Case Summary (G.R. No. 199283)
Respondents and their claims
Respondents (Spouses Morales) sued for judicial foreclosure, alleging they made a P500,000 loan on March 23, 1993 to Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome at 5% monthly interest, secured by a mortgage over the Bago Bantay property. When payment defaulted and partial payment only was made, respondents foreclosed and obtained judgment against the defendants.
Key Dates
Chronology of key procedural events
- March 23, 1993: Alleged loan executed.
- January 9, 2001: Complaint for judicial foreclosure filed by respondents.
- December 22, 2009: Trial court rendered judgment ordering defendants to pay P500,000 plus 7% monthly interest and costs; property to be sold upon nonpayment.
- January 29, 2010: Petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the trial court decision.
- February 8, 2010: Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (later amended).
- May 25, 2010: Trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and request for handwriting examination.
- June 24, 2010: Petitioners received copy of the May 25, 2010 order.
- July 9, 2010: Computed last day to file notice of appeal (15 days from June 24).
- August 11, 2010: Petitioners filed a notice of appeal (deemed late by the trial court).
- September 24, 2010: Petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38).
- July 27, 2011 and November 10, 2011: Court of Appeals resolutions denying petitioners’ petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration respectively.
- June 9, 2014: Supreme Court rendered the decision at issue.
Applicable Law
Governing legal rules and jurisprudence
- 1987 Constitution: Applicable as the case decision is dated 2014.
- 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 38 (petition for relief from judgment — Section 1 and Section 3) and Rule 65 (petition for certiorari — Section 1).
- Key jurisprudence referenced: Insular Life Savings & Trust Co. v. Spouses Runes; Guevarra v. Spouses Bautista; Gesulgon v. NLRC; Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals; Turqueza v. Hernando; Torres v. China Banking Corporation; Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU; Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals; Bentulan v. Bentulan-Mercado.
Trial Court Judgment and Postjudgment Motions
Trial court decision and immediate postjudgment actions
The trial court rendered judgment on December 22, 2009, ordering payment of the loan with interest and costs and authorizing foreclosure sale upon nonpayment. Petitioners’ counsel received the decision on January 29, 2010. Petitioners timely filed a motion for reconsideration and an amended motion, as well as a request for a handwriting expert examination; the trial court characterized the motions as pro forma (administratively insufficient because they failed to identify specific findings or conclusions challenged) and denied the motions and the handwriting-examination request on May 25, 2010.
Computation of Finality and Timeliness
Finality of judgment and applicable filing periods under Rule 38
The Supreme Court clarified the distinct and jurisdictional dual time periods under Section 3, Rule 38: (a) a 60-day period counted from the time petitioner learns of the judgment, order or proceeding sought to be set aside; and (b) a six-month period counted from entry of judgment or final order. The Court reiterated that both periods are jurisdictional, inextendible and must be strictly observed because relief from final judgments is an equitable exception to the rule of finality. In this case, notice to counsel on January 29, 2010 started the 15-day appeal period (rendering the decision final on February 13, 2010) and the six-month window for filing a petition for relief expired on August 12, 2010. Petitioners filed their petition for relief on September 24, 2010 — beyond the six-month period — rendering it untimely and subject to outright dismissal.
Adequacy of Motion for Reconsideration and Tolling Effect
Pro forma motions do not toll appeal periods
The Court held that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro forma because they failed to specify findings or conclusions in the decision that were unsupported by evidence or contrary to law. Under Rule 37, Section 2, and related jurisprudence, such perfunctory motions do not toll the 15-day period to appeal. Consequently, the trial court correctly treated the notice of appeal filed on August 11, 2010 as late.
Standard for Excusable Negligence
Legal standard for excusable negligence under Rule 38
Relief from judgment on the ground of excusable negligence requires proof that the negligence was so gross that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it. The doctrine seeks to prevent reviving an appellate right lost through inexcusable negligence. A petition grounded on counsel’s negligence must therefore demonstrate that the omission could not have been prevented with ordinary care.
Application to Counsel’s Age Argument
Rejection of counsel’s age as excusable negligence
Petitioners argued that their counsel’s failure to file a timely appeal was excusable due to counsel’s advanced age (80 years). The Court rejected this contention as an unfounded stereotype and prejudicial slur against senior citizens. The Court found no evidence that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have prevented the alleged lapse; petitioners thus remained bound by their counsel’s negligence and did not meet the high threshold for excusable negligence required for equitable relief.
