personal properties.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate through falsity: the defendant allegedly falsely represented herself as the legal wife of the deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the CFI of Manila. They also averred that the defendant submitted for approval a project of partition purporting to show that the deceased left a will bequeathing the estate to three persons, namely Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush, and Anna Berger. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant knew of their status as acknowledged natural children yet proceeded to deprive them of participation in the estate. They claimed discovery of the alleged fraud and misrepresentation occurred only in July 1962.

The Complaint’s Reliefs and the Defendant’s Response

On these allegations, the plaintiffs prayed that the partition project be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting and another project of partition adjudicating the plaintiffs’ legal participation in the estate; and that, if the defendant had disposed of the estate or portions of it, she be ordered to pay the plaintiffs the market value thereof. The complaint also sought payment for the value of fruits received, damages, and attorney’s fees.

The defendant moved to dismiss on multiple grounds: lack of cause of action, res judicata, and statute of limitations. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the defendant filed a reply. On January 10, 1963, the lower court denied the motion, stating that the grounds relied upon were “not indubitable.”

Early Proceedings and the Second Motion to Dismiss

After the denial, the defendant filed an answer denying the material averments of the complaint and invoking laches, res judicata, and statute of limitations as affirmative defenses. The case was then set for hearing. On the scheduled date, however, the hearing was postponed due to the defendant’s manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss.

When filed, the second motion challenged the court’s jurisdiction, contending that the action sought to annul a project of partition already approved by the probate court and that, therefore, only the probate court could take cognizance, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

Dismissal of the Complaint on a Different Ground

On October 31, 1963, the lower court granted the second motion and dismissed the complaint. It did not base the dismissal on the “jurisdiction” ground raised in the second motion. Instead, the court dismissed the case because, in its view, the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied, prompting the present appeal.

The Procedural Issue on Appeal

The plaintiffs raised a procedural question: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss? The decision emphasized that the first motion to dismiss had already been denied because the invoked grounds were not indubitable. The second motion, in contrast, did not reiterate those previously raised grounds and raised only the issue of jurisdiction.

The Court held that when the lower court dismissed on a ground other than the one pleaded in the motion, it effectively acted motu proprio. The Court also noted that the lower court did not state why prescription was applicable, nor why it reversed its earlier position that the matter was not indubitable on the grounds then presented. The plaintiffs also were not afforded a chance to argue the point.

Ruling Citing Rules on Dismissal by Motion

The Court relied on Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos et al., 88 Phil. 94, which held that Rule 8, Section 1 enumerates the grounds for dismissal by motion and requires that dismissal be pursued through the required motion. The Court further cited the principle that Rule 30 (as discussed in Manila Herald) limits court-initiated dismissals to specific circumstances, such as the plaintiff’s failure to appear at trial, failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, or failure to comply with the Rules or court orders. Since none of those situations were shown, the Court concluded that the lower court lacked authority to dismiss on an unpleaded ground after receiving the motion and deciding upon a basis not raised in it.

Applying that doctrine, the Court held that although a motion to dismiss had been filed, the lower court’s dismissal rested on a ground not alleged in the motion. It therefore set aside the challenged orders. The Court added that even if the lower court were to reconsider the issue of prescription anew, prescription still did not appear to be indubitable on the face of the complaint.

Prescription Was Not Indubitable on the Pleadings

The defendant invoked Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides that an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, with exceptions that the Court treated as not obtaining in the case. The Court held, however, that the provision was not indubidably applicable because the plaintiffs did not seek acknowledgment as the cause of action. The plaintiffs instead alleged that they were already “acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line” of John T. Bush. The truth of that allegation would necessarily require evidence at trial. For that reason, the Court refused to treat prescription as an indisputable bar at the dismissal stage.

The Court also addressed the defendant’s reliance on the second motion’s “jurisdiction” theory under Rule 75, Section 1 (formerly Rule 73, Section 1). The Court observed that the rule fixes jurisdiction for the probate settlement of a decedent’s estate “so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-22761)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The plaintiffs-appellants Rose Bush Malig and Joe, Thomas, and John all surnamed Bush, represented by their attorney-in-fact Rose Bush Malig, appealed from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 51639.
The defendant-appellee is Maria Santos Bush, who opposed the plaintiffs’ complaint and moved to dismiss at two stages.
The first order dismissed the complaint after resolving a jurisdictional challenge raised in a second motion to dismiss.
The second order denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.
The plaintiffs’ appeal raised a procedural question: whether the trial court could dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss.

Key Factual Allegations

The plaintiffs alleged that they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush.
The plaintiffs asserted that they were born of the common-law relationship of their father John T. Bush with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August 1941.
The plaintiffs alleged that, during the conception of the plaintiffs, John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez suffered no disability to marry each other.
The plaintiffs stated that they lived with their alleged father during his lifetime and were treated by him as his acknowledged natural children.
The plaintiffs alleged that at the time of John T. Bush’s death, he left real and personal properties.
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant falsely alleged she was the legal wife of the deceased and thereby secured her appointment as administratrix of the estate in Testate Proceedings No. 29932.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant submitted a project of partition for approval, purporting that the deceased left a will bequeathing the estate to Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush, and Anna Berger.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant knew of the plaintiffs’ status as acknowledged natural children.
The plaintiffs asserted that they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation only in July 1962.
The plaintiffs prayed for annulment of the project of partition, for a complete inventory and accounting and another project of partition adjudicating their participation, and, in the event of disposal, payment of the market value and payment of fruits, damages, and attorney’s fees.

Motions and Trial Court Actions

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata, and statute of limitations.
The plaintiffs opposed the first motion to dismiss, and the defendant filed a reply.
On January 10, 1963, the trial court denied the first motion, reasoning that the grounds were not indubitable.
After issues were joined, the trial court set the case for hearing, but the hearing was postponed at the defendant’s manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss.
The defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction and citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court as the basis for exclusive cognizance by the court where the probate settlement was handled.
On October 31, 1963, the trial court dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations, not on the jurisdiction ground invoked by the defendant’s second motion.
The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied the motion, prompting the appeal.

Procedural Issue Raised

The plaintiffs argued that the trial court could not dismiss the action on a ground different from the