Title
Ley Construction and Development Corp. vs. Sedano
Case
G.R. No. 222711
Decision Date
Aug 23, 2017
A lease dispute arose when petitioner sued respondent for unpaid rent. The Supreme Court upheld dismissal due to improper venue, affirming the exclusive venue stipulation in the lease contract requiring filing in Pasay City.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 222711)

Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner alleged that it leased the property from PNCC on January 14, 2005 and subleased a 14,659.80‑sq.m. portion to respondent by a notarized lease contract dated September 11, 2006, for a ten‑year term beginning November 15, 2005, at a monthly rent of P1,174,780.00 with annual increases. Petitioner sued for collection of unpaid rent for August to December 2011, asserting arrears totaling P8,828,025.46 and seeking damages.

Respondent’s Position and Counterclaims

Respondent answered and filed a third‑party complaint against PNCC. He asserted he had been paying rent to petitioner until PNCC demanded direct payment to it after petitioner’s eviction from the premises pursuant to a court order; consequently, he remitted rent payments to PNCC for August–December 2011. He argued, if held liable to petitioner, PNCC should reimburse him for those payments. Respondent additionally pleaded that he had advanced deposits and overpayments to petitioner totaling P3,518,352.00 (deposit and advance rentals) plus P400,000.00 overpayment, and he interposed a counterclaim for reimbursement and for moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses.

PNCC’s Position

PNCC’s answer to the third‑party complaint contended respondent had no cause of action against it, noting respondent acknowledged PNCC’s right to receive rent and had entered into a lease with PNCC after petitioner’s eviction. PNCC therefore denied liability to respondent for reimbursement.

Procedural History

Petitioner filed its complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Valenzuela City, Branch 75 (Civil Case No. 40‑V‑12). Respondent raised improper venue as an affirmative defense, citing Section 21 of the lease contract, which provided that “All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others.” The Valenzuela‑RTC, by order dated June 15, 2015, dismissed petitioner’s complaint for improper venue and denied reconsideration by order dated January 27, 2016. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Applicable Law (1987 Constitution; Rules and Jurisdictional Thresholds)

The 1987 Constitution is the operative constitution for the decision. Procedurally, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs venue of civil actions: generally venue for personal actions lies where the plaintiff or any principal plaintiff resides or where the defendant resides or may be found at the election of the plaintiff, but parties may, by written agreement entered before filing, validly agree on exclusive venue (Rule 4, Section 4(b)). Jurisdictional thresholds distinguishing Metropolitan/municipal trial courts from RTCs derive from Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended (and RA 7691), with the RTC exercising exclusive original jurisdiction where the demand exceeds statutory thresholds (the complaint here involved an amount in excess of P8,000,000, thus within RTC jurisdiction).

Issue Presented

Whether the Valenzuela‑RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid in Civil Case No. 40‑V‑12 because the contract stipulated exclusive venue in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

RTC’s Ruling on Venue

The Valenzuela‑RTC held that Section 21 of the lease contract was void insofar as it would limit filing of cases that fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal trial courts (for example, forcible entry and detainer). However, the RTC found the stipulation valid as to matters within RTC jurisdiction. Because petitioner’s action for collection of sum of money exceeded the jurisdictional threshold for the RTC, the Valenzuela court ruled that the dispute should have been filed in the RTC of Pasay City pursuant to the contractual venue clause, and therefore dismissed the complaint for improper venue. The RTC also ruled that respondent did not waive the venue defense by filing motions for extensions, counterclaims, or impleading PNCC, since improper venue was timely asserted in his answer.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Rationale

The Supreme Court affirmed the Valenzuela‑RTC. It reiterated the controlling principles: parties may validly agree in writing, before suit is filed, on exclusive venue (Rule 4(4)(b)), and an exclusive venue clause is valid when (a) the stipulation is exclusive in intent, (b) expressed in writing, and (c) agreed upon before filing, as discussed in cases such as Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. Tecson and Briones v. Court of Appeals. The lease’s Section 21 plainly satisfied these elements: it is written, predates the suit, designates Pasay City and states “exclusive of all others,” demonstrating exclusive intent. The Court emphasized that such a stipulation is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction: jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be contracted away, and the law is deemed written into every contract. Because petitioner’s cause—collection of rent in an amount exceeding the RTC threshold—fell squarely

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