Title
Madrid vs. Spouses Mapoy
Case
G.R. No. 150887
Decision Date
Aug 14, 2009
Registered owners prevail in possession dispute; petitioners' oral claims of ownership and reliance on PD 1517 rejected due to lack of evidence and tolerated occupancy.
registered owners
possession
parcels of land

Case Summary (G.R. No. 150887)

Factual Background

The respondents were the registered owners of two parcels—Lot Nos. 79 and 80 of Block No. 27—with a combined area of 270 square meters, located at No. 1400 Craig Street corner Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila. On April 4, 1988, the respondents sought to recover possession through accion publiciana filed with the RTC of Manila against Gregorio Miranda and his family and two other unnamed defendants. After pre-trial, the unnamed defendants were identified as petitioners Madrid and Bernardo, who were thereafter served with summons and became the defendants in the case. The Mirandas did not remain active in the appellate proceedings; they were no longer parties in the Supreme Court stage and had not appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals.

The respondents alleged that they acquired the properties from the spouses Procopio and Encarnacion Castelo through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1978. They maintained that they merely tolerated petitioners’ continued occupancy until their possession allegedly became illegal upon their demands to vacate. They claimed continuing withholding of possession caused them damage.

Petitioners countered by asserting ownership based on alleged oral transactions involving the original owner, Vivencio Antonio, and his supposed transferee and predecessor-in-interest, Gregorio Miranda. They claimed that Miranda was Antonio’s carpenter as early as 1948 and that Antonio gave the properties to Miranda in 1972 as consideration for more than twenty (20) years of loyal service. Petitioner Bernardo claimed a separate oral grant: he alleged that he became Miranda’s ward in 1965 when he was ten years old and helped develop, fix, and guard the properties; he asserted that Antonio promised him the bodega as gratitude. Petitioner Madrid claimed that he started occupying a portion of the properties in 1974, later constructed a house there in 1989 with permission of Bernardo, and relied on the length of their occupancy.

Petitioners further invoked Section 6 of PD 1517, asserting that their ten-year or more continuous residence and the alleged construction of their homes on the lands entitled them to protection against dispossession and to a right of first refusal to purchase, at reasonable prices and within a reasonable time.

RTC Proceedings and Ruling

The case proceeded before the RTC-Manila, Branch 3. On July 21, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights to vacate the premises evidenced by TCT Nos. 130064 and 130065, and to restore possession to the respondents. The RTC also ordered petitioners to pay P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 as reasonable rental commencing from the filing of the complaint until they vacated.

In resolving the dispute, the RTC upheld the respondents’ right to possession as registered owners. It rejected petitioners’ attempt to establish ownership through an alleged oral sale, citing the absence of a public instrument or at least a note or memorandum supporting their claims. The RTC also rejected petitioners’ reliance on PD 1517, reasoning that the decree protects legitimate tenants who have legally occupied the land by contract and built their homes on the land, whereas petitioners were characterized as mere squatters.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

Petitioners appealed under Rule 41 to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeals decision dated July 16, 2001 affirmed the RTC decision and treated the dismissal as consequential to the RTC’s disposition of the case.

The CA held that the TCTs in the respondents’ names constituted evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title. It found that petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof of ownership. It also rejected petitioners’ reliance on their alleged continuous occupation in the concept of owner. The CA concluded that Bernardo’s possession as an owner began only in 1975 under the alleged gift or grant from Antonio to Bernardo, while Madrid could not have been in the concept of an owner because he supposedly recognized Miranda as owner and paid rents.

