Rodrigo Loza y Apolonio vs. People

Information, Accusation, and Material Events

The Information charged Loza that, on or about September 16, 2002, being then legally married to FE DY LOZA (still living and with the marriage subsisting or undissolved), Loza contracted a second marriage with IVY ARINGO Y TIANSAY in a ceremony solemnized on September 16, 2002 at the Municipal Trial Court, Legazpi City. The prosecution further alleged that the subsequent marriage was discovered by FE DY LOZA on October 19, 2002 to her damage and prejudice. Upon arraignment on November 28, 2016, Loza pleaded not guilty.

Plea Change and the Claimed Voluntary Surrender

Before trial, Loza submitted a Plea Bargaining Proposal on June 30, 2017 to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code and sought consideration of his voluntary surrender and plea of guilty as mitigating circumstances. Pre-trial took place on July 31, 2017. Loza later sought to withdraw his not-guilty plea on August 23, 2017, and the RTC granted the motion on October 23, 2017, after which Loza was re-arraigned and changed his plea to guilty.

The principal factual matter for purposes of mitigation arose from Loza’s interactions with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Laguna District Office, specifically with Special Investigator Mark Anthony G. Diaz (SI Diaz), whom the defense presented to prove voluntary surrender.

SI Diaz’s Testimony on the NBI Clearance Incident

SI Diaz testified that on August 30, 2016, Loza applied for an NBI clearance at the NBI Laguna District Office. During processing, it was discovered that there was a “hit” in the name “Rodrigo Loza,” indicating the existence of a pending case and a possible warrant of arrest. When informed, Loza admitted that he had a pending case. Because the office lacked the records, SI Diaz directed Loza to return for interview.

SI Diaz then requested from NBI Manila copies of the relevant records. A copy was received showing the pendency of a warrant of arrest against a Rodrigo Loza. When Loza returned on September 7, 2016, SI Diaz informed him of the pending case and the outstanding warrant. Loza then said “Masuko na lang ako” and asked for help on posting bail. SI Diaz served the warrant, informed Loza of his rights, and issued a Certificate of Detention for bail posting, and a Certification dated September 13, 2017 stating that Loza voluntarily surrendered to their office.

On cross-examination, SI Diaz clarified that his initial return to processing on August 30, 2016 occurred because he typically used the term “arrested by the authority” in returns of warrant, without treating the person’s situation as voluntarily surrendered or not. SI Diaz also stated that when Loza learned of the “hit,” Loza admitted having a pending case.

RTC Proceedings and Conviction for Bigamy

The RTC found Loza’s plea of guilty voluntary and convicted him of bigamy under Article 349. It imposed an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional (minimum) to six years and one day of prision mayor (maximum). The trial court also dismissed the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action, because the prosecutor manifested that the prosecution would no longer present evidence.

The RTC also specifically addressed Loza’s request to consider his voluntary surrender as an additional mitigating circumstance. It denied such request.

Trial Court’s Refusal to Appreciate Voluntary Surrender

In rejecting voluntary surrender, the RTC held that the elements were not satisfied. It reasoned that the first and third requisites were lacking: the offender must not have been actually arrested, and the surrender must be voluntary and spontaneous. The RTC found that Loza did not go to the NBI to surrender, but to apply for clearance. It also held that because a warrant existed and verification was required, Loza’s continued presence and subsequent interview effectively made his arrest inevitable. It further noted that the return of warrant stated that Loza was “arrested,” and that the RTC release order in another case also used the word “arrested.” Finally, it stressed that the case had been pending for more than thirteen years from the filing of the Information and that the warrant’s implementation had not occurred, which it treated as incompatible with spontaneity.

Loza moved for reconsideration of the denial of voluntary surrender, but the RTC denied it on April 23, 2018.

Appellate Court Ruling Affirming the RTC

Loza appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its Decision dated October 26, 2020, and later denied Loza’s motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 7, 2021.

