G.R. No. 122274 - Llenes vs. Dicdican

Case Summary (G.R. No. 122274)

Factual Background

The private respondent, Vivian G. Ginete, alleged that petitioner uttered defamatory words in her presence on 23 September 1993. Ginete filed a complaint for grave oral defamation with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas on 13 October 1993. The Ombudsman-Visayas required the petitioner to file a counter-affidavit, which the petitioner did not submit. The Graft Investigation Officer recommended indorsement to the City Prosecutor, and on 28 March 1994 the City Prosecutor filed an information for grave oral defamation in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu (Criminal Case No. 35684-R).

Procedural History

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on 30 May 1994, asserting that the offense had prescribed because grave oral defamation prescribes in six months under Article 90. The MTC, through Judge Amado B. Bajarias, Sr., denied the motion to quash on 18 July 1994 and denied reconsideration on 29 November 1994. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC, Cebu (Civil Case No. CEB-16988), which affirmed the MTC orders on 3 July 1995. After the RTC denied reconsideration on 23 August 1995, petitioner sought relief by filing the present Rule 65 petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue Presented

Whether the filing of a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for the crime of grave oral defamation so that the subsequent filing of an information in the Municipal Trial Court within six months is timely.

Parties’ Contentions

The petitioner contended that Article 90 fixes prescription for grave oral defamation at six months, which is 180 days under Article 13, Civil Code, and that the information filed on 28 March 1994 occurred 186 days after the alleged offense and therefore was prescribed. Petitioner relied on Zaldivia vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277, for the proposition that the filing of an information at the fiscal’s office does not interrupt prescription when a special law applies. The private respondent argued that the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman-Visayas was equivalent to filing with the fiscal’s office under Section 1, Rule 110, Rules of Court, and that such filing interrupted prescription; she distinguished Zaldivia because that case involved the Rule on Summary Procedure and Act No. 3326.

Rulings Below

The Municipal Trial Court denied petitioner’s motion to quash and denied reconsideration. The Regional Trial Court, per Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, affirmed the MTC orders, holding that the orders denying the motion to quash were interlocutory and that petitioner’s remedy was to proceed to trial and renew defenses if necessary, citing Acharon vs. Purisima and People vs. Bans. The RTC further found no grave abuse of discretion in the MTC’s actions and characterized any error in equating filing with the Ombudsman to filing with the fiscal’s office as an error of judgment rather than an indubitable abuse.

Legal Principles and Precedents

The Court reviewed the governing statutes on prescription for crimes: Article 90 (fixing terms), Article 91 (computation and interruption), and Act No. 3326, as amended (which provides that prescription is interrupted by the institution of judicial proceedings). The Court examined the jurisprudential history on interruption by filing, tracing two lines of precedent and concluding that the controlling doctrine derives from the second People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967), which established that filing a complaint in the municipal court or in the fiscal’s office for preliminary investigation interrupts prescription. The Court noted further development in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538 (1983), which broadened the rule to include filing in the fiscal’s office, and later reaffirmation in Calderon-Bargas vs. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, 227 SCRA 56 (1993). The Court contrasted these decisions with Zaldivia vs. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), which interpreted Act No. 3326 and the Rule on Summary Procedure to require filing in court to interrupt prescription in cases governed by that special law.

Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

The Court determined that the alleged defamatory words were uttered on 23 September 1993 and that prescription began to run on that date. The pivotal question was whether filing the complaint with the Ombudsman constituted an interruption under Article 91 or under the procedural rule in Section 1, Rule 110, given the Ombudsman’s constitutional and statutory powers. The Court examined Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI, 1987 Constitution, and Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770, which confer upon the Ombudsman authority to act promptly on complaints and to investigate and prosecute acts of public officers, including the power to conduct preliminary investigations and to recommend prosecution. The Court concluded that the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate complaints against public officers is broad and includes the power to initiate preliminary investigations that may lead to prosecution. Invoking the reasoning of Olarte and Francisco, the Court held that the policy reasons supporting interruption by filing in the municipal court or fiscal’s office apply with equal force to complaints filed with the Ombudsman when the subject is a public officer. The Court distinguished Zaldivia because that case involved the Rule on Summary Procedure and Act No. 3326, which govern special summary offenses, and thus do not control an ordinary offens

