Title
Maceda, Jr. vs. Moreman Builders Co., Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 100239
Decision Date
Oct 28, 1991
Petitioners sought execution of a final judgment rescinding a contract and awarding damages. Trial court delayed execution by creating a committee; Supreme Court ruled this was grave abuse of discretion, mandating immediate enforcement.
grave abuse of discretion
final judgment
writ of execution

Case Summary (G.R. No. 100239)

Factual Background

Petitioners and private respondent litigated Civil Case No. 113498, which sought rescission of contract and damages with attachment and preliminary injunction. Petitioners obtained a writ of preliminary attachment, and the Sheriff levied certain properties, which were inventoried. On 28 November 1978, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The decision rescinded the building contract and awarded actual, moral, and liquidated damages totaling P445,000.00, plus P20,000.00 for an increase in construction materials and P35,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal on 7 March 1989. Private respondent’s subsequent petition for review reached this Court, where the Third Division in G.R. No. 88310 found that petitioners failed to show any reversible error in the dismissal. The Third Division emphasized that the case records were not transmitted to the appellate court despite orders, that years passed before motions were filed, and that the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal after private respondent’s motion, finding that Moreman had become a “phantom and fugitive paper corporation” due to failures to submit SEC reports and an abandoned address found by the Sheriff. This Court’s resolution was made immediately executory and became final after reconsideration was denied on 26 March 1990.

Trial Court Proceedings on Execution and the Creation of a Committee

After the finality of the decision and the denial of reconsideration, petitioners filed a motion to execute the decision dated 28 November 1978. Private respondent opposed execution and filed multiple motions and pleadings asserting that the judgment had been satisfied or even over satisfied. Ultimately, on 26 October 1990, respondent judge issued an Order granting the issuance of a writ of execution.

Private respondent then moved for reconsideration, and respondent judge, in a later Order dated 23 May 1991, denied the motion while simultaneously staying the execution order’s prompt enforcement. The Order stated that a committee was necessary because the deputy sheriff who executed the writ of attachment was dead, and the records allegedly did not show where the attached properties were located, even though the properties were considered under custodia legis. Respondent judge reasoned that there was a need to determine both the whereabouts of the properties and their values at the time of levy and their present values, to enable proper appreciation of enforcement and avoid unnecessary delay. Respondent judge therefore created a committee of three members, appointed the Clerk of Court as chairman, and required each party to designate one representative. The committee was tasked to proceed to where the attached properties were then found, to determine the specific locations and to make valuation at the time of attachment and at present, with a report to be submitted within five days after field work. The Clerk of Court was directed to issue the writ of execution only after the court had appreciated the committee’s report.

Petitioners’ Contentions in the Supreme Court

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari without first seeking reconsideration of the 23 May 1991 Order, claiming that such reconsideration would be futile. They argued that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by violating res judicata based on the finality of the decision dated 28 November 1978, and by obstructing this Court’s final and executory resolutions in G.R. No. 88310 dated 21 February 1990 and 26 March 1990. Petitioners maintained that the creation and purpose of the committee implied that the court intended to credit the value of unused construction materials against the judgment awards and, hence, indirectly recognized private respondent’s ownership of the properties attached, contrary to the findings in the final decision. They further invoked the characterization in G.R. No. 88310 that the decision was “immediately executory,” asserting that respondent judge did not accord it due effect.

Petitioners sought a restraining order and, after hearing, a writ of mandamus directing respondent judge to vacate and set aside the 23 May 1991 Order and to direct the Sheriff to execute the 26 October 1990 writ without delay.

Respondents’ Contentions

In their Comment, respondents asserted that respondent judge merely applied Section 15 of Rule 57 on satisfaction of judgment out of property attached. They argued that the attached properties belonged to private respondent and that, because of constitutional due process concerns, the court needed to determine where the attached properties were and their present value before ordering enforcement. Respondents also contended that res judicata did not apply because no prior adjudication had been made on the ownership of the attached properties. Finally, they argued that the petition for certiorari was defective because petitioners did not seek reconsideration before resorting to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on Grave Abuse and the Ministerial Nature of Execution

The Court granted the petition, but it did so not for the reasons relied upon by petitioners. The Court held that the decision dated 28 November 1978 had long become firm, final, and executory. It reiterated that the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ of execution, and that issuance of execution is a court’s ministerial duty that may be compelled through mandamus. The Court further emphasized that execution of a final judgment cannot be postponed or deferred by the trial court, and that courts should not become instruments of maneuvers meant to delay the execution of final decisions.

Applying these principles, the Court found that respondent judge had been “trapped” into aborting or preventing prompt execution of the 26 October 1990 Order by conditioning enforcement on a committee’s determination of the attached properties’ whereabouts and valuation. The Court considered the procedure ordered by respondent judge unprecedented and inherently productive of undue delay. It noted that no one could know how long it would take to locate the properties, that even after location the parties might not agree on valuation, and that the court would then have to receive evidence on conflicting valuations. The Court also found unacceptable the implied premise that, in a case where attachment has been issued and the attaching creditor prevails, determination of valuation must be made as a condition for execution.

Legal Basis: Rejection of Reliance on Rule 57, Section 15

Respondents sought justification under Section 15 of Rule 57, which provides a mechanism for satisfying judgment out of attached property, particularly by paying proceeds from sales of property or, if balance remains, by selling or by collecting credits as determined in the action and stated in the judgment. The Court held that reliance on this provision was misplaced.

First, Section 15 of Rule 57 sets guidelines for the sheriff (or proper officer), not for the court as an antecedent requirement before any execution procedure had been invoked. In the case at bar, no writ of execution had yet been referred to the sheriff when the trial court intervened. The Court reasoned that court intervention could only occur if the sheriff failed to follow the procedure, and that it was premature to require the court to act before any breach occurred.

Second, the Court ruled that the procedure under Section 15 was not mandatory. The provision used the word “may,” meaning the sheriff may cause satisfaction out of attached property if it is sufficient. Because the provision is directory, the sheriff may disregard the attached properties and proceed against other properties of the judgment debtor if necessary.

Third, the Court found that the conditions for the procedure were not present in the intended manner. The rule required the possibility that attached properties or relevant proceeds could be in the han

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