Case Summary (G.R. No. 263590)
Procedural posture and relief sought
Petitions were consolidated. Petitioners sought: declaratory relief that RA 11935 is unconstitutional; issuance of injunctive relief (temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, writs of certiorari/prohibition/mandamus as applicable); direction that COMELEC proceed with the BSKE on December 5, 2022 (or close thereto). Respondents (through OSG) defended RA 11935 as valid, argued that Congress enjoys plenary legislative power to postpone elections, and maintained COMELEC retains administrative authority under Sections 5 and 45 of the OEC for localized postponements.
Core factual background
- RA 11935, approved October 10, 2022, postponed the December 5, 2022 synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections (BSKE) to the last Monday of October 2023, and provided that incumbent barangay and SK officials remain in office “until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified,” unless sooner removed or suspended for cause.
- RA 11462 previously had postponed a prior BSKE to December 5, 2022 and provided terms and subsequent scheduling.
- Petitioners alleged that the law: (a) unlawfully extended terms of incumbent barangay officials and thereby deprived voters of suffrage; (b) impermissibly usurped COMELEC’s exclusive authority to postpone elections under Sections 5/45 OEC; (c) effected a legislative appointment and violated equal access to public service; (d) attempted to permit an unconstitutional realignment/transfer of appropriations. COMELEC and OSG argued Congress may regulate elections and set election dates, that postponement did not deprive voters of suffrage but only altered timing, and that hold-over provisions are legally permissible to maintain continuity.
Legal issue before the Court
Whether RA 11935, which postponed the December 2022 BSKE to October 2023 and authorized incumbent barangay and SK officials to remain in office pending successors, is constitutional under the 1987 Constitution and related law — specifically whether it unlawfully infringes the right of suffrage, exceeds legislative authority, usurps COMELEC functions, or violates constitutional prohibitions on transfer of appropriations.
Threshold: justiciability, standing, and scope of review
The Court found the consolidated petitions justiciable: petitioners (voters, taxpayers, citizens, lawyers) had sufficient personal and substantial interest and alleged actual or imminent injury to vote and associated rights; the challenge was timely (filed within days after enactment); the matter involved alleged grave abuse of discretion by Congress and the Court’s duty to interpret constitutional limits justified exercise of judicial review. The Court also noted exceptions to the political question doctrine under the 1987 Constitution’s expanded judicial power to determine grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Sovereignty and the constitutional primacy of suffrage
The decision reiterates foundational propositions: sovereignty resides in the people; the right of suffrage is a fundamental political right “preservative of all rights”; free, periodic, genuine elections are necessary to maintain democratic legitimacy. International instruments (UDHR; ICCPR — ratified by the Philippines) reinforce the requirement for genuine periodic elections and reasonable, objective criteria for any restrictions. These constitutional and international norms form the backdrop for assessing any state regulation that affects voting.
Congress’s legislative power regarding elections and COMELEC’s functions
The Court recognized: (a) Congress possesses broad, plenary legislative power that extends to matters affecting elections (Article V, VI, VII, X etc. of the Constitution); (b) Congress specifically is empowered to enact the local government code and determine the term of office for barangay officials (Article X); (c) COMELEC is the independent constitutional body charged with administration, enforcement and regulation of election laws (Article IX-C) with administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial functions; and (d) Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) delegated limited authority to COMELEC to postpone elections, but only for serious, enumerated causes and limited geographical scope (political subdivisions). The Court held that Congress’ power to legislate necessarily encompasses the power to postpone elections in the ordinary sense because that power is not expressly withheld by the Constitution and Congress retains authority to determine terms and the scheduling mechanism.
Scope and limits of COMELEC’s statutory postponement power (Sections 5 and 45 OEC)
Sections 5 and 45 of the Omnibus Election Code authorize COMELEC to postpone elections motu proprio or upon verified petition, but only for enumerated, serious causes (violence, terrorism, loss/destruction of paraphernalia/records, force majeure, and analogous unforeseen causes) and limited to political subdivisions (province, city, municipality, barangay). The Court emphasized these are delegated, limited powers and do not preclude Congress from exercising its own legislative authority to reset election dates under other circumstances. The Court noted COMELEC Chairperson’s concurrence with this delineation in oral argument.
Substantive due process and the required test for laws affecting suffrage
The Court evaluated RA 11935 under substantive due process principles (lawful subject — the public interest; lawful means — reasonable and necessary methods). It reiterated hierarchy of scrutiny (strict, intermediate, rational-basis) and emphasized the need for legitimate governmental interest and reasonable necessity of the means. Ultimately the Court found RA 11935 failed substantive due process: the law lacked a legitimate government interest satisfactorily grounded in the statute’s text and legislative history, and the means employed were not reasonably necessary, being arbitrary and oppressive of suffrage.