On the PD 1517 claim, the CA ruled that petitioners were not covered because their occupation was based on the owner’s mere tolerance, and PD 1517 did not extend to such occupants. The CA further held that the RTC did not err in applying the pre-trial order to petitioners. It reasoned that petitioners’ rights of possession derived from the principal defendants, the Mirandas, who were represented at pre-trial, and that petitioners waived any right to pre-trial by failing to move that a new pre-trial be held.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court Petition

Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, contending that the lower courts failed to consider: (1) the respondents’ supposed bad faith in acquiring title; (2) the history of occupancy—Gregorio Miranda since 1948, Bernardo since 1966, and Madrid since 1973; and (3) petitioners’ continuous residence for more than ten (10) years, allegedly entitling them to PD 1517 protections. Petitioners also argued that the indefeasibility of Torrens title should not apply because fraud attended the respondents’ acquisition of title. Finally, they insisted that the RTC should not have applied the pre-trial order to them because they were allegedly not served with summons in time and were not present during pre-trial.

The respondents countered that the issues raised by petitioners were essentially factual and had been adequately addressed and refuted by the CA.

Legal Framework: Accion Publiciana and Ownership Questions

The Supreme Court clarified that accion publiciana—also called accion plenaria de posesion—is an ordinary civil action intended to determine the better right to possess realty independently of title. It is pursued after the lapse of the period from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession, specifically after the expiration of one year. Its objective is recovery of possession, not ownership.

However, the Court recognized that when the parties raise ownership issues, courts may incidentally resolve ownership to determine the right to possess, but such adjudication remains provisional and is not a final and binding determination of ownership for purposes of a later action directly involving title.

Applying these principles, the Court observed that both parties indeed raised conflicting claims of ownership. Petitioners relied on an alleged oral sale and long occupation traced to Miranda and Antonio. Respondents relied on their TCTs as registered owners. Accordingly, the outcome depended on the weight of evidence and the legal force of the title presented.

Limitations of a Rule 45 Petition and Finality of Concurrent Findings

The Court emphasized that weighing evidence and resolving factual disputes were not appropriate for a Rule 45 petition, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts under such review. It also noted that where the CA affirmed the trial court’s findings, those findings became final and conclusive and were no longer open to review.

In this case, both the RTC and the CA had given greater weight to the respondents’ certificate of title. They also found that petitioners’ possession was merely by the respondents’ tolerance. The Court saw no reason to disturb these concurrent factual determinations.

The Court reiterated that a Torrens certificate of title serves as evidence of indefeasible title in favor of the person named therein, and the titleholder is entitled to the attributes of ownership, including possession, subject only to legal limitations. Since the respondents were undisputed holders of the certificate of title, petitioners’ oral-sale claims could not prevail.

Fraud Allegation as a Prohibited Collateral Attack

Petitioners’ argument that fraud attended the acquisition of respondents’ title was treated as a collateral attack on the Torrens title. The Court explained that registration under the Torrens system not only perfects title and renders it indefeasible after the statutory period, but also renders the title immune from collateral attack.

A collateral attack occurs when an attack on the judgment granting title is made in another action to obtain a different relief, and it is incidental to the present action. The Court contrasted this with direct attacks aimed at annulling, setting aside, or enjoining the enforcement of the title judgment, or seeking recovery if the property had been disposed of. The Court held that permitting collateral attacks through claims of fraud would undermine the integrity and guaranteed indefeasibility of Torrens titles.

Accordingly, petitioners could not invoke fraud to impugn the respondents’ title in the present accion publiciana proceeding.

PD 1517: Requirements and the “Tenant” Limitation

With respect to petitioners’ claim under PD 1517, the Court stated that protection under the decree required the claimant to be: (1) a legitimate tenant for ten (10) years or more; (2) one who built a home on the land by contract; and (3) one who resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. The Court highlighted the statutory definition of a “tenant” under Section 3(f) of PD 1517, which excluded occupants whose presence was merely tolerated without contract, those who entered by force or deceit, and those whose possession was under litigation.

The Court reasoned that petitioners whose occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance clearly fell outside PD 1517’s coverage. Since their occupation lacked the legal character of a contracted tenancy, they could not claim the decree’s rights and privileges.

Procedural Objection on Pre-Trial and Waiver

Petitioners also objected that they were not properly bound by the RTC pre-trial order because they allegedly were served with summons belatedly and were absent during pre-trial. The Court acknowledged that summons and resulting late entry would ord

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