Title
Macias vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. L-18684
Decision Date
Sep 14, 1961
Petitioners challenged Republic Act 3040, alleging unconstitutional apportionment of districts, disproportionate representation, and procedural violations. The Supreme Court ruled the law void, citing violations of proportional representation and affirming petitioners' standing.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-18684)

Statement of the claim and procedural posture

Petitioners sought injunctive relief to prevent respondent officials from implementing Republic Act No. 3040. They asserted the Act was unconstitutional on three grounds: (a) passage of the bill without furnishing Members printed final copies at least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) approval more than three years after the return of the last census enumeration; and (c) apportionment of districts without regard to relative provincial populations. Respondents admitted some allegations, denied others, and principally relied on presumptions of regularity and constitutionality in legislative enactment and on assertions that the Act was based on an official census report and complied with proportionality principles.

Early disposition and reservation for fuller opinion

This Court initially issued a brief resolution (announced August 23) finding Republic Act No. 3040 to violate the Constitution in several respects, enumerating concrete examples of disproportionate apportionment, declaring the law void, and granting the injunction requested by petitioners without the posting of bond. The resolution expressly reserved fuller explanation, and the present opinion provides the detailed legal reasoning supporting the earlier resolution.

Standing (personality) of petitioners

The Court found that petitioners possess requisite standing. As voters and as elected officials representing provinces alleged to have been discriminated against by the apportionment, they have a sufficient personal and public interest to challenge an apportionment law that denies them the full and effective elective franchise guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court cited authorities recognizing the right of citizens and officeholders to contest redistricting statutes that impair constitutional rights of representation.

Printed-bill, three-calendar-day requirement

The Constitution prescribes that no bill shall be passed by either House unless it has been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished Members at least three calendar days prior to passage, except where the President certifies the bill’s immediate necessity. Petitioners produced certificates by the House Secretary indicating no printed copies were distributed three days prior to passage and that no presidential certificate of urgency had been received. Respondents invoked the enrolled-bill presumption — that a duly certified copy of an enacted statute conclusively proves regularity of legislative procedure — and cited precedents and statutory provisions supporting that presumption. The Court recognized the constitutional purpose behind the printed-bill requirement (to prevent fraud, trickery, deceit, and subterfuge) and acknowledged the conflict between enforcing that requirement and the enrolled-bill presumption. However, the Court declined to resolve that question in this opinion because it found the case dispositive on the apportionment proportionality issue.

Census return and whether the enumeration’s report constituted a “return”

The Constitution requires Congress to make apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration. The Act was based on a report from the Director of the Census dated November 23, 1960, which described the figures as a preliminary count produced by hand-tally and subject to revision when mechanical processing was complete, but the report also instructed that, until final report was made, these figures should be considered official for all purposes. Petitioners argued the report was merely preliminary and therefore could not trigger the three-year apportionment period; respondents argued the report was official and sufficient. The Court observed that authorities exist supporting the view that an enumeration, though subject to revision, may nevertheless be deemed official for governmental action including apportionment. The Court did not find this issue decisively favorable to petitioners and treated the return-of-enumeration question as not controlling the disposition, since the apportionment failed the constitutionally required proportionality test.

Constitutional standard for apportionment

The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House be apportioned among the provinces "as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants." The Court stressed that equality of representation is a foundational principle of representative government and that apportionment statutes must approximate equality of representation according to population as closely as practicable.

Specific disproportions found in the apportionment

The Court identified numerous concrete instances in which Republic Act No. 3040 produced clear disproportions between representation and population. Representative examples include: (1) Cebu allotted seven members while Rizal, with a larger population, received only four; (2) Manila allotted four members while Cotabato, with a larger population, received three; (3) Pangasinan received more members despite having fewer inhabitants than Manila and Cotabato; (4) Samar (871,857) received four members, while Davao (903,224) received only three; (5) Bulacan (557,691) received two members while Albay (515,961) received three; (6) Misamis Oriental (387,839) received one member while Cavite (379,902) received two. Additional mismatches included Mountain Province receiving three

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