Court’s principal substantive holding: unconstitutionality for violating suffrage and due process
- The Court held RA 11935 unconstitutionally violated the people’s freedom of suffrage and substantive due process because: (a) the statute, as enacted, contained no valid, persuasive public interest justification in its text; (b) the legislative record showed differing and conflicting rationales and a clear animating purpose centered on realigning COMELEC’s allocated funds (approximately PHP 8.4 billion) to fund other government programs (notably COVID-19 response and economic recovery); and (c) such purpose would effect an impermissible transfer/realignment of appropriations in violation of Article VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution (prohibition on transfers of appropriations except in prescribed manner and by designated officers). The Court held that the purported fiscal realignment was an unconstitutional consideration that rendered the law arbitrary and unreasonable, thereby failing substantive due process.
Constitutional prohibition on transfer of appropriations and related findings
The Court emphasized Article VI, Section 25(5): no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations except as specifically authorized (only certain officials may, by law, be authorized to augment items from savings in their respective appropriations). Judicial precedent (Demetria v. Alba; Sanchez v. Commission on Audit) requires actual savings and confines realignment authority to designated officers. The Court found Congress’ intent, via the legislative history and explanatory notes, to realign COMELEC election funds to pandemic/economic programs impermissible and therefore tainted RA 11935 with arbitrariness that violated the Constitution.
Grave abuse of discretion and excess of congressional authority
By enacting RA 11935 primarily to achieve a purported realignment of appropriations and extend incumbents’ incumbency under the guise of postponement, Congress was found to have gravely abused its legislative discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court concluded the enactment was a capricious exercise of power in violation of constitutional limits, warranting judicial nullification.
COMELEC’s hold-over doctrine and legislative appointment concern
The Court explained the hold-over principle: in the absence of an express contrary provision, incumbents may remain in office until successors are duly elected/qualified to prevent a vacuum. The Court distinguished hold-over (tenure extended de facto) from an extension of the term (term remains fixed by statute). The decision rejected the contention that RA 11935’s hold-over amounted to a legislative appointment; hold-over is a recognized administrative necessity and was constitutionally permissible when properly limited and not used to circumvent electoral choice. Prior precedent upholding hold-over in localized failures of elections was invoked. Nonetheless, the Court held that the law’s actual purpose rendered it unlawful despite the conceptual validity of hold-over as a doctrine.
Operative fact doctrine and practical consequences of invalidation
The Court applied the operative-fact doctrine: a statute declared unconstitutional is void, but its existence prior to the judicial declaration is an operative fact that may have consequences not readily undone without injustice or impracticability. Because RA 11935 had been enacted and actions taken (COMELEC had adjusted preparations), and because strict adherence to revival of RA 11462 would create an anomalous and unduly long interval (potentially almost seven years between BSKEs) contrary to the legislative intent of triennial periodicity, the Court exercised equitable restraint: it declared RA 11935 unconstitutional but recognized certain operative consequences to avoid
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 263590)
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
- Consolidation of two petitions: G.R. No. 263590 (Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal) and G.R. No. 263673 (Atty. Alberto N. Hidalgo, et al.) challenging the constitutionality of RA 11935.
- Petitions filed in October 2022 (Macalintal, Oct. 17) and Oct. 20, 2022 (Hidalgo, et al.).
- Reliefs sought included declaration RA 11935 unconstitutional, mandamus/compelling COMELEC to proceed with BSKE on December 5, 2022 (or reasonably close), prohibitory reliefs, and urgent temporary restraining orders / preliminary injunctions.
- Court required respondents to comment and set oral arguments; memoranda were submitted by parties following oral argument.
Principal Facts
- On October 10, 2022, President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. approved RA 11935 which:
- Postponed synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections (BSKE) scheduled for December 5, 2022 to the last Monday of October 2023; and
- Authorized incumbent barangay and SK officials to remain in office (hold-over) until their successors are duly elected and qualified, unless removed/suspended for cause.
- Sections relevant in RA 11935: amended Section 1 (date of election: last Monday of October 2023 and every three years thereafter) and Section 3 (hold-over provision for incumbents).
- Prior statutory history: statutes and amendments dating to RA 9164 and subsequent laws (RA 9340, RA 10632, RA 10656, RA 10923, RA 10952, RA 11462) had previously set, reset, or postponed BSKE dates and contained hold-over or related provisions.
- COMELEC preparations for the December 2022 BSKE were reported to have been underway but stopped after RA 11935.
Petitioner Arguments (summarized)
- Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (G.R. No. 263590) argued RA 11935 unconstitutional because:
- Congress lacks power to postpone or cancel a scheduled election — that authority resides with COMELEC under Section 5 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC); Congress overstepped by legislating postponement.
