Title
Lucas vs. Fabros
Case
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226
Decision Date
Jan 31, 2000
Judge Fabros granted reconsideration in an ejectment case despite procedural rules; SC ruled no abuse, as dismissal wasn't on merits.

Case Summary (A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226)

Pleadings and Court Actions in the Underlying Ejectment Case

Lucas alleged that respondent issued an Order dated February 26, 1997 which granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of an earlier Order dated January 13, 1997 that had dismissed the ejectment case for the failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the preliminary conference. Lucas pointed to the governing procedural regime for ejectment matters under the Rules on Summary Procedure, and specifically invoked Section 19 (c), which prohibits certain pleadings and motions, including a “motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial.”

Lucas claimed that respondent violated this prohibition when she granted the motion for reconsideration, notwithstanding that respondent had acknowledged in open court that the case was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Lucas further alleged that the grant of reconsideration was done “out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury,” and urged the Court to discipline the judge through the doctrine of IPSA LOQUITOR.

Administrative Complaint and Respondent’s Admission

After respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint on June 18, 1997, she filed her Comment dated September 16, 1997. Respondent admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration even if it was a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She justified her action by asserting that it was granted “in the interest of justice.”

Respondent explained that the questioned Order dated January 13, 1997 dismissed the ejectment case because neither the plaintiff nor her counsel appeared at the preliminary conference, and that Atty. Jose Suing had been empowered by Special Power of Attorney to appear. She narrated that Atty. Suing filed a motion for reconsideration on January 17, 1997 after learning of the dismissal, alleging that he failed to appear due to sudden, excruciating stomach pain. Respondent emphasized that, despite the defendant’s objection that a motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading under the summary procedure rule, she still granted the motion.

Respondent also argued that the rule should not operate as a rigid “straight jacket,” and that judges should discern circumstances that could otherwise result in miscarriage of justice. She cited, by way of justification, Section 5 (g) of Rule 135, as an inherent power allowing the Court to “amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.” She additionally contended that the order of dismissal had not attained finality as far as the defendant was concerned.

Referral to the Office of the Court Administrator and Its Recommendation

The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation after the case was docketed as an administrative matter.

On August 25, 1997, the OCA submitted a Memorandum making findings adverse to respondent. The OCA concluded that respondent abused her discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that respondent knew that a motion for reconsideration of a judgment was prohibited in an ejectment case covered by the summary procedure. The OCA held that a judge’s intention to do justice could not excuse liability, and that respondent should have denied the motion because the plaintiff had other remedies such as appeal.

The OCA recommended that respondent be fined PHP 2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion.

The Court’s Issue and Governing Rule on Prohibited Motions

In its disposition, the Court focused on the scope of Section 19 (c) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court reiterated that, as a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19. It quoted the rule’s prohibition, including a motion for reconsideration of a judgment.

However, the Court qualified the prohibition by reference to controlling jurisprudence. It relied on the doctrinal statement that the prohibited motion contemplated by Section 15 (c) of the earlier Rules and later Section 19 (c) effective November 15, 1991 referred specifically to a motion that seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered after trial on the merits. The Court invoked Joven v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700, 707-708 (1992) for this limitation, explaining that the prohibition applies to reconsideration of a judgment after trial on the merits, not to other kinds of dismissals.

Legal Reasoning: Nature of the Dismissal Order and Non-Applicability of the Prohibition

Applying the rule as construed in Joven, the Court characterized respondent’s Order dated January 13, 1997 dismissing the ejectment case due to failure of a party to appear at the preliminary conference as “obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case.” It reasoned that, because the dismissal order was not a merits adjudication reached after trial, the motion for reconsideration of such an order did not fall within the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Proc

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