Case Summary (G.R. No. L-9265)
Key Dates
Factual and procedural highlights from the record: petition filed June 21, 1948; strike declared July 18, 1948 (later ruled illegal); trial hearings June 8, 1951–January 7, 1954; trial decision February 10, 1955; CIR en banc resolution June 6, 1955 (modified trial judge’s decision); petition for certiorari filed by petitioner; Supreme Court disposition affirming CIR resolution (decision promulgated April 29, 1957). The 1935 Constitution was the operative constitution at the time of decision.
Applicable Statutes and Authorities
Primary statutory provisions invoked and discussed: Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Eight‑Hour Labor Law), specifically Section 1 (definition of working day and non‑working time) and Section 6 (contractual waivers void ab initio); Commonwealth Act No. 103 (establishing the Court of Industrial Relations) as amended by Commonwealth Acts No. 254 and No. 559; implementing regulations (Code of Rules and Regulations to Implement the Minimum Wage Law, ch. III, art. 1, §§4–5). Controlling precedents cited include Manila Terminal Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations and other labor jurisprudence referenced in the opinion.
Factual Background
The Luzon Marine Department Union sought recognition, close shop and check‑off and several remedial demands. While proceedings were pending, the Union struck in 1948; the strike was declared illegal by the Supreme Court in a separate case. The Union then pursued unresolved claims which included overtime and holiday pay, unpaid wages, and reinstatement of certain suspended or dismissed employees allegedly removed for union activities. The CIR heard extensive evidence and originally ruled on February 10, 1955; the CIR en banc later modified aspects of that decision on reconsideration.
Trial Court Findings (February 10, 1955)
The trial judge found claimants performed duties from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., including Sundays and holidays; claimants received three meals daily and about 20 minutes rest after each meal; overtime payments had been made in specified amounts for certain categories up to March 1947 and higher amounts thereafter; repair periods involved eight‑hour workdays. The trial court denied some overtime claims for lack of precise proof and denied reinstatement claims while awarding reparation pay to certain named employees on the basis that their separations were not for union activities. The judge considered Luzon Stevedoring a public service operator for the purpose of holiday pay exemption under Commonwealth Act No. 444 as interpreted in prior authority.
CIR En Banc Modification (June 6, 1955)
On reconsideration, the CIR en banc modified the trial court’s decision to the extent that it concluded the claimants rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. (i.e., a twelve‑hour day) and that four hours of overtime included in that schedule should be paid independently of the modest daily allowance (“coffee‑money”) the company had given. The en banc also clarified that the 20‑minute rest after meals should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime. The company’s motion for reconsideration of this modification was denied.
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
Luzon Stevedoring petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to review the CIR en banc resolution and sought clarification after the CIR applied its own resolution to exclude the 20‑minute breaks from non‑working time. Respondents moved to dismiss and argued that the CIR ruling involved purely factual determinations not subject to review for legal error. The CIR judges likewise contended the resolutions were factual findings.
Issue I — Applicability of Eight‑Hour Law to Seamen and Meaning of “Working Place”
Petitioner argued seamen’s non‑continuous and interrupted nature of work aboard tugboats required a different rule from dryland laborers. The Court analyzed Section 1 of CA No. 444 and related implementing regulations and focused on the statutory phrase “working place.” The Court concluded there was no need to adopt a different legal criterion for these seamen: the critical inquiry is whether an interval is “not working and the laborer can leave his working place and can rest completely.” The Court interpreted “working place” broadly (it need not be left premises‑wise; it suffices that the worker may cease work, rest completely and leave at will the spot where he actually stays while working). Because the CIR en banc had specifically found the claimants worked 6:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m. and implicitly were not free to rest completely or leave so as to qualify those intervals as non‑working, the Supreme Court declined to disturb that factual finding (invoking statutory limits on review of CIR factual determinations).
Issue II — Reliance on Secretary of Justice Opinion
Petitioner invoked a 1941 Attorney General/Secretary of Justice opinion. The Court found that opinion inapposite because it addressed interisland vessels (different circumstances) and because the record did not show petitioner had, in fact, relied on that opinion. The Court treated the matter as theoretical and declined to act on it.
Issues III & IV — Waiver, Acquiescence, Estoppel and Laches
Petitioner argued employees, having continued to work without protest for years and in some instances receiving relatively high pay, should be barred from back claims by waiver, estoppel or laches. The Court reaffirmed governing law: agreements contrary to CA No. 444 are void ab initio (Sec. 6); estoppel and laches cannot be invoked against employees to defeat recovery for past overtime (Manila Terminal Co. precedent). The Court explained that while prolonged silence may in some cases permit an inference that overtime was not actually worked or was already compensated, that factual inference requires evidentiary support. Here, evidence showed many claimants received wages below the later minimum wage and claimants asserted earlier complaints to a company overseer; consequently no inference of waiver or estoppel could be drawn.
Issue V — Retroactivity of Overtime Awards
Petitioner argued that any back overtime should be computed only from the date of filing the petition. The Court rejected that approach, holding that the purpose of the Eight‑Hour Law is to compensate for services actually performed in excess of statutory hours and that compensation should retroact to the date the overtime was actually rendered. The Court observed practical reasons why employees may delay asserting claims (fear of dismissal, economic pressure) and concluded limiting recovery to the filing date would
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-9265)
Citation and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 101 Phil. 257; G.R. No. L-9265; decision promulgated April 29, 1957.
- Petition for certiorari filed by Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. to review a resolution dated June 5, 1955, of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR).
