G.R. No. L-25716 - Lopez vs. Roxas

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-25716)

Applicable Law and Key Dates

The dispute involves Republic Act No. 1793, which created the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, declared on December 17, 1965, the proclamation of Lopez as Vice-President, and the filing of Roxas’s election protest on January 5, 1966. Lopez’s petition was filed with the Supreme Court on February 22, 1966. The case was decided on July 28, 1966, applying the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as it predated the 1987 Constitution.

Constitutional Basis of Judicial Power and Election Contests

The Supreme Court held that under the 1935 Constitution, judicial power is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court and in inferior courts as established by law, except where the Constitution explicitly assigns jurisdiction elsewhere. The Constitution vests Congress with certain electoral tribunal functions for election contests involving members of the Senate and House of Representatives, but is otherwise silent on contests for the President and Vice-President. The judicial power includes settling justiciable controversies that require legislative definitions of enforceable rights and remedies as well as determining the courts' jurisdiction.

Justiciability of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Contests Before RA 1793

Prior to Republic Act No. 1793, no legal remedy existed for a losing candidate to challenge the proclamation of the President-elect or Vice-President-elect through a judicial process. Consequently, disputes concerning these national offices were non-justiciable as no procedure or tribunal was established to adjudicate such controversies.

Republic Act No. 1793 and Creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal

Section 1 of RA 1793 created an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal empowered as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect. This law conferred upon the Supreme Court an additional original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear election protests involving these offices. The tribunal is composed of the Chief Justice and the other members of the Supreme Court, meaning that the PET is not a separate court but acts as the Supreme Court performing a specialized function.

Nature and Scope of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court clarified that RA 1793 does not create a new court but merely entrusts the Supreme Court with additional duties of hearing election contests for the President and Vice-President, akin to the way courts of first instance perform special judicial functions as probate or juvenile courts without being inferior. The PET’s jurisdiction to judicially determine the validity of election returns and ballots does not infringe upon Congress’s ministerial power to canvass votes and proclaim winners. Whereas Congress’s role is executive and ministerial in canvassing, the PET exercises judicial power to correct irregularities or fraud in the vote tally.

Separation of Powers and Constitutional Appointment Power

Congress’s enactment of RA 1793 does not violate the constitutional separation of powers or the President’s appointment prerogative. Assigning additional duties to incumbent Supreme Court Justices to serve as the PET does not create new offices nor require reappointment. The law merely imposes additional judicial functions consistent with constitutional principles and established practices in other jurisdictions.

Legislative Discretion and Constitutional Intent

The Constitution’s silence on election contests involving the President and Vice-President indicates legislative discretion to enact laws determining the body and procedure for resolving such disputes. The historical record from the 1935 Constitutional Convention and subsequent legislative debates demonstrates the framers’ intent to leave this matter to ordinary legislation rather than constitutional mandate. Prominent members and legal experts confirmed that the absence of a constitutional provision did not preclude congressional action establishing judicial procedures for these election contests.

Distinction Between Congressional Canvassing and Judicial Review

Congress’s power to canvass and proclaim election winners is distinct from the PET’s judicial function to adjudicate contested election results. The PET

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-25716)

Background and Parties Involved

Fernando Lopez (petitioner) and Gerardo Roxas (respondent) were the principal candidates for the Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the November 9, 1965, general elections.
Congress, by Resolution No. 2 (December 17, 1965), proclaimed Lopez elected with 3,531,550 votes, a plurality of 26,724 votes over Roxas who had 3,504,826 votes.
Roxas filed Election Protest No. 2 with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal on January 5, 1966, asserting that he, not Lopez, obtained the majority of valid votes.
Lopez initiated an original action in the Supreme Court on February 22, 1966, seeking prohibition and a preliminary injunction to bar the Presidential Electoral Tribunal from proceeding, arguing the Tribunal's creation under Republic Act No. 1793 was unconstitutional.

Petitioner’s Constitutional and Legal Arguments

The Constitution is silent on election contests for President and Vice-President, thereby Congress cannot authorize such contests.
Contests contradict Congress’s exclusive constitutional power to canvass and proclaim election results for these offices.
Since no constitutional amendment exists for President/Vice-President election protests (as there is for Congress members), RA No. 1793 intrudes upon and effectively amends the Constitution.
The tenure of President and Vice-President is fixed constitutionally and cannot be abridged by legislative enactment.
The creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal unlawfully allows it to review Congress’s proclamation.
The Constitution’s framers rejected provisions for a special commission for election protests involving the President and Vice-President.
The participation of Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal violates separation of powers because Tribunal decisions on law are appealable to the Supreme Court.
Congress’ legislation cannot confer judicial power to entities other than courts established by law, nor can it appoint Tribunal members in substitution for the President’s appointment powers.

Judicial Power and the Constitution’s Allocation

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Philippine Constitution vests all judicial power in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be created by law.
Judicial power involves settling justiciable controversies involving enforceable rights.
Congress has the authority to define judicial remedies and jurisdictions subject to constitutional limits (Art. VIII, Sec. 2).
Prior to RA No. 1793, no legal remedy existed for defeated candidates for President or Vice-President to contest election results; such controversies were non-justiciable.
RA No. 1793 created the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, vesting it with exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect.
The Tribunal is composed of the Chief Justice and ten other justices of the Supreme Court, thereby conferring upon the Supreme Court additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.

Nature and Legal Character of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal

The act did not create a separate tribunal or court but conferred additional jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to act as the Presidential