G.R. No. L-1123 - Mabanag vs. Vito

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-1123)

Factual Background

A joint resolution of Congress proposed to append an ordinance to the Constitution that would, during the effectivity of an Executive Agreement with the United States, open Philippine lands, natural resources, and public utilities to citizens and enterprises of the United States on the same terms as to Filipino citizens. At the joint session that adopted the resolution, the Secretary called the roll and the certified tally was sixteen yes and five no in the Senate and sixty-eight yes and eighteen no in the House. Petitioners alleged that three proclaimed senators and eight proclaimed representatives, all declared elected in the April 1946 elections, were not permitted to take their seats or to vote on account of suspensions or deferrals pending electoral contests, and that the exclusion of those members rendered the joint resolution deficient of the three-fourths-of-all-members vote required by Article XV.

Relief Sought and Procedural Posture

Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to restrain respondents from carrying into effect the joint resolution and from implementing Republic Act No. 73, including printing ballots and expending public funds for the plebiscite. The case was submitted on pleadings and a comprehensive stipulation of facts. The petitioners included sitting senators and representatives and officers of three political parties; respondents answered and defended on jurisdictional and substantive grounds.

Threshold Jurisdictional Question

Respondents contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the challenged congressional certification and enrolled resolution were conclusive under the enrolled bill doctrine and because the issues were political and nonjusticiable. The Court treated the jurisdictional objection and the doctrine of conclusiveness as related in practice. The majority described the political-question doctrine as precluding judicial inquiry into matters committed to the political departments, subject only to express constitutional grant of power to the judiciary.

Majority Reasoning — Political Question and Coleman v. Miller

The Court viewed the amendatory process as consisting of two political stages, proposal and ratification, linked in pursuit of a single objective, and held that the proposal stage partakes of the same political character as ratification. The majority relied heavily on Coleman vs. Miller and concurring opinions in that United States Supreme Court case to support the proposition that questions concerning the validity of the proposal and related procedures are political and generally nonjusticiable. The majority reasoned that if ratification is a political question not subject to judicial review, there is no logical basis to treat proposal as justiciable while denying the same character to ratification.

Majority Reasoning — Enrolled Bill Rule and Evidence Policy

The Court accepted the force of the enrolled bill rule as grounded in respect for coordinate branches and practical considerations of stability and convenience. It surveyed American authorities and authorities discussed in Wigmore and American Jurisprudence, and it noted section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure which permitted proof of legislative proceedings by journals or by published statutes and contained a proviso that authenticated copies signed by presiding officers and secretaries of legislative bodies would be conclusive proof of due enactment. The majority observed that the Rules of Court provide methods of proving legislative acts (citing Rule 123, sections 5 and 41) and concluded that deference to the certificate of the presiding officers and the enrolled resolution precluded deeper judicial intrusion into the internal proceedings of the legislative department in the circumstances of this case.

Application to the Present Petition and Disposition

Given its conclusions on nonjusticiability of the proposal stage and the admissible conclusiveness of an authenticated enrolled resolution, the majority found it unnecessary to decide whether the excluded senators and representatives were "members" for the purpose of computing the three-fourths vote under Article XV. The petition for prohibition was dismissed without costs.

Concurring Opinions — Agreement on Different Grounds

Justice Bengzon concurred in the dismissal but expressly took the view that the Court possessed jurisdiction; he nevertheless would not invalidate the enrollment because the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals were, in his view, conclusive. He relied on the arithmetic tally appearing in the minutes (Exhibit 3) and considered the requirements met. Justice Padilla concurred with Justice Bengzon. Justice Hilado concurred in the result but dissented from the majority’s statement that counting the suspended members would have made the affirmative votes short of three-fourths; he reasoned that suspension is a political question and that courts must respect the legislative determination of suspension, which in his view justified excluding suspended members from the count. Justice Paras concurred with Hilado.

Dissenting Opinion — Judicial Review and Journal Entry Rule

Justice Perfecto dissented vigorously. He argued that the Court should exercise its constitutional duty to adjudicate alleged violations of Article XV and that the joint resolution had not been adopted by three-fourths of all members as required. He concluded from the stipulated facts that the Senate comprised twenty-four members and the House ninety-six members at the time of the vote, so that the recorded affirmative votes (sixteen and sixty-eight) fell short of the required

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-1123)

Parties and Procedural Posture

ALEJO MABANAG ET AL., PETITIONERS were eight senators, seventeen representatives, and presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party who filed a petition for prohibition.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO ET AL., RESPONDENTS were the members of the Commission on Elections and the Treasurer, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing.
The petition sought to prohibit enforcement of a congressional instrument captioned "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto."
The case was submitted on pleadings and a detailed stipulation of facts and the Court heard no further extrinsic evidence.
The petition challenged the validity of Republic Act No. 73 and the resolution authorizing submission of a constitutional amendment to a plebiscite.

Key Factual Allegations

The general elections were held on April 23, 1946, after which three senators and eight representatives were proclaimed elected by a majority of the Commission on Elections.
The three proclaimed senators were deferred from being sworn and were thereafter not allowed to sit or vote in the Senate pending election protests.
Eight representatives likewise were not allowed to sit or to vote in the House except to participate in the election of the Speaker, and a resolution to suspend them had been referred to committee without final action.
At the joint session on September 18, 1946, the roll-call reflected sixteen senators voting "yes" and five "no," and sixty-eight representatives voting "yes" and eighteen "no" with one abstention and one absence.
Republic Act No. 73 called for submission of the proposed amendment to a plebiscite on March 11, 1947, and appropriated PHP 1,000,000 for that purpose.
The proposed amendment would, during the term of a specified Executive Agreement, open certain public domain lands, resources and public utilities to citizens and enterprises of the United States on parity with Filipinos.

Issues Presented

Whether this Court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition challenging the adoption by Congress of a proposed constitutional amendment.
Whether the doctrine that political questions are nonjusticiable barred judicial inquiry into the adoption and submission of a proposed constitutional amendment.
Whether courts must treat a duly authenticated enrolled resolution or act as conclusive proof of its contents and of a city's or legislature's compliance with constitutional voting requirements (the enrolled bill rule) or whether courts may examine legislative journals (the journal entry rule).
Whether the three senators and eight representatives excluded from the roll-call should be counted in determining the three-fourths vote required by Art. XV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution (as applied).

Contentions of Parties

The petitioners contended that the resolution was not approved by three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately as required by Article XV and that submission and expenditure under Republic Act No. 73 would be unconstitutional.
The respondents contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the matter raised a political question and that the Court was bound by the enrolled certification of the joint resolution as conclusive proof that the constitutional voting requirement had been satisfied.
Respondents further asserted that even if inquiry were permitted, the certified roll and subsequent law-making acts demonstrated compliance with constitutional numerosity requirements.

Statutory Framework

Article XV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution provided that amendments may be