Title
Mabanag vs. Vito
Case
G.R. No. L-1123
Decision Date
Mar 5, 1947
Petitioners sought prohibition against a constitutional amendment resolution, alleging vote impropriety; Supreme Court dismissed, citing political question doctrine, separation of powers, and enrolled bill rule.
constitutional amendment
resolution
validity
A

Case Summary (A.C. No. 5161)

Procedural History and Stipulation

The case was heard on pleadings and a stipulation of facts. The parties stipulated facts about proclamations of election, notarial oaths taken outside the floor, payments of salaries, procedural acts in both houses (including motions and committee referrals), and the recorded roll-call votes used in the joint session certification. Petitioners filed for prohibition to restrain executive and administrative respondents from proceeding to implement the resolution (printing ballots, holding the plebiscite, using public funds).

Issues Presented

(1) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to entertain the petition challenging the validity of the congressional resolution proposing a constitutional amendment? (2) If jurisdiction exists, was the resolution adopted in compliance with Article XV of the Constitution requiring proposal by a vote of three‑fourths of all the members of each House voting separately? (3) Are duly authenticated enrolled legislative acts or resolutions conclusive upon the courts, or may courts go behind such enrollments and consult legislative journals or other evidence?

Majority Disposition and Prudential Conclusion

The petition was dismissed. The Court held it unnecessary to resolve the factual question whether the suspended/excluded members were to be counted for purposes of the three‑fourths computation because the court’s inquiry was foreclosed by two doctrines emphasized by the majority: (a) political‑question nonjusticiability in this context of the amendment process, and (b) the enrolled‑bill / conclusive‑authenticity doctrine regarding duly authenticated legislative acts and resolutions.

Majority Reasoning — Political Question and Coleman v. Miller

The majority treated the proposal and the ratification stages of amending the Constitution as political in nature and largely committed to political departments. It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Coleman v. Miller to support the proposition that the efficacy of submission and ratification of constitutional amendments is in the political domain and not wholly subject to judicial review. The majority concluded that proposal to amend is a highly political function, committed to Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity, and that there is little judicial role to intrude into that process where political considerations predominate.

Majority Reasoning — Enrolled‑Bill Rule and Conclusiveness

The Court further relied on the notion that a duly authenticated enrolled bill or resolution is conclusive proof of its contents and of due enactment, grounded in respect for coordinate branches and supported by statutory provisions then extant (section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210) and authorities (including Wigmore and American jurisprudence). The majority treated the enrolled‑bill rule and the political‑question doctrine as practically complementary: reverence for the political department’s official certifications constrains judicial inquiry into legislative procedure and votes. On those grounds, the majority declined to go behind the authenticated certification of adoption of the resolution.

Treatment of Precedent: United States v. Pons and Section 313

The majority addressed petitioners’ reliance on United States v. Pons (34 Phil., 729), concluding that Pons did not displace the enrolled‑bill doctrine. The Court noted that section 313 of the old Code provided methods of proving legislative proceedings (j journals or authenticated enrolled copies) and contained a proviso making signed enrolled acts conclusive—reasoning that the enrolled‑bill rule had statutory and doctrinal support in the jurisdiction. The majority therefore saw no ground to disturb the certification of congressional action.

Concurring Opinion (Justice Bengzon, with Padilla)

Justice Bengzon concurred in the result but emphasized that he viewed the Court as having jurisdiction. Nonetheless, he declined to invalidate the challenged statute because he considered the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals conclusive; he endorsed the enrolled‑bill concept and cited extensive U.S. state court authority holding that courts may determine whether a constitutional amendment was properly adopted but expressed deference in practice to legislative certifications and the practical operation of section 313 and related rules. He observed arithmetic from the congressional record that, on its face, met the three‑fourths numerical requirement as the enrolled certificate recorded it.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (Justice Hilado, joined by Paras)

Justice Hilado concurred in the result but dissented from the majority’s suggestion that, had the suspended members been counted, the required three‑fourths would still have been lacking. Hilado took the position that suspension is a political determination within the legislative branch and that, because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of suspension, it must accept the legislative determination of membership status. Therefore, suspended members should not be counted in computing the three‑fourths requirement; he also argued for a textual reading that Article XV refers to members voting, and suspended or disqualified members cannot be presumed to have voted against a proposal.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Perfecto) — Strong Judicial Review Position

Justice Perfecto vigorously dissented. He argued that the Court must not abdicate its constitutional duty to enforce the Constitution and that the enrolled‑bill doctrine and the political‑question rationale could not immunize manifest violations of the constitutional amendment procedure. He emphasized that, on arithmetical facts, the recorded yes votes did not constitute three‑fourths of the full membership (16 of 24 senators is short of 18; 68 of 96 representatives is short of 72), and that certifications by presiding officers that contradict governing numerical requirements cannot confer validity. He rejected the majority’s reliance on for

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