- A supplemental petition (with leave) was filed by petitioner on September 5, 1955; both petitions were given due course by this Court by resolution of September 15, 1955.
- The Court considered a motion to dismiss filed by respondent Luzon Marine Department Union as an answer (resolution of October 14, 1955).
- Respondent judges of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a timely answer defending their resolutions as based on factual findings.
- Decision announced by Justice Felix, with Justices Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes J. B. L., and Endencia concurring.
Factual Background
- On June 21, 1948, respondent Luzon Marine Department Union filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations containing several demands against Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., including full recognition of collective bargaining, close shop, and check off.
- While the CIR case was pending, the Union declared a strike on July 18, 1948. This strike was ruled illegal by this Court in G.R. No. L-2660, promulgated May 30, 1950.
- After that ruling, the Union filed a "Constancia" with the CIR asking that remaining unresolved demands from the original petition be granted.
- The unresolved demands presented in the Constancia were enumerated as follows (quoted as in the record):
- Point No. 2: "That the work performed in excess of eight (8) hours be paid an overtime pay of 50 per cent the regular rate of pay, and that work performed on Sundays and legal holidays be paid double the regular rate of pay."
- Point No. 7: "That all officers, engineers and crew members of motor tugboats who have not received their pay corresponding to the second half of December, 1941, be paid accordingly."
- Point No. 11: "That Ciriaco Sarmiento, Chief Mate, M/V Ularlin, Kafael Santos, Port Engineer, and Lorenzo de la Cruz, Chief Engineer, M/V Shark, who have been suspended without justifiable cause and for union activities, be reinstated with pay from time of suspension."
- Point No. 12: "That all officers, engineers and crew members of the motor tugboats 'Shark', 'Herring-', 'Pike' and 'Ray', who have been discharged without justifiable cause and for union activities, be reinstated with/pay from time of discharge."
- The case was set for hearing and the parties submitted oral and documentary evidence from June 8, 1951 to January 7, 1954.
- An original intervenor (Union de Obreros Estibadores de Filipinas, UOEF) moved for withdrawal and was permitted to withdraw.
Trial Court Findings (Decision of February 10, 1955)
- The trial Judge found:
- The company gave employees three free meals every day and about 20 minutes rest after each mealtime.
- Employees worked from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. every day, including Sundays and holidays.
- For work performed in excess of eight hours, officers, patrons and radio operators were given overtime pay of P4 each and P2 each for the rest of the crew up to March 1947; after that date payments increased to P5 and P2.50 respectively until separation or the strike of July 19, 1948.
- When tugboats underwent repairs, personnel worked only eight hours a day excluding Sundays and holidays.
- Claimants’ evidence attempting to show work beyond 6:00 p.m. was uncertain and indefinite; therefore that demand was denied.
- The company had been considered a public service operator by the Public Service Commission in case No. 3035-C ("Philippine Shipowners Association vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al.", Exh. 23), and therefore was exempt from paying additional remuneration for work on Sundays and legal holidays pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 (citing Manila Electric Co. vs. Public Utilities Employees Association).
- Conclusion: employees were entitled only to overtime pay for work tendered in excess of eight hours on ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays; the company had proved payment of such overtime as shown in exhibits (Exhs. 1 to 20-B).
- It remained a matter of computation whether such overtime pay covered the actual overtime worked equivalent to the 25% minimum rate fixed by law absent other proof.
- Demands Nos. 11 and 12 (reinstatement) were denied; however, the company was ordered to pay reparation pay and overtime for services rendered by Ciriaco Sarmiento, Rafael (Rafael spelled also as Kafael in another place) Santos and Lorenzo de la Cruz after the trial court found their separations were not due to union activities but for valid and legal grounds.
Motions for Reconsideration and CIR En Banc Resolution (June 6, 1955)
- The Luzon Marine Department Union moved for reconsideration seeking:
- Declaration that members who worked from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. were entitled to four hours’ overtime pay.
- That meal times should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime.
- That amounts of P3 and P2 set aside for daily meals be considered part of actual compensation in computing unpaid overtime.
- That employees separated without just cause be paid wages from date of separation until decision in L-2660 became final.
- Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. sought reconsideration only as to the interpretation that time aboard a tugboat constitutes "working time" for the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
- The CIR, sitting en banc pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 254 and 559), issued a resolution on June 6, 1955 modifying the February 10, 1955 decision:
- Held that the four hours of overtime included in the regular daily schedule from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. should be paid independently of the so-called "coffee-money".
- Found that extra amounts were given to crew members of some tugboats for work performed beyond 6:00 p.m. over a period of some 16 weeks.
- The company’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Subsequent Proceedings Leading to This Petition
- From the CIR en banc resolution, Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. filed the present petition for certiorari.
- CIR, on petitioner’s motion for clarification, ruled that the 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime; petitioner filed supplemental certiorari dated September 5, 1955.
- Respondent Union’s motion to dismiss was treated as an answer alleging the CIR resolutions raised no question of law because issues were purely factual.
- CIR judges likewise asserted their resolutions were based on factual findings and involved no error of law.
Issues Presented by Petitioner
- The petitioner presented several issues for the Court’s consideration, summarized as stated in the record: I. Whether the definition of "hours of work" as applied to dryland laborers is equally applicable to seamen, or whether a different criterion should apply because seamen’s employment differs in nature and conditions from dryland labor. II. Whether a person should be penalized for following an opinion issued by the Secretary of Justice in the absence of judicial pronouncement; petitioner cited Opinion No. 247, Series of 1941 of the Secretary of Justice. III. Whether, when employees with full knowledge of