- RA 11935 amounts to a legislative appointment by enabling incumbents to remain beyond their fixed term, circumventing the requirement that barangay officials be elected.
- The law amends Section 5 of the OEC in violation of the single-subject/title rule.
- The act deprives the electorate of suffrage, unlawfully extends term of incumbents, denies equal access to public service, and permits terms longer than administrative superiors.
- Petition prayed TRO/WPMI to stop implementation and direct COMELEC to hold BSKE on December 5, 2022 or close to it.
- Atty. Hidalgo, et al. (G.R. No. 263673) argued that:
- The postponement is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion by Congress; petitioners (lawyers, taxpayers, voters) have standing.
- Congress' power to fix terms does not encompass power to postpone BSKE; postponement equals term extension, violating electorate's right to choose.
- Sought TRO and preliminary injunction; asked Court to declare RA 11935 void and bar implementation.
Respondents’ Principal Arguments (OSG on behalf of respondents)
- OSG argued the Court should not exercise expanded jurisdiction absent grave abuse of discretion and cautioned on separation of powers/political question concerns.
- Substantively, OSG maintained RA 11935 is valid:
- Congress has plenary legislative power that includes legislating measures affecting elections, including setting/postponing dates.
- Postponement does not deprive suffrage; it merely adjusts the date for exercise of that right.
- No denial of equal access to public service; hold-over is not a legislative appointment; hold-over doctrine preserves continuity.
- COMELEC authority under the OEC to postpone is delegated and limited; Congress may act on broader bases.
- If COMELEC power to postpone under Sections 5 and 45 is delegated, Congress can regulate or alter it by legislation.
- OSG argued petitioners failed to show entitlement to TRO/injunction.
Legal Framework and Key Provisions Considered
- Constitutional provisions discussed heavily:
- Article II: Declaration of Principles (sovereignty resides in the people).
- Article V (Suffrage): Congress authorized to provide grounds for disqualification and to provide for secrecy/safeguards.
- Article VI: powers of Congress (fixing terms, election-related provisions, local government code).
- Article IX-C (Commission on Elections): powers and functions including to enforce and administer election laws and to decide all questions affecting elections except those involving the right to vote; classification of COMELEC powers as administrative, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative per Francisco v. COMELEC.
- Article X: local government provisions (Congress to enact local government code; term of elective local officials).
- International instruments considered: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21) and ICCPR (Article 25) — Philippines ratified ICCPR; both recognize periodic and genuine elections.
- Statutory law: Omnibus Election Code (OEC) Sections 5 and 45 — COMELEC authority to postpone elections for serious causes (violence, terrorism, loss/destruction of paraphernalia, force majeure, analogous causes) with limitations: geographic scope (political subdivisions) and nature of causes (unforeseen, serious).
- General principles invoked: sovereignty of the people, right of suffrage as fundamental and preservative of other rights, separation of powers, plenary legislative power, delegated authority and limits, substantive and procedural due process, levels of scrutiny (strict, intermediate, rational), judicial review standards (traditional and expanded modes), standing, ripeness, lis mota, political question doctrine, statute-of-operative-fact doctrine.
Court’s Findings — Justiciability, Standing and Ripeness
- Court found it had jurisdiction and the consolidated petitions met requisites for judicial review under both traditional and expanded modes:
- Case or controversy: prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion and a concrete adverseness of rights (plenary power of Congress v. people’s suffrage).
- Standing: petitioners (voters, taxpayers, lawyers) sufficiently alleged personal and substantial interest, and imminent or actual injury (postponement impairs right to participate).
- Ripeness: challenge raised at earliest opportunity (shortly after enactment); the law’s continued effect constitutes an immediate or threatened injury; case not moot despite passage of December 5, 2022 date because the law’s transgression on suffrage continued until BSKE is held.
- Lis mota: Court determined constitutional questions were unavoidable and necessary to resolve the petitions.
Court’s Core Holdings
- RA 11935 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
- Primary grounds:
- RA 11935 unconstitutionally violated the freedom of suffrage by failing to satisfy the substantive due process requisites: no legitimate government interest sufficiently established by the statute itself; legislative history showed conflicting reasons and legislative intent tainted by an unconstitutional consideration — reallocation/realignment of COMELEC appropriations of P8.44 billion to finance other government programs such as COVID-19 response and economic recovery.
- The means employed were arbitrary/unreasonable: realignment/transfer of COMELEC appropriations by Congress contravened Article VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution (prohibiting transfer of appropriations except as explicitly allowed and then only by specified officials and in specific ways) and established doctrine (Sanchez, Demetria v. Alba).
- The enactment of RA 11935 was attended by grave abuse
- Primary grounds: