G.R. No. 84850 - Llamado vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. 84850)

Factual Background

Ricardo A. Llamado, then Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation, and Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., co-signed a postdated check payable to Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00. The check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The two were prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. Pascual fled the country, and the trial court obtained jurisdiction only over Llamado.

Trial Court Proceedings and Sentence

The trial court convicted Llamado and, in a decision dated 10 March 1987, sentenced him to one year of prision correccional, imposed a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and ordered reimbursement to Gaw of P186,500.00 plus costs. After the decision was read on 20 March 1987, Llamado, through counsel, orally manifested his intention to appeal; the trial court thereupon ordered the records forwarded to the Court of Appeals the same day.

Proceedings on Appeal and Extensions

The Court of Appeals served Llamado with a notice dated 9 July 1987 to file his Appellant’s Brief within thirty days. Llamado obtained several extensions to file his brief, the last of which expired on 18 November 1987. While his brief was being prepared, Llamado engaged new counsel and sought probation relief.

Petition for Probation and Procedural Chronology

On 30 November 1987 Llamado, with new counsel, filed a Petition for Probation under P.D. No. 968 in the trial court, but the trial court declined acceptance because the records had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Llamado then filed a "Manifestation and Petition for Probation" dated 16 November 1987 with the Court of Appeals, enclosing a copy of the petition submitted to the trial court and requesting either that the Court of Appeals grant probation or remand the records to the trial court for consideration. On 3 March 1988 Llamado filed a "Manifestation and Motion" formally withdrawing his appeal conditioned on approval of his petition for probation. The Office of the Solicitor General commented with no objection to probation; Gaw filed opposition. On 17 June 1988 the Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied the petition for probation, with Mr. Justice Bellosillo filing a dissent and Mr. Justice Santiago writing a concurring opinion; a motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 1988.

Statutory Framework of Probation Law and Its Amendments

The original Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 authorized the trial court to grant probation "at any time" after conviction and sentence and deemed the filing of the application to be a waiver of appeal or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. P.D. No. 1257 (1 December 1977) amended Section 4 to limit probation to a period "after [conviction and sentence] but before he begins to serve his sentence," and retained that an application filed with notice to the appellate court would be deemed a waiver or automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal, further providing that if filed on or after the date of the appellate court judgment, the trial court should act on the basis of that judgment. P.D. No. 1990 (5 October 1985) again amended Section 4 and narrowed the temporal window: probation could be granted only if the application was made "within the period for perfecting an appeal" and expressly provided that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."

Legal Issue Presented

The dispositive question was whether Llamado’s application for probation, filed after an appeal notice had been lodged with the trial court and the records forwarded to the Court of Appeals, after the appellate court had issued notices and extensions to file the Appellant’s Brief but before the actual filing of the brief, was barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990.

Parties' Contentions

Llamado contended that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" in Section 4 should not be read to refer to the fifteen-day perfection period established by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules, and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; he argued instead for a broader interpretation meaning the "earliest opportunity" to seek probation and invoked the rule that penal statutes must be liberally construed in favor of the accused. He also urged that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to act on his petition and should have remanded the records to the trial court. The Solicitor General interposed no objection; Gaw opposed the grant of probation.

Court's Analysis on Statutory Interpretation

The Court examined the statutory history and concluded that P.D. No. 1990 plainly narrowed the time for filing a probation application to "within the period for perfecting an appeal." The Court identified the applicable perfection period as the fifteen-day period for appealing a Regional Trial Court judgment, as provided in Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules, and Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court held that "perfecting an appeal" is a term of art in procedural law, referring to filing a notice of appeal with the trial court and serving a copy upon the People of the Philippines, and that Llamado’s oral manifestation in open court at the time of promulgation was at least equivalent to a written notice of appeal and thus perfected his appeal within the applicable period.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Construction and Invocation of Liberal Interpretation

The Court rejected Llamado’s reliance on the preambulatory "whereas" clauses of P.D. No. 1990, observing that whereas clauses are not part of the operative language and cannot control plain, specific statutory terms. The Court further rejected the plea for a liberal construction on the ground that the Probation Law is not a penal statute in the sense urged and, in any event, where statutory language is cle

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 84850)

Parties and Posture

Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation and was convicted in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Respondent Leon Gaw was the private complainant who received a dishonored postdated check for P186,500.00 co-signed by petitioner and Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr.
Respondent the Honorable Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s petition for probation in C.A.-G.R. No. 04678, prompting review by the Supreme Court.
The trial court convicted petitioner and sentenced him to one year of prision correccional, a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and reimbursement to Private Respondent of P186,500.00 plus costs.
Petitioner announced an appeal orally in open court on 20 March 1987, and the trial court forwarded the records to the Court of Appeals the same day.

Key Facts

Petitioner and Pascual co-signed a postdated check payable to Private Respondent in the amount of P186,500.00 which was dishonored for lack of funds.
The trial court convicted petitioner alone because jurisdiction over Pascual was not obtained due to his flight from the country.
The Court of Appeals issued a notice to file Appellant’s Brief on 9 July 1987 and granted several extensions, the last of which expired on 18 November 1987.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Probation in the trial court on 30 November 1987, and he filed a Manifestation and Petition for Probation with the Court of Appeals dated 16 November 1987 seeking remand or direct grant.
Petitioner filed a formal withdrawal of his appeal conditioned on probation approval in a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 1988.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment expressing no objection to probation, while Private Respondent filed objections that were considered by the Court of Appeals.

Statutory Framework

P.D. No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976), Section 4 originally allowed probation to be applied for "at any time" after conviction and deemed filing an application a waiver or automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
P.D. No. 1257 (1 December 1977) amended Section 4 to permit probation only after conviction and before the defendant began to serve his sentence, and it allowed the trial court to act on applications filed on or after appellate judgment on the basis of the appellate judgment.
P.D. No. 1990 (5 October 1985) further amended Section 4 to require that the application be made "within the period for perfecting an appeal" and added a proviso that no application shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal.
The period for perfecting an appeal was identified in the opinion as fifteen days under B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and specifically Section 5 of Rule 122, Revised Rules of Court.
Section 3(a) of Rule 122 was cited for the proposition that an appeal is taken or perfected by filing a notice of appeal with the trial court and serving a copy on the People of the Philippines.

Issue

The principal issue was whether petitioner’s application for probation filed after an oral notice of appeal, after forwarding of records to the Court of Appeals, and after the issuance of a notice to file Appellant’s Brief but before the actual filing of such brief, was barred