Title
Lorenzo vs. Marquez
Case
A.M. No. MTJ-87-123, MTJ-88-141
Decision Date
Jun 27, 1988
Judge Primo L. Marquez faced charges for harassment, violating judicial disqualification rules, and illegally issuing a subpoena, leading to his dismissal for grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
grave misconduct
harassment
reappointment

Case Summary (A.M. No. MTJ-87-123, MTJ-88-141)

Factual Background

The complaint charged the respondent judge on three counts. First, it accused him of harassment for failing to indorse the reappointment of complainant Lorenzo as Municipal Trial Court Aide. Second, it alleged violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, specifically for deciding Civil Case No. 1202, titled “Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya vs. Gilda Balid, et al.”, when he had previously acted as counsel for the plaintiff. Third, it accused him of issuing a subpoena for the appearance of Jose D. Obosa, a prison inmate at the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP), to appear before him when Obosa allegedly had no case pending before the respondent court and was not a witness in any pending matter therein.

The record of the administrative investigation showed that the respondent defended himself against each allegation. For the first charge, he claimed that he did not recommend Lorenzo’s reappointment because she was inefficient. He further suggested that his reluctance might have been influenced by the fact that Lorenzo was a “protegee” of the respondent’s predecessor, former Judge Jose Parentela, Jr., who reportedly exposed the illegal issuance of a subpoena by the respondent. The respondent maintained that as the presiding judge he had the privilege to recommend the employee with whom he would work, and that his refusal to recommend reappointment could not be treated as administrative wrongdoing.

For the second charge, the respondent did not dispute that he had acted as counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1202. The Court later found that the plaintiff in that case was represented by Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya, and the complaint for that civil case was filed by Crisostomo L. Luna, described as president and board chairman of the plaintiff and as the respondent’s uncle. The respondent had, at the time of the filing, also been a member of the board of directors of the plaintiff. The civil case proceeded with an order dated November 28, 1986, declaring the defendants in default for failure to file an answer.

When the respondent assumed office, he issued an order dated February 10, 1987 requiring the plaintiff to secure another counsel in his place and setting the case for hearing. Thereafter, on March 9, 1987, he issued an order considering the case submitted for decision. On April 2, 1987, he rendered a decision favorable to the plaintiff. The dispositive portion directed the defendants to pay jointly and severally a principal amount of P4,676.00, with one (1%) percent interest on the unpaid balance and two (2%) percent penalty interest per month until full payment, plus attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and collectible, litigation expenses of P460.00, and costs.

The civil case was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City.

Administrative Procedure and the Deputy Administrator’s Report

After the respondent filed his answer, the Court conducted a formal investigation through Deputy Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro. Evidence was received from both complainant and respondent. The deputy administrator submitted his report and recommendation to the Court on May 27, 1988. The Court thereafter evaluated the allegations, the respondent’s defenses, and the supporting records, particularly the text of the Rules of Court relevant to disqualification and the documentary and testimonial evidence regarding the subpoena.

The Parties’ Contentions

On the first charge of harassment, the respondent insisted that he acted on a legitimate assessment of efficiency and that his decision not to indorse the reappointment of Lorenzo fell within his discretion as presiding judge. The Court, however, addressed the charge by reference to whether administrative liability could be sustained on the record before it.

On the second charge, the respondent argued that there had been no objection from the parties, and he proceeded to preside and decide the case. The administrative theory under Section 1, Rule 137 was that a judge could not sit in a case in which he had been counsel, unless the stringent condition of written consent of all parties, signed by them and entered upon the record, was met.

On the third charge, the respondent was accused of issuing a subpoena for prison inmate Obosa to appear before him in Criminal Case No. 8924, titled “People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Salamat”. The respondent contended that he issued the subpoena because he wanted the accused Salamat arrested. He explained that he met a certain Rivera during speaking engagements in San Narciso, Quezon, who allegedly told him that Obosa was a friend of Salamat who might be able to disclose the whereabouts of Salamat. He also claimed that complainant Maximino Torres requested the issuance of the subpoena and that Torres signed the request after drafting a letter dated August 14, 1987. The prosecution evidence disputed the coherence and timing of these explanations.

