Title
Malaba vs. Gaw Ching
Case
G.R. No. 74938-39
Decision Date
Jan 17, 1990
Lessee Gaw Ching challenged property sale and demolition; SC upheld sale validity, ruled demolition lawful, denied damages due to lack of legal standing and notice.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 74938-39)

Background and Factual Findings

Gaw Ching leased a building and lot at 697-699 Asuncion Street, Binondo, Manila from the lessor and later from Malabanan after the original lessor’s death. The lease was month-to-month and without a fixed written duration. Malabanan sought to sell the property to Gaw Ching in 1980 at a price of P5,000.00 per square meter, a price Gaw Ching considered prohibitive and refused. Malabanan then purportedly sold the property to Senolos in August 1979, a fact that Gaw Ching denied receiving official notice of until November 1980. Despite multiple offers to purchase, Gaw Ching did not consummate a sale with Malabanan. Later, the building was condemned by the City Engineer due to its condition, demolition orders were issued and executed, during which Gaw Ching's belongings were allegedly damaged. Gaw Ching contested the demolition, claiming lack of proper notice and damages resulting from its execution.

Trial Court’s Decision

The RTC upheld the validity of the contract of sale between Malabanan and Senolos and ruled that there was no violation of the lessee’s right of preemption under P.D. No. 1517, Proclamation No. 1893, or LOI No. 935. The trial court found that Gaw Ching had ample opportunity to exercise any right of first refusal but failed to act affirmatively. It further held the demolition order was valid and lawful under the exercise of police power following proper procedures. Claims for damages by Gaw Ching were largely dismissed due to lack of evidence and his failure to safeguard his belongings.

Intermediate Appellate Court’s Reversal

The IAC reversed the RTC by a 3-2 vote, annulling the contract between Malabanan and Senolos on grounds of fraud, deceit, and bad faith. It found the sale to Senolos was null and void because the sale price offered to Gaw Ching was inflated after the purported earlier sale to Senolos at a lower price. The appellate court held that Gaw Ching, as a long-time tenant, had a preemptive right to purchase the property and that the demolition of the building was unwarranted, contravened civil and procedural laws, and caused damages. Consequently, it awarded Gaw Ching moral, exemplary, and actual damages totaling P350,000, plus attorney’s fees of P20,000, holding petitioners jointly liable.

Legal Principles Regarding Third-Party Actions to Annul Contracts

The Supreme Court reiterated settled legal doctrines that generally, only parties to a contract or those with direct legal interest may seek annulment of that contract (Civil Code, Articles 1311 and 1397). Strangers to a contract lack capacity to impugn its validity. An exception may exist if a non-party shows direct prejudice caused by the contract, but such nullification must be strictly necessary to protect the non-party’s lawful rights.

Application of Legal Principles to Gaw Ching’s Case

Gaw Ching, as a lessee and not a party to the contract of sale between Malabanan and Senolos, was considered a stranger to that contract. The Court emphasized that:

  • The property was outside declared Urban Land Reform Zones where P.D. No. 1517's preemptive rights apply.
  • Even if it were inside such a zone, the preemptive right under P.D. No. 1517 exists only when the lessee has established a home on the land and resided there continuously for at least ten years—a criterion not met here.
  • No contractual stipulation granted Gaw Ching any preemptive or preferential right.
  • Malabanan made valid offers to sell to Gaw Ching, who declined them; hence, there was no prejudice or fraud in the subsequent sale to Senolos.
  • A lessee cannot challenge the title of his lessor; the lease automatically lapsed after issuance and execution of the demolition order, which terminated the tenancy.

On the Demolition and Alleged Damages

The Supreme Court found that:

  • The demolition order issued by the proper authorities, specifically the City Engineer and approved by the Mayor, was valid and a lawful exercise of police power to abate a nuisance under applicable laws (Civil Code Articles 436 and 482; P.D. 1096).
  • Only the owner of the building was entitled to appeal the demolition order to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways; Gaw Ching, as lessee, had no such right and did not formally appeal.
  • A letter from MPWH to hold demolition in abeyance was issued during the final stages of demolition and

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur is a legal research platform serving the Philippines with case digests and jurisprudence resources. AI digests are study aids only—use responsibly.