The CA reiterated that for voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the offender must (i) not have been actually arrested, (ii) surrender himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent, and (iii) do so voluntarily. The CA emphasized spontaneity and intent to give oneself up unconditionally, either by acknowledging guilt or by wishing to save authorities the trouble and expense of searching and capturing the accused.

On the facts, the CA held that the first and third elements were missing. It stressed that when Loza returned on September 7, 2016, he was served with the warrant and arrested by SI Diaz. It treated Loza’s utterance “Masuko na lang ako” as not genuinely spontaneous, because it was uttered when Loza was informed of the pending case and warrant and his arrest was therefore inevitable. The CA credited SI Diaz’s account over Loza’s untested assertions, noting that Loza did not testify before the RTC. It also ruled that jurisprudence cited by Loza, including De Vera v. De Vera, was inapplicable because in Loza’s case a warrant had already issued and the factual basis for similar circumstances was not shown.

The CA further stated that Loza did not present evidence showing that his surrender was attended by the circumstances required by jurisprudence, and it rejected Loza’s attempt to attribute voluntariness to the supposed fact that he was not certain about identity during the first clearance application.

The Sole Issue Framed by the Petition

The Supreme Court treated the matter as a pure question of law: whether Loza was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as contemplated under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code, based on the facts of the case.

Arguments of Petitioner and the Office of the Solicitor General

Loza argued that when he applied for clearance on August 30, 2016, he was unaware of any outstanding warrant or that the case had reached the stage of warrant issuance. He insisted that the “hit” meant only that there was a pending case for “Rodrigo Loza,” and not necessarily that it was the same person as him. He asserted that only when his identity was confirmed during the interview on September 7, 2016 did he learn of the case and warrant, after which he told SI Diaz “Masuko na lang ako,” which he claimed should be interpreted as voluntary surrender before arrest. He also claimed that no evidence showed police or NBI conducted search efforts that would have incurred trouble and expense.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General echoed the RTC and CA view that Loza’s voluntariness was not established. It highlighted the factual findings that Loza admitted having a pending case when first informed of the “hit,” and that the warrant had long been outstanding. It argued that Loza’s statements about not knowing the warrant’s existence were factual matters not properly reviewable through a petition that relied primarily on legal issues. It also maintained that the utterance “Masuko na lang ako” was immaterial because, regardless, Loza’s arrest was supposed to be effected by protocol once verified, and therefore the surrender lacked spontaneity.

Supreme Court’s Framework: Voluntary Surrender Under Article 13(7)

The Court restated that Article 13(7) identifies as a mitigating circumstance that the offender “had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents.” The Court acknowledged that jurisprudence has developed varying emphases on the requirements, but it distilled three requisites consistent with the discussion in People v. Hanasan: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested, (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent, and (c) the surrender was voluntary.

The Court then reviewed the historical doctrinal development of spontaneity requirements, beginning with People v. Sakam, and including lines of cases that treated the issuance of a warrant as either not necessarily negating surrender (as in People v. Yecla and People v. Brana) or as relevant to assessing spontaneity depending on the actual circumstances. It also recognized cases that considered the accused’s flight, intentions, and the contexts in which the accused appeared at police or authority stations, citing, among others, People v. Oco and De Vera v. De Vera. The Court also reiterated that where the record does not clearly show voluntary surrender, doubts cannot be resolved in favor of the accused, citing People v. Banzales.

Application to Loza: Satisfaction of the First Two Requisites

The Supreme Court held that certain factual premises used by the RTC were erroneous. It found that the evidence did not support the trial court’s conclusion that Loza had already been arrested at the time of the surrender narrative. The Court relied on SI Diaz’s testimony that Loza uttered “Masuko na lang ako” before the warrant was served upon him, and it noted that SI Diaz testified that his endorsement language in the return of the warrant used “arrested by the authority” without distinguishing whether the arrest was consequent to voluntariness.

The Court also found the second requisite met: SI Diaz, being an NBI officer, was a person in authority or agent to whom a surrender may be made.

The Core Issue: Voluntariness and Spontaneity

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