Title
Lorenzo Shipping Corp. vs. BJ Marthel International, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 145483
Decision Date
Nov 19, 2004
Petitioner refused payment citing late delivery after respondent supplied cylinder liners; court ruled delivery timely, contract valid, no valid rescission, affirming respondent’s claim.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 123290)

Petitioner

Lorenzo Shipping Corporation issued two purchase orders (No. 13839 dated 2 November 1989; No. 14011 dated 15 January 1990) for cylinder liners and issued ten postdated checks purporting to represent full payment for the first cylinder liner. Petitioner later claimed late delivery, sought to rescind the contract, and offered partial payment (P150,000), asserting the liners were delivered too late for scheduled dry-dock repairs.

Respondent

BJ Marthel International, Inc. submitted a formal quotation dated 31 May 1989 stating delivery “within 2 months after receipt of firm order” and payment terms “25% upon delivery, balance payable in 5 bi-monthly equal installments.” Respondent placed the order with its Japanese principal by opening an L/C on 23 February 1990, delivered two cylinder liners on 20 April 1990 (sales invoices noted “subject to verification”), and pursued collection through demand letters and litigation.

Key Dates

  • Quotation: 31 May 1989.
  • Purchase Order No. 13839: 2 November 1989 (one set, P477,000).
  • Purchase Order No. 14011: 15 January 1990 (second set).
  • Dishonored check deposited: 26 January 1990 (postdated to 18 January 1990).
  • L/C opened by respondent: 23 February 1990.
  • Delivery of cylinder liners: 20 April 1990.
  • Demand letters and suit: 1991 onward; RTC decision dismissing complaint; CA reversal; Supreme Court decision denying petition.

Applicable Law

  • 1987 Philippine Constitution (as the governing constitution at the time of decision).
  • New Civil Code provisions cited in the decision: Article 1169 (delay requires demand), Article 1191 (rescission for nonperformance in reciprocal obligations), Article 1249 (effect of delivery of negotiable instruments), Article 1324 (withdrawal of offer subject to time).
  • Rules of Court: Sections 2 and 3, Rule 57 (preliminary attachment).
  • Relevant jurisprudence cited in the decision (e.g., Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Matti; University of the Philippines v. De los Angeles; other cases referenced in the opinion).

Factual Summary of the Transaction and Payment

Respondent’s quotation specified delivery within two months and 25% payment upon delivery. Petitioner’s purchase orders omitted specific delivery dates and altered payment timing (purchase orders stated “25% down payment” but did not indicate when paid). Petitioner issued ten postdated checks as purported full payment for the first liner; one check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and later events concerning replacement or return of that check were disputed by the parties. Respondent proceeded to place orders in Japan and ultimately delivered both liners to petitioner’s warehouse on 20 April 1990. Petitioner accepted delivery (with “subject to verification” notation) but later refused to pay the full contract price.

Procedural History

Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and damages in the RTC of Makati; sought preliminary attachment which was granted and later lifted upon counter-bond. The trial court, after hearing, dismissed respondent’s complaint, ruling that respondent was bound by its quotation and that petitioner had validly cancelled the contract when respondent returned the postdated checks; counterclaims by petitioner were dismissed for lack of proof. The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering petitioner to pay P954,000 plus 14% interest from May 1991. Petitioner sought reconsideration in the CA which was denied and filed the present petition for review; the Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the CA.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether respondent incurred delay in performing its contractual obligations such that time was of the essence and petitioner validly rescinded the contract.
  2. Whether petitioner effectively rescinded the contract and thereby extinguished its obligation to pay.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Formation and Interpretation of the Contract

The Court emphasized that the ultimate criterion for treating time as of the essence is the actual or apparent intention of the parties, as manifested in the contract or surrounding circumstances. The Court observed that the quotation and the purchase orders contained materially different terms (notably omissions in the purchase orders regarding delivery dates and timing of down payment). The quotation constituted an offer in the negotiation phase, while the purchase orders represented the perfected agreement; discrepancies showed that the parties renegotiated terms prior to perfection of the contract. Testimony by both Pajarillo (sales manager for respondent) and Kanaan, Jr. (respondent’s VP) established renegotiation and that the final agreed term for down payment became 25% upon confirmation of order (i.e., upon order), not strictly upon delivery as the original quotation had stated. Petitioner produced no evidence refuting that the parties had re-negotiated and its own omissions in the purchase orders created ambiguity resolved against petitioner.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Whether Time Was of the Essence and Reasonableness of Delivery

Because the purchase orders did not fix delivery dates and omitted essential timing terms, the Court applied the doctrine that when delivery time is not fixed or is stated in indefinite terms, time is not of the essence; delivery must be made within a reasonable time. The Court found no evidence respondent knew of any specific dry-docking schedule for petitioner that would make immediate delivery essential. The lapse of several months between the quotation and petitioner’s purchase orders undermined petitioner’s reliance on the quotation’s two-month delivery term. Given the need for respondent to place orders with a Japanese supplier and the supplier’s heavy workload, delivery on 20 April 1990 was deemed within a reasonable period. The Court of Appeals’ finding that delivery was reasonable was affirmed.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Postdated Checks and Effect on Obligations

The Court held that the issuance of postdated checks by petitioner could not be treated as payment until the checks were cashed; under Article 1249, negotiable instruments delivered as payment produce the effect of payment only when cashed (absent creditor fault). The earliest check maturity was 18 January 1990, so petitioner’s argument that delivery should have been due by 2 January 1990 was untenable because full payment had not been completed by that date. Respondent’s actions in opening an irrevocable letter of credit on 23 February 1990 demonstrated its good-faith conduct in proceeding with performance based on business relationship and expectations.

Supreme Court’s Analys

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