Case Summary (G.R. No. 207711)
Procedural and Factual Background
Petitioner was appointed regular administrator of the decedent’s estate on March 20, 1996. After nearly 24 months, petitioner had neither filed the statutorily required inventory of estate assets and liabilities nor paid estate taxes. On March 10, 1998, private respondent filed an urgent motion to remove petitioner for these failures. Petitioner filed opposition on March 30, 1998 but failed to appear at scheduled hearings despite proper notice. The RTC issued an order on July 15, 1998 relieving petitioner as administrator and directing issuance of letters of administration to private respondent upon filing a P20,000 bond. The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on August 28, 1998; petitioner received that order on September 7, 1998 and filed a notice of appeal on September 29, 1998. Meanwhile, the RTC had issued letters of administration in favor of private respondent on September 24, 1998. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction/restraining order in the Court of Appeals on October 8, 1998 (amended October 12, 1998). The Court of Appeals denied a temporary restraining order on November 26, 1998, and on April 14, 2000 dismissed the petition, affirming the RTC’s orders; reconsideration was denied July 26, 2000. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari.
Primary legal issues presented
Primary Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the RTC properly ordered immediate issuance of letters of administration to private respondent despite the pendency of an appeal by petitioner.
- Whether the issuance of letters of administration on September 24, 1998 was premature and therefore indicative of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC.
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the presumption of regularity to the issuance of letters of administration and in adjudicating issues petitioner contended were not properly raised in the certiorari petition.
Standard of review and relevant legal principles
Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Principles
- Discretionary execution: Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court permits a trial court, or an appellate court after the trial court loses jurisdiction, to order execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal upon a showing of good reasons stated in a special order after due hearing. This discretionary execution mechanism allows practical measures to prevent prejudice or administrative paralysis when circumstances justify immediate execution.
- Precedent permitting immediate assumption: De Borja v. Tan recognizes that a trial court does not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering an appointee to immediately assume the office of administrator pending appeal when sufficient reasons exist to warrant execution pending appeal.
- Scope of certiorari under Rule 45 vs certiorari as an original remedy under Rule 65: In appeals by certiorari under Rule 45, the proper grounds are limited to questions of law. Allegations of grave abuse of discretion, lack or excess of jurisdiction — the province of original certiorari under Rule 65 — are not ordinarily cognizable in a Rule 45 petition. This distinction is reinforced by Reas v. Bonife and Fajardo v. Bautista, which emphasize that certiorari (Rule 45) as a mode of appeal differs from certiorari as an original action (Rule 65), and that remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive.
Court’s analysis on discretionary execution and removal
Court’s Analysis on Discretionary Execution and Removal
The courts below found adequate justification for discretionary execution. The RTC concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the estate would be left without an administrator and that settlement of the estate had been unduly delayed due to petitioner’s inaction (failure to render an accounting, failure to pay estate taxes, and failure to appear at hearings). Given the statutory duty of trial courts to expedite settlement of estates and the express authorization under Rule 39 to order execution pending appeal when good reasons exist, the trial court’s order allowing immediate issuance of letters of administration was within its discretion and was not characterized as grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court concurred that these factual circumstances supported discretionary execution and thus found no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court’s acts nor error in the Court of Appeals’ affirmation.
On the scope of review and petitioner’s contentions
On Scope of Review and Petitioner’s Contentions
Petitioner argued that the issuance of letters of administration was premature because his appeal had been perfected or was pending and therefore the order should not have been executed. He also contended that the Court of Appeals improperly applied the presumption of regularity and resolved issues (e.g., private respondent’s qualifications, propriety of petitioner’s discharge) not raised in the petition. The courts treated these contentions within the established procedural boundaries: where the remedy invoked is an appeal by certiorari (Rule 45), only errors of law can be raised. Allegations amounting to grave abuse of discretion are generally not proper under Rule 45 and thus receive limited consideration. The courts found that petitioner had not demon
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 207711)
Procedural Posture
- Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Arturo G. Mackay (petitioner) seeking annulment of the Court of Appeals Decision dated April 14, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49219 and its Resolution dated July 26, 2000 denying motion for reconsideration.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan City, issued by Acting Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles in Special Proceeding No. C-1814 dated July 15, 1998 and September 28, 1998.
- This petition was resolved by a Resolution authored by Justice Quisumbing; the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and resolution.
Facts of the Case
- Petitioner Arturo G. Mackay was appointed regular administrator of the intestate estate of deceased Eufrocina G. Mackay on March 20, 1996.
- Nearly twenty-four (24) months after appointment, petitioner had not submitted the required inventory of estate assets and liabilities nor paid estate taxes due.
- Private respondent Antonio G. Mackay filed an urgent motion on March 10, 1998 for the removal of petitioner as regular administrator due to the delay and noncompliance.
- Petitioner filed opposition to the motion on March 30, 1998, and the opposition was set for hearing; petitioner failed to attend scheduled hearings despite notices.
- On July 15, 1998, Judge Adoracion G. Angeles issued an Order relieving petitioner as regular administrator and appointing private respondent as substitute administrator upon filing an administrator's bond of P20,000.00.
- The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated August 28, 1998; a copy was received by petitioner on September 7, 1998.
- The trial court issued letters of administration in favor of private respondent on September 24, 1998.
- Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal on September 29, 1998.
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with the Court of Appeals on October 8, 1998, and an amended petition on October 12, 1998 (docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 49219).
Chronology of Key Events
- March 20, 1996: Petitioner appointed regular administrator of the estate of Eufrocina G. Mackay.
- March 10, 1998: Urgent motion for removal filed by private respondent.
- March 30, 1998: Petitioner filed opposition to the removal motion.
- July 15, 1998: RTC Order relieving petitioner as administrator and appointing private respondent upon bond.
- August 28, 1998: RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; copy received by petitioner September 7, 1998.
- September 24, 1998: RTC issued letters of administration in favor of private respondent.
- September 29, 1998: Petitioner filed notice of appeal and record on appeal.
- October 8, 1998: Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with Court of Appeals.
- October 12, 1998: Amended petition filed in the Court of Appeals.
- November 26, 1998: Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
- April 14, 2000: Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the RTC orders.
- July 26, 2000: Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
- September 30, 2003: Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed CA decision and resolution.
Relief Sought and Petitioner’s Claims
- Petitioner sought annulment of the Court of Appeals decision and its resolution, and sought prohibition and certiorari relief including a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin implementation of the trial court’s orders and the issuance of letters of administration to private respondent.
- Petitioner asserted that:
- The issuance of letters of administration dated September 24, 1998 to private respondent was premature.
- The Court of Appeals erred in applying a presumption of regularity in official performance despite the alleged premature issuance and violation of the reglementary period on appeals in special proceedings.
- The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in resolving issues (e.g., private respondent’s qualification and propriety of petitioner’s discharge) that petitioner contended were proper subjects of ordinary appeal and not raised in the certiorari petition.
Trial Court Orders and Actions
- July 15, 1998 Order (RTC, Branch 125):
- Relieved Arturo Mackay as regular administrator of Eufrocina Mackay’s estate.
- Ordered that upon filing of an administrator's bond in the amount of P20,000.00, letters of administration be issued to Antonio G. Mackay.
- Dispositive language quoted in source: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, Arturo Mackay is hereby relieved as a regular administrator of the estate of the deceased Eufrocina Mackay and upon the filing of an