Title
Loong vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 93986
Decision Date
Dec 22, 1992
A candidate's disqualification petition filed 49 days after COC submission was deemed untimely; SC ruled COMELEC lacked jurisdiction, emphasizing strict adherence to statutory deadlines.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 93986)

Key Dates

  • 15 January 1990: Loong filed his certificate of candidacy (last day for filing).
  • 17 February 1990: Election for officials of the Mindanao Autonomous Region.
  • 5 March 1990: Ututalum filed SPA No. 90-006 petition to disqualify Loong (49 days after Loong’s filing; 16 days after election).
  • 7 March 1990: Edris filed Petition in Intervention.
  • 15 May 1990: COMELEC (Second Division) issued resolution asserting jurisdiction to hear SPA No. 90-006.
  • 3 July 1990: COMELEC denied reconsideration; Loong was proclaimed Vice-Governor on the same date.
  • 9 July 1990: Loong filed special civil action (certiorari) in the Supreme Court.
  • 22 December 1992: Supreme Court rendered the decision under review.
    Applicable Constitution: 1987 Philippine Constitution (decision rendered after 1990).

Factual Background

Loong alleged he relied on community practice and personal confirmations of his mother and others that his date of birth was July 4, 1954. Ututalum alleged Loong did not meet the age qualification (35 years on election day) required by the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, and thus filed to cancel Loong’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Loong answered, raising that the petition was time-barred under Section 78 and that COMELEC lacked jurisdiction.

Procedural Posture Before the Supreme Court

COMELEC’s Second Division (two Commissioners concurring, one dissenting) denied Loong’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, relying on this Court’s Frivaldo decision and on Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646 to permit filing a certificate-cancellation petition after the statutory 25-day period if filed within a reasonable time after discovery and before proclamation. Loong sought certiorari to annul the COMELEC resolutions dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July 1990.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law (Section 78, Omnibus Election Code).
  2. Whether COMELEC’s procedural rule (Rule 25) or Sections 6 and 7 of RA No. 6646 could extend or modify the statutory 25-day filing period for petitions to cancel certificates of candidacy.
  3. Whether SPA No. 90-006 could be treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code when filed before proclamation.

Relevant Statutes and Rules

  • Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881): Section 74 (contents of certificate of candidacy), Section 78 (25-day period to file petition to cancel certificate for false representation), Section 253 (quo warranto filing period after proclamation).
  • Republic Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao): age requirement—at least 35 years on election day for Vice-Governor.
  • Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987): Sections 6 and 7 (effects of disqualification cases and procedural application to petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates).
  • COMELEC Rules of Procedure: Rule 23 (petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy), Rule 25 (disqualification proceedings and time to file under that rule).
  • Precedents cited: Frivaldo v. COMELEC (citizenship disqualification; Court had allowed post-proclamation challenge in limited context), Aznar v. COMELEC, and other decisions addressing the timing and proper remedy for disqualification claims.

Court’s Legal Analysis — Timeliness Under Section 78

The Supreme Court emphasized that Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code prescribes a mandatory, legislative 25-day period from filing of the certificate of candidacy to bring a petition to cancel that certificate for false representation. In the case at bar SPA No. 90-006 was filed 49 days after Loong’s certificate filing (and 16 days after the election), which plainly exceeded the statutory 25-day period. The Court concluded SPA No. 90-006 was therefore filed out of time under Section 78.

Court’s Legal Analysis — COMELEC Rules and RA 6646

The Court held that procedural rules promulgated by COMELEC (e.g., Section 3, Rule 25 permitting filing “any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation”) cannot supersede or modify the clear legislative prescription of Section 78. COMELEC lacks legislative power to alter statutory filing periods. The Court further examined Sections 6 and 7 of RA No. 6646 and found they do not alter or extend the 25-day period in Section 78; rather, Section 7 expressly reiterates that the procedure provided applies to petitions under Section 78. Section 6 addresses the effects of a disqualification case (e.g., suspension of proclamation in certain circumstances) but does not change filing periods. Thus RA 6646 did not validate filing beyond Section 78’s 25 days.

Court’s Legal Analysis — Quo Warranto and the “Procedural Gap”

The Court acknowledged the practical possibility that discovery of a false representation might occur after the 25-day Section 78 period has lapsed, creating a temporal gap before proclamation during which the would-be petitioner might be without remedy. Nevertheless, the Court held that the election laws foresee this situation by providing a separate remedy—quo warranto under Section 253—which may be filed within ten days from proclamation. The proper legislative remedy for any perceived procedural gap rests with the Legislature; COMELEC cannot remedy it by extending filing periods by rule. Because SPA No. 90-006 was filed before proclamation, it could not be treated as a quo warranto petition (that remedy is premature until after proclamation).

Court’s Legal Analysis — Limited Scope of Frivaldo

The Court examined Frivaldo, noting that the Frivaldo decision involved lack of Philippine citizenship—a fundamental qualification implicating loyalty to the Republic—and had been allowed to be litigated beyond the usual filing periods. The Court declined to apply Frivaldo broadly to all grounds of ineligibility. Where ineligibility arises from age, residence, or other similar grounds, the Court emphasized that statutory filing periods (e.g., the 25-day period of Section 78 or the 10-day quo warranto period under Section 253) should be applied strictly. The Cou

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