Legal Basis on Judicial Disqualification (Second Charge)

The Court anchored the second charge on Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, among other disqualifying relationships, “has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,” or where he is otherwise proscribed under the rule. The rule further provides that a judge may disqualify himself for other just or valid reasons, but the specific limitation relevant to prior counsel required that the judge could not sit in the case without written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

From the rule’s explicit terms, the Court held that the respondent could not sit in a case in which he had been counsel, absent written consent meeting the rule’s requirements. The Court emphasized that consent could not be treated as merely verbal or as tacit acquiescence, and it reiterated that the consent had to be written, signed by the parties, and entered upon the record.

The Court also confronted the factual setting. It found that the respondent had been counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1202, and that although he issued orders after assuming office regarding the securing of another counsel and the setting and submission of the case, he still proceeded to render the decision favorable to the plaintiff. The Court treated this as a clear breach of the disqualification rule under Rule 137.

The Subpoena Charge and Its Circumstances (Third Charge)

The third charge was treated by the Court as more serious. The Court referred to the record of Criminal Case No. 8924, “People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Salamat,” for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It found that on July 24, 1987, the respondent issued a subpoena addressed to prison inmate Jose Obosa, then a convict in the NBP at Muntinlupa, Rizal. The subpoena required Obosa to appear before the respondent court on July 27, 28, and 29, 1987 at 8:30 A.M., and bore a notation at the top reading “For Conference.” On August 18, 1987, the respondent issued another order and, based on it, issued a further subpoena requiring Obosa to appear for a conference on August 28, 1987 at 8:30 A.M. The Court noted that the case against Salamat had not been set for hearing because the accused had not yet been arrested. It therefore concluded that there was no apparent reason to require Obosa’s appearance in the manner ordered.

The respondent’s explanation was found wanting. He claimed that he sought Obosa’s help to locate Salamat while Salamat was still at large. He also asserted that complainant Torres requested the subpoena, and the respondent pointed to a letter dated August 14, 1987 signed by Torres. The Court treated the timing as inconsistent because the first subpoena had been issued earlier, on July 24, 1987, long before the later letter-request.

The Court further scrutinized how Obosa’s appearance actually took place. Because of the subpoenas, Obosa appeared at about past 12:00 noon on July 28, 1987 at the respondent’s house in Sariaya, Quezon, with two prison escorts, instead of at the courtroom. The Court noted that the respondent did not inquire about the whereabouts of Salamat. The respondent later claimed that he did not have the chance because he had to bring his sick daughter to the hospital. On July 29, 1987, Obosa again appeared at the respondent’s house past noon, yet the respondent similarly did not inquire about the whereabouts of Salamat.

The evidence presented by the NBI agent Salvador Ranin, who investigated the case, added a further factual basis for the Court’s conclusion that the subpoenas were unjustified. Ranin testified that from July 28, 1987 up to August 2, 1987, Obosa did not return to his quarters at the NBP, although the NBP logbook had an entry alleging his return on August 2, 1987 at 2:10 in the afternoon. The Court noted that on that same day, the murder of Local Government Secretary Jaime Ferrer occurred at 6:45 P.M. of the same day. Ranin testified that three school children saw a man with a gun running toward La Huerta, Paranaque. Ranin added that Obosa’s residence was in Paranaque. Ranin took photographs and showed them to witnesses and children, who positively identified Obosa as the man who fled the scene. Later, fifteen persons were lined up at NBI headquarters in Manila with Obosa and the witnesses identified him as the man fleeing after the offense. Ranin emphasized that, in the NBI’s view, the NBP logbook entry about Obosa’s alleged return was a false entry. The Court also noted that Obosa was later charged as a principal in related criminal prosecutions: Criminal Case No. 011 and Criminal Case No. 012 pending before the RTC, Makati, Metro Manila, for the murder of Secretary Ferrer and his driver, respectively, although the respondent was not accused in those cases.

On the procedural side, the Court underscored that under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Rules of Co

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms