G.R. No. 77008 - Lopez vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. 77008)

Factual Background

On June 5, 1984, Petitioner, through Mrs. Ty, filed an action for ejectment against Antonio Murillo in the Metropolitan Trial Court of the Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 0045993. In support of the filing, Mrs. Ty presented a special power of attorney authorizing her to prosecute the case in Petitioner’s behalf. The document was stated to have been executed by Petitioner before a city judge-notary public of Oslo, Norway. The Metropolitan Trial Court admitted the special power of attorney and, on November 25, 1984, rendered judgment in favor of Petitioner, ordering ejectment.

Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court

The Metropolitan Trial Court accepted the special power of attorney presented by Mrs. Ty as sufficient authority for the filing and prosecution of the ejectment case. After admission of the instrument, the court proceeded to adjudicate the dispute on the merits and ultimately ruled in favor of Petitioner on November 25, 1984.

Appeal to the Regional Trial Court

Antonio Murillo appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Q-44813. Among other grounds, he challenged Mrs. Ty’s authority to bring the action. He argued that the special power of attorney was inadmissible in evidence unless its due execution and authenticity were first proved. In its decision of November 15, 1985, the Regional Trial Court reversed the Metropolitan Trial Court, holding that the questioned special power of attorney was inadmissible because its due execution and authenticity were not proved. Consequently, it concluded that the suit was not instituted by the real party in interest nor by a duly authorized representative.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Regional Trial Court denied it in an order dated June 10, 1986.

Review by the Court of Appeals

Petitioner then sought relief by certiorari, but the Court of Appeals treated the pleading as a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09452. On September 30, 1986, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court emphasized that the action was not filed by the proper party, explaining that the real party in interest was Petitioner, who had turned out to be the registered owner, while the action was filed by an attorney-in-fact under a supposed special power of attorney whose due execution was not established. It held that an action can be filed only by the real party in interest, citing the principle that an attorney-in-fact has no interest in the litigation.

A dissenting opinion by Justice Bienvenido Ejercito took the contrary view. The dissent argued that the special power of attorney, being a public document duly executed before a notary public, did not require proof of its authenticity.

Supreme Court Petition and the Issue Framed

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. After a temporary restraining order was issued on February 9, 1987, the Supreme Court proceeded to resolve the issue posed by the petition: whether a special power of attorney executed in a foreign country is admissible in evidence as a public document in Philippine courts, absent the specific procedural requirements for foreign public records.

The Parties’ Contentions

Mrs. Ty, the alleged attorney-in-fact, contended that the special power of attorney was notarized and therefore constituted a public document that should be admitted in evidence without need of authentication and/or proof of due execution. Antonio Murillo countered that the document could not be treated as a public document for evidentiary purposes because its authenticity had not been proved in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court held that the special power of attorney in question was a public document in nature because it was notarized by a notary public or other competent public official with the solemnities required by law. It acknowledged that when executed and acknowledged in the Philippines, such a public document, or a certified true copy, is generally admissible without the need to prove due execution or authentication, unlike a private writing. In support, the Court referenced the evidentiary framework of Section 21, Rule 132 and Section 25, Rule 132.

However, the Court proceeded to apply the governing rule on proof of public or official records. It underscored the text of Section 25, Rule 132, which provides that when an office in which a record is kept is in a foreign country, the certification must be made by a qualified Philippine consular or foreign service officer and authenticated by the seal of office. It further stressed that a city judge-notary who notarized the document in the foreign country cannot issue the required certification under Section 25, Rule 132.

Accordingly, the Court found that the record did not disclose any compliance by Petitioner with the certification and authentication requirements under Section 25, Rule 132. Because such compliance was absent, the Court ruled that the special power of attorney was not admissible in evidence in Philippine courts.

The Supreme Court then connected this evidentiary deficiency to the litigation’s jurisdictional consequences. Since Mrs. Ty’s authority to prosecute the ejectment case in Petitioner’s name had not been duly established in evidence, the litigation was not commenced by the real party in interest or by one duly authorized by the real party in interest. Invoking the principle that courts do not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the real party in interest when the action is not properly instituted, the Court held that the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals never acquired jurisdiction over Petitioner. For lack of the requisite jurisdiction, the Court declared all proceedings null and void ab initio, citing People v. Navarro as authority for the effect of proceedings conducted without jurisdiction.

The Court therefore formulated the co

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 77008)

The case arose from a petition for review assailing the Court of Appeals decision dated September 30, 1986 and involving the admissibility in Philippine courts of a special power of attorney notarized in a foreign country.
The principal petitioner was Angelita Lopez, represented by Priscilla L. Ty as her alleged attorney-in-fact.
The respondents were the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 103), and Antonio Murillo.
The Supreme Court treated the controversy as a question affecting the validity of the institution of an ejectment action because the authority of counsel or attorney-in-fact depended on the admissibility of the power of attorney in evidence.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Angelita Lopez (petitioner) filed an ejectment case in the Metropolitan Trial Court of the Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 0045993, through Priscilla L. Ty.
Antonio Murillo (private respondent) appealed the MTC judgment to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as Q-44813.
The RTC reversed the MTC decision, holding that the special power of attorney was inadmissible for failure to prove due execution and authenticity.
Angelita Lopez sought relief in the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari, which the appellate court treated as a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09452.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit on September 30, 1986, with emphasis that the action was not filed by the proper party due to lack of proof of due execution of the power of attorney.
The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on February 9, 1987, enjoining enforcement of the RTC and CA dispositions.
The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition on April 8, 1987.
The Court ultimately set aside all proceedings below and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction attributable to the failure to validly establish the attorney-in-fact’s authority in evidence.

Key Factual Allegations

Angelita Lopez, a Filipino citizen residing in Norway, filed an ejectment action on June 5, 1984.
The ejectment suit was filed in the name of Lopez but prosecuted by Priscilla L. Ty as her alleged attorney-in-fact.
The special power of attorney was allegedly executed by Lopez before a city judge-notary public of Oslo, Norway.
The MTC admitted the special power of attorney and rendered judgment in favor of petitioner on November 25, 1984, finding the ejectment of private respondent warranted.
On appeal, the RTC held that the special power of attorney was inadmissible because its due execution and authenticity were not proved, concluding that suit was not commenced by the real party-in-interest nor by a duly authorized representative.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the core outcome by reasoning that the action was not filed by the proper party because the due execution of the special power of attorney was not established, and it cited the proposition that an attorney-in-fact has no interest in the litigation.
A key factual premise remained that the power of attorney was notarized in Norway by a city judge-notary, but the record did not show compliance with the method of certification and authentication required for public documents kept abroad.

Statutory Framework

The Supreme Court framed the main evidentiary issue through the rules on proof of public or official record under Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Court relied on the principle that when executed and acknowledged in the Philippines, a public document or a certified true copy is admissible in evidence.
The Court distinguished foreign notarization from Philippine notarization by emphasizing that foreign public documents require the certification and authentication specified in Section 25, Rule 132.
The decision referenced Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court for the general structure of proof rules in relation to admissibility of writings.
The Court also cited authorities stating that a public document notarized by competent officers bears an evidentiary character, including Cacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742 (1906) and Anlillon v. Barcelona, 37 SCRA 148, as well as U.S. v. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 241.
The jurisdictional consequence of failure to properly establish authority was anchored on the doctrine that courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the real party-in-interest when the action was not commenced by the real party or one duly author