Title
Macias vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. L-18684
Decision Date
Sep 14, 1961
Petitioners challenged Republic Act 3040, alleging unconstitutional apportionment of districts, disproportionate representation, and procedural violations. The Supreme Court ruled the law void, citing violations of proportional representation and affirming petitioners' standing.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-18684)

Factual Background

Petitioners sought injunctive relief to prevent respondents from implementing Republic Act 3040, alleging three constitutional defects: failure to furnish printed final copies of the bill to Members of the House at least three calendar days prior to its passage; enactment more than three years after the return of the last census; and apportionment of districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents denied some allegations, contended they acted under duty imposed by the statute, and asserted a presumption of constitutionality. The National Treasurer further pleaded lack of personality on the part of petitioners and relied on the enrolled-bill presumption and on the Director of Census report of November 23, 1960, as the basis for the apportionment. The Court issued an August 23, 1961 resolution finding constitutional violations and granting the injunction without bond, reserving fuller explanation for formal opinion.

Personality of the Petitioners

The Court found that petitioners had standing to sue. The petitioners were Members of the House and the provincial governor who alleged and demonstrated that their provinces suffered discriminatory apportionment under Republic Act 3040. Specific disparities alleged included Misamis Oriental with 387,839 inhabitants being given one district while Cavite with 379,902 inhabitants received two; Negros Oriental and Bulacan with 598,783 and 557,691 inhabitants respectively being allotted two districts each while Albay with 515,961 inhabitants received three. The Court relied on authority that citizens deprived of as full and effective an elective franchise as entitled under the Constitution possess sufficient interest to challenge apportionment statutes and cited decisions such as Stiglitz vs. Schardien and Jones vs. Freeman as supportive precedent, noting that Colegrove vs. Green was inconclusive on the question.

The Printed-Bill Requirement

The Constitution’s three-calendar-day printing and distribution requirement was central to petitioners’ challenge. Petitioners introduced certificates of the Secretary of the House showing that no printed copies had been furnished three days prior to the bill’s passage on May 10, 1961, and that no presidential certificate of urgency had been received. Respondents invoked the enrolled-bill presumption that legislative procedural details were conclusively complied with, and cited statutory provision Act 190, sec. 313(2), as supporting exclusion of contrary proof. The Court declined to resolve that procedural question definitively, observing that the case could be disposed on the substantial issue of proportional apportionment.

Population Census Evidence

The Court considered the Director of the Census letter of November 23, 1960, which described the population count as a “preliminary count” subject to revision yet stated that “until the final report is made, these figures should be considered as official for all purposes.” Petitioners argued the apportionment could not rest on a preliminary report; respondents relied on the report’s official language and asserted that determination of what constituted a return of an enumeration was for Congress. The Court noted authorities from other jurisdictions that, although a census report may be preliminary and subject to correction, it could be regarded as official for governmental action such as apportionment, citing cases including Cahill vs. Leopold and other state decisions.

Apportionment Discrepancies and Comparative Analysis

The Court examined the allocation produced by Republic Act 3040 and found multiple instances where the statutory distribution diverged materially from the constitutional directive of apportioning “as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants.” Among the specific discrepancies identified in the Court’s August 23 resolution were: (a) Cebu assigned seven Members while Rizal, with a larger population, received four; (b) Manila assigned four Members while Cotabato, with a larger population, received three; (c) Pangasinan received five Members although it had fewer inhabitants than Manila and Cotabato; (d) Samar with 871,857 inhabitants was allotted four Members while Davao with 903,224 received three; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 inhabitants received two Members while Albay with 515,961 received three; and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 inhabitants received one Member while Cavite with 379,904 received two. The Court further noted additional anomalies, including Mountain Province receiving three Members while Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan, each with larger populations, received two, and Sulu receiving one Member despite having more inhabitants than provinces allotted two. The Court compared these disparities to authority from other jurisdictions where similar inequalities were held to render apportionment acts unconstitutional, citing decisions such as Houghton County vs. Blacker, Giddings vs. Blacker, Barker vs. State, and Denney vs. State, and quoted the characterization of such inequalities as “arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of equality.”

Justiciability and Judicial Review

Respondents urged deference on the ground that apportionment is a political question and that Republic Act 3040 constituted an improvement over existing conditions. The Court rejected the political-question defense and affirmed the judicial po

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