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 122274)

The Court resolved a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that challenged the denial of a motion to quash premised on prescription.
The pivotal question was whether the filing of a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for grave oral defamation interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
The Court gave due course to the petition and decided the case based on the pleadings because the issue was sufficiently discussed.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Susan V. Llenes, an Education Supervisor II, filed the special civil action for certiorari.
The respondents included Hon. Isaias P. Dicdican, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, and Hon. Amado B. Bajarias, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 7, as well as Vivian G. Ginete.
The private complainant, Vivian G. Ginete, initiated the process by filing a complaint with the Ombudsman-Visayas.
The Municipal Trial Court denied the petitioner’s motion to quash.
The Regional Trial Court affirmed the MTC rulings and held that the interlocutory denial of the motion to quash was reviewable only after trial, consistent with cited remedial doctrine.
After the RTC denied reconsideration, the petitioner pursued Rule 65 before the Court.

Key Factual Allegations

Vivian G. Ginete was then officer-in-charge of the Physical Education and School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional Office of Region VII of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
The complainant filed with the Ombudsman-Visayas a complaint for grave oral defamation alleging defamatory utterances made by the petitioner on 23 September 1993.
The petitioner was identified as an Education Supervisor II of the same DECS Regional Office.
The case proceeded after the Ombudsman office found the matter for further prosecution and indorsed it for filing of the necessary information.

Chronology of Proceedings

The complaint was filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas on 13 October 1993.
The Ombudsman required the petitioner to file a counter-affidavit pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7, but the petitioner failed to comply.
In a resolution dated 15 March 1994, a graft investigation officer recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City for filing of the information.
The deputy ombudsman approved the recommendation.
On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information for grave oral defamation with the Municipal Trial Court.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 35684-R and assigned to Branch 7.
On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to quash asserting that the case had already prescribed.
The MTC denied the motion to quash in an order dated 18 July 1994.
The petitioner sought reconsideration, which the MTC denied on 29 November 1994.
The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16988.
On 3 July 1995, the RTC affirmed the MTC orders and treated the denial as interlocutory.
The RTC denied reconsideration on 23 August 1995, prompting this Rule 65 petition.

Defense Based on Prescription

The petitioner invoked Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code to argue that grave oral defamation prescribes in six months.
She relied on Article 13 of the Civil Code, asserting that when the law speaks of months they are understood as 30 days, making the prescriptive period 180 days.
She contended that because the information was filed only on 28 March 1994, which was 186 days or six months and six days after 23 September 1993, the crime had already prescribed.
She also cited Zalderia vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, to support her position that filing at the fiscal’s office would not stop prescription.

RTC and MTC Rulings

The Municipal Trial Court denied the motion to quash on 18 July 1994.
The MTC agreed with the private respondent that Rule 110, Sec. 1 treats filing with the proper court or with the fiscal’s office as interrupting prescription for covered offenses.
The MTC accepted that filing with the Ombudsman was equivalent to filing with the fiscal’s office given the Ombudsman’s authority under Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770.
The RTC affirmed on 3 July 1995 and characterized the MTC’s denial as interlocutory.
The RTC held that, per Acharon vs. Purisima and as reiterated in People vs. Bans, the petitioner should proceed to trial and then appeal an adverse judgment.
The RTC found no satisfactory showing that the MTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, noting that the petitioner’s asserted ground was not indubitable.
The RTC further reasoned that even if the MTC erred, such error would be one of judgment because there was no decided case directly on the specific equivalency issue and Article 91 referred broadly to “filing of the complaint or information.”

Statutory Framework

The applicable prescription rules were Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court treated grave oral defamation as prescribing in six months under Article 90.
Article 91 provided that prescription commenced from the day the crime w