Title
Macalinao vs. Macalinao
Case
G.R. No. 250613
Decision Date
Apr 3, 2024
The court ruled on the distribution of seafarer Pedrito's death benefits among his legal spouse Cerena, legitimate child Cindy, and two illegitimate children Kenneth and Kristel, affirming their rights against petitioners Elenita and her children from a bigamous marriage.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 250613)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Relevant dates: marriage of Pedrito and Cerena — June 5, 1981; separation in fact — c.1985; Pedrito’s second marriage to Elenita — April 3, 1990 (while first marriage subsisted); Pedrito’s death — June 26, 2015. Procedural history: respondents filed estate settlement action (initially styled as petition for nullity) in RTC Branch 207, Muntinlupa City; RTC rendered decision on September 12, 2018; Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ appeal on August 29, 2019 and denied reconsideration on November 25, 2019; Petition for Review under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court resulted in a decision dated April 3, 2024.

Applicable Law (constitutional and statutory framework)

Because the decision date is 1990 or later, the 1987 Constitution is the governing constitutional framework. Statutory and regulatory instruments applied or discussed in the decision include: the New Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) — especially Articles on succession and legitimes (Arts. 776, 781, 887, 888, 892, 895, 983, 999); the Family Code (including Art. 35(4), Art. 40, Art. 55, Art. 63, and Art. 176 modifying legitime treatment for illegitimate children); POEA Memorandum Circular No. 010-10 (Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers on-board Ocean-Going Ships, 2010) — specifically Section 20.B(1) defining death benefits and Section 20.B(3) defining beneficiaries as those payable “in accordance with rules of succession under the Civil Code”; Republic Act No. 4917 (exemption of retirement/separation benefits from taxes and attachment); SSS, GSIS and Workmen’s Compensation statutes and jurisprudence were surveyed for comparative purposes (RA 8282, RA 8291, Act No. 3428 as amended).

Factual Background

Undisputed facts admitted at pre-trial included: Pedrito’s 1981 marriage to Cerena and their child Cindy; Pedrito’s 1990 marriage to Elenita while the first marriage still subsisted and two children (Kenneth and Kristel) from that union; no judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage had been secured; Pedrito and Cerena separated in fact for decades; Excel Marine determined the death benefits and deposited PHP 4,506,309.52 with the RTC as the alleged full settlement; the parties failed to amicably settle distribution and the RTC identified as the key issue whether the death benefits formed part of Pedrito’s estate and, if so, the proper distribution among claimants.

RTC Decision

The RTC (September 12, 2018) declared the marriage between Pedrito and Elenita void for bigamy and upheld the 1981 marriage to Cerena as valid and subsisting. It declared Kenneth and Kristel illegitimate (born of a void marriage). The RTC also concluded the death benefits formed part of the decedent’s estate (characterizing them as contractual death benefits nonetheless forming part of the patrimony) and directed distribution under Articles 888 and 892 of the New Civil Code, awarding one-half to Cerena as conjugal share and dividing the remainder among Cerena and the three children in accordance with the cited succession provisions.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The CA (August 29, 2019) affirmed the RTC. It treated the threshold question as which marriage was valid and found the second marriage void ab initio because Pedrito’s first marriage subsisted. The CA agreed that Cerena remained the legal spouse, that Cindy was legitimate and Kenneth and Kristel were illegitimate, and that Elenita could not inherit by intestacy. The CA also sustained the procedural practicality of resolving distribution in the instant action without a separate special probate proceeding given the limited asset (the deposited death benefit).

Supreme Court — Nature of the Death Benefits (holding)

The Supreme Court corrected the lower courts’ legal characterization: the death benefits do not form part of the decedent’s hereditary estate or inheritance. Instead, they are contractual death compensation payable upon the seafarer’s death under the POEA contract (a conditional obligation triggered by work‑related death during the contract). The POEA Memorandum Circular defines “beneficiaries” as those to whom death compensation is payable “in accordance with rules of succession,” but that cross-reference is for identification of qualified beneficiaries and apportionment only; it does not convert death benefits into ordinary hereditary assets. The Court also confirmed statutory tax treatment: amounts of this nature are excluded from gross estate computation under RA 4917 and its treatment in the tax code.

Supreme Court — Who Qualifies as Beneficiaries (holding)

The Supreme Court held that the only qualified beneficiaries under the POEA rules in this case are: (a) Cerena as the legitimate surviving spouse (because Pedrito’s first marriage was never judicially dissolved); (b) Cindy as the legitimate child of the first marriage; and (c) Kenneth and Kristel as illegitimate children of Pedrito (born of the void marriage). Elenita is not a legal spouse for succession purposes because her marriage to Pedrito was bigamous and void ab initio; therefore she is not a beneficiary under the POEA definition which defers to succession rules.

The Court rejected importing a dependency test (as found in SSS/GSIS/workmen’s compensation frameworks) into the POEA Memorandum Circular where no such requirement appears. Although other social‑security statutes condition spouse entitlement on dependency, the POEA rule contains no dependency requirement and explicitly ties beneficiaries to succession rules; the Court declined to judicially add a dependency requirement, stating that any perceived gap is properly for the Legislature to address.

The Court also rejected arguments that Cerena’s long factual separation or her later marriage to another person automatically disqualified her. The Court observed that remedies that would disqualify a spouse (legal separation or judicial disinheritance) were unavailable to Pedrito because he himself contracted a bigamous marriage first.

Supreme Court — Manner of Distribution (holding and reasoning)

The central succession question was how to apportion the proceeds where the surviving compulsory heirs were the surviving spouse, one legitimate child, and two illegitimate children. The New Civil Code contains provisions governing legitimes and intestate succession (notably Arts. 888, 892, 895, 983 and 999), but no single provision expressly prescribes the exact share in the specific constellation present here. The Court reviewed two doctrinal approaches:

  • One approach (application of Art. 999 directly) would give equal shares to the surviving spouse and the sole legitimate child (each one‑third when illegitimate children are included proportionately), with the illegitimate children sharing remaining portions proportionately. The Court noted this could impair the legitime of the legitimate child.

  • The other approach (favored by the Court) gives primacy to protecting legitimes: first satisfy the legitime of the legitimate child (one‑half of the hereditary estate under Art. 888), then satisfy the legitime of the surviving spouse (one‑fourth under Art. 892 where the spouse concurs with only one legitimate child), and take the legitime of illegitimate children from the free portion (Art. 895, as modified by Art. 176 Family Code). Where the free portion is limited, the illegitimate children’s shares are adjusted and divided equally among them.

Applying the second approach the Court held that, for purposes of apportioning the contractual death proceeds (which are to be disbursed among qualified beneficiaries in accordance with the rules on succession), the proper distribution is:

  • One‑fourth (1/4) to Cerena, the legitimate surviving spouse;
  • One‑half (1/2) to Cindy, the sole legitimate child;
  • One‑eighth (1/8) to Kenneth, an illegitimate child;
  • One‑eighth (1/8) to Kristel, an illegitimate child.

The Court grounded this allocation in the primacy of compulsory succession and the inviolability of legitimes; it relied on doctrinal authorities, prior administrative and jurisprudential materials, and statutory text (Arts. 892, 895 as modified, and related provisions)

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