Title
Luzon Development Bank vs. Krish
Case
G.R. No. 203530
Decision Date
Apr 13, 2015
Petitioners sought to annul CA's affirmation of RTC's attachment order in a collection case; SC ruled only cash or counterbond could discharge attachment, rejecting real property deposit.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 203530)

Petitioner’s and Respondent’s Positions (Factual Summary)

Respondent Erlinda alleged ownership of time deposit certificates worth P28,597,472.70 and on presentation for payment the bank (petitioner) allegedly refused to honor them, prompting respondent to obtain a preliminary writ of attachment (RTC, February 27, 2001). Garnishments included the bank’s accounts in BPI Family Bank (Calamba) for P28,597,472.70 and an account at the Central Bank for P49,000,000.00. Following protracted incident and collateral proceedings, respondent was ordered to file an attachment bond of P35,000,000.00 (June 25, 2009, filed through Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation and approved July 7, 2009). Petitioners failed to file a required counterbond within court-ordered periods and attempted to secure release of the attachment by depositing bank property (real property or certificates of title) instead of cash or a counterbond.

Key Dates and Procedural History

  • Complaint and preliminary writ of attachment: February 2001.
  • RTC orders lifting and then dealing with incidents: various orders culminating in orders of September 8, 2003 and December 18, 2003 (nullified by CA certiorari decision later).
  • CA order (7th Division) nullifying certain RTC orders and directing filing of counterbond: November 15, 2006.
  • Respondent’s attachment bond filed and approved: June–July 2009.
  • RTC denied petitioners’ motion to admit bank property in lieu of counterbond: September 24, 2010 (denial of reconsideration May 26, 2011).
  • RTC reinstated writ of attachment for petitioners’ failure to file counterbond: June 27, 2011 (amended reinstated writ served June 30, 2011).
  • CA affirmed RTC orders: Decision March 27, 2012; reconsideration denied September 11, 2012.
  • Petition for review to the Supreme Court denied (decision affirmed April 13, 2015). Applicable constitutional framework: 1987 Constitution (decision rendered post-1990).

Controlling Legal Provisions and Precedent

  • Rule 57, Sections 2 and 5, Rules of Court (Attachment and the effect of deposit or counterbond): the Court quoted both sections, emphasizing that an order of attachment requires attachment of sufficient property unless the party “makes deposit or gives a bond … in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,” and that the sheriff shall attach property unless the party “makes a deposit with the court … or gives a counter-bond … in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court … or to the value of the property to be attached.”
  • Precedents cited by the Court: Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante (recognizing posting of counterbond or cash deposit as a means to secure discharge of an attachment) and Alcazar v. Arante (statutory construction — words are to be given their plain, ordinary, common usage absent contrary legislative intent).

Issue Presented for Resolution

Whether the petitioners could deposit bank property (real property or certificates of title) in lieu of a cash deposit or a counterbond to discharge or stay the implementation of a writ of attachment, in view of the RTC’s denial of that request and the CA’s affirmation thereof.

Supreme Court’s Legal Analysis: Text and Ordinary Meaning

The Supreme Court focused on the explicit language of Rule 57, Sections 2 and 5. It observed that those provisions condition the release or non-implementation of an attachment on the party making a “deposit” or giving a “bond” “in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,” or on a deposit “in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court … or to the value of the property to be attached.” The Court emphasized the proximate relation between the terms “deposit” and “amount,” concluding that “amount” is commonly associated with a sum of money. Applying the ordinary-meaning canon of statutory construction (as in Alcazar v. Arante), the Court held that “deposit” in this context must be understood to require a monetary deposit (or the posting of a bond/counterbond), not the admission of bank property or real property titles in lieu of cash.

Reliance on Precedent and Prior Practice

The Court cited Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante to underscore that one recognized method to secure discharge of an attachment is the posting of a counterbond or making the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed by the court. The Supreme Court treated these authorities as consistent with and supportive of a plain-language interpretation of Rule 57 that limits “deposit” to money (or a bond instrument), not to in-kind deposits of property.

Disposition and Rationale

Because the statutory text requires a deposit “in an amount” and a counter

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.