Availability of Certiorari and Requirement to Exhaust Ordinary Remedies
Rule 65 and the necessity of a motion for reconsideration before certiorari
The Court affirmed that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioners had an available remedy — a motion for reconsideration of the trial court order denying the petition for relief from judgment — and that petitioners’ failure to file such a motion deprived the CA petition of viability. The Supreme Court emphasized that a motion for reconsideration affords the court that rendered the order the opportunity to correct errors, and is therefore ordinarily required before seeking extraordinary relief by certiorari.
Factual Nature of the Issues Raised
Questions presented were primarily factual, not purely legal
Petitioners contended they were not obliged to file a motion for reconsid
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 199283)
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
- Petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals resolutions dated July 27, 2011 and November 10, 2011 in CA‑G.R. SP No. 120251.
- Petitioners (Juliet Vitug Madarang; Romeo Bartolome, represented by attorneys-in-fact Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome) sought review of the Court of Appeals' denial of their petition for certiorari which had challenged the trial court's denial of their petition for relief from judgment and the trial court's denial of due course to their late notice of appeal.
- Relief originally sought below included setting aside the trial court's foreclosure/judgment against the Bago Bantay property.
Case Caption, Citation and Decision Date
- Reported as 735 Phil. 632, Third Division, G.R. No. 199283.
- Decision rendered June 9, 2014; original decision received by the Office on July 14, 2014 (Notice of Judgment).
- Opinion authored by Justice Leonen; Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr., and Mendoza, JJ., concurred.
Core Holdings
- The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
- The Court of Appeals' resolutions dated July 27, 2011 and November 10, 2011 in CA‑G.R. SP No. 120251 are AFFIRMED.
- A petition for relief from judgment is an extraordinary equitable remedy subject to strict, jurisdictional, double time limits under Rule 38, Section 3 (60 days from knowledge; not more than six months from entry).
- Failure to comply with those reglementary periods mandates dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment.
- The claim that counsel’s failure to timely appeal was excusable negligence because counsel was eighty (80) years old is inadequate and impermissibly stereotypes senior citizens; petitioners failed to prove excusable negligence.
- Notice of judgment to counsel of record is notice to the client; petitioners are bound by counsel’s receipt of the decision.
- The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari for failure to first file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment because a motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy contemplated by Rule 65, Section 1.
Factual Background — Origin of the Dispute
- On March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome allegedly borrowed P500,000.00 from Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales and agreed to pay within two months with 5% per month interest.
- To secure the loan, the Spouses Bartolome allegedly mortgaged a house and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, to the Spouses Morales.
- The loan period lapsed without full repayment; after demand, only partial payment was made.
- The Spouses Bartolome died; Spouses Morales filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property on January 9, 2001, naming as defendants Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, and Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome.
- Allegations included that Madarang represented herself as "Lita Bartolome" and induced the loan; Romeo and Rodolfo were sued as legitimate heirs; Ruby Anne as Rodolfo’s wife.
- Defendants challenged the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage, specifically the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures, and argued the complaint was barred by prior dismissal in another branch of the RTC for failure to comply with an order.
Trial Court Disposition and Orders
- Trial court decision dated December 22, 2009 (penned by Presiding Judge Edgar Dalmacio Santos) ordered defendants to pay P500,000.00 plus 7% interest per month and costs within 90 days but not more than 120 days from entry of judgment; failure to pay would lead to public auction sale of the Bago Bantay property.
- Defendants received a copy of that decision on January 29, 2010.
- Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on February 8, 2010, later amended, and requested a Philippine National Police handwriting expert to examine the alleged signatures.
- The trial court found the motion for reconsideration and its amendment pro forma for failure to specify findings or conclusions not supported by evidence or contrary to law; it ruled the claimed reasons for the handwriting examination were not well taken.
- Trial court order dated May 25, 2010 denied the motion for reconsideration, its amendment, and the handwriting expert request. Defendants received that order on June 24, 2010.
- On August 11, 2010 defendants filed a notice of appeal; trial court, in its August 13, 2010 order, denied due course for being filed out of time because counsel had received the May 25, 2010 order on June 24, 2010 and the 15‑day appeal period lapsed on July 9, 2010.
Subsequent Motions, Petitions and Dates
- Petition for relief from judgment filed September 24, 2010, blaming counsel’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal and alleging excusable negligence due to counsel Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon be