Title
Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 77372
Decision Date
Apr 29, 1988
Petitioners challenged PRC's Resolution No. 105, prohibiting review classes before exams, as unconstitutional. Supreme Court ruled RTC had jurisdiction, voided the resolution for violating liberty and academic freedom.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 77372)

Factual Background

On or about October 6, 1986, the Professional Regulation Commission issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its Additional Instructions to examinees for the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution barred any examinee from attending review classes, briefings, conferences, or the like, or from receiving hand-outs, review materials, or tips from review centers, schools, lecturers, or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day, including the examination day itself, and threatened sanctions under Section 8, Article III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. The petitioners were reviewees scheduled to take licensure examinations on October 25 and November 2, 1986.

Trial Court Proceedings

On October 16, 1986, the petitioners filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, seeking to restrain the Professional Regulation Commission from enforcing Resolution No. 105 and to have the resolution declared unconstitutional. The respondent Commission moved to dismiss on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review and enjoin its resolution. By order dated October 21, 1986, the trial court declared that it had jurisdiction and enjoined the Commission from enforcing Resolution No. 105, finding the resolution unconstitutional.

Court of Appeals Decision

Dissatisfied, the Professional Regulation Commission filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to nullify the RTC order. On January 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals granted the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591, declared the order dated October 21, 1986 null and void, and directed the respondent court to dismiss Civil Case No. 86-37950 with prejudice for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Commission was at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court and that co-equal bodies could not control or interfere with each other’s acts, relying on National Electrification Administration v. Mendoza, Pineda v. Lantin, and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. v. Luna.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The petition presented two principal issues: whether the Regional Trial Court was of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it could not pass upon the validity of the Commission’s administrative acts, and whether the Commission could lawfully prohibit examinees from attending review classes or receiving review materials, tips, or the like during the three days immediately preceding every examination day.

Petition to the Supreme Court and Relief Sought

The petitioners sought certiorari review of the Court of Appeals decision and requested that the Supreme Court reverse that decision, uphold the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to entertain the injunctive action, and declare Resolution No. 105 null and void for being unconstitutional and unreasonable.

Supreme Court's Jurisdictional Analysis

The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in equating the Professional Regulation Commission with the Securities and Exchange Commission cases relied upon. Those authorities denied trial-court review because the statutes creating the Securities and Exchange Commission expressly prescribed exclusive remedies and review procedures. By contrast, Presidential Decree No. 223 contains no provision making Commission orders or resolutions directly appealable to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The Court held that the Regional Trial Courts retain general jurisdiction under Sec. 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 over actions not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial body, and that judicial review of executive and administrative acts is well established in precedent such as Medalla v. Sayo and Republic v. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II. The Court further explained that Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 confers exclusive appellate jurisdiction on the Intermediate Appellate Court only over final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies; it does not reach administrative rules of general applicability. Citing Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer and Salud v. Central Bank of the Philippines, the Court emphasized the distinction between quasi-judicial adjudications and purely administrative acts, and concluded that Resolution No. 105 was an administrative regulation of general applicability, not a quasi-judicial final order invoking the exclusive appellate route.

Supreme Court's Merits Analysis of Resolution No. 105

Having settled jurisdiction, the Court proceeded to the merits and held that Resolution No. 105 was unconstitutional. The Court found the measure unreasonable and arbitrary because it barred an examinee from attending legitimate review activities or receiving lawful instructional materials during the last three days before an examination, and because the sanction threatened future exclusion from examinations even when no corrupt motive was shown. The Court also found enforcement impractical and intrusive, noting the Commission could not reasonably police every examinee during the three-day period. The Court invoked settled administrative-law principles that regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to their objective, and concluded the resolution bore no reasonable relation to its avowed purpose of preserving the integrity of licensure examinations.

Rights Implicated and Supporting Precedent

The Court held that Resolution No. 105 infringed upon the examinees’ right to liberty and upon the academic freedom of review schools and centers. The Commission had no authority to dictate how examinees should prepare for examinations or to curtail the autonomy of educational institutions in determining methods of instruction, except when overriding public welfare demands restraint. The Court relied on its prior articulation of judicial review of executive acts in Medalla v. Sayo, on the protect

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