Title
Lerias vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 193548
Decision Date
Apr 8, 2019
Spouses Yñiguez claimed ownership of land, contested by Southern Leyte. A compromise recognized their title, but CA issued an injunction favoring Southern Leyte. SC ruled CA abused discretion, upholding Yñiguez's Torrens title as indefeasible.
certiorari
writ of preliminary injunction
clear legal right
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 223785)

Factual Background and Genesis of the RTC Case

The Spouses Yniguez instituted in the RTC a complaint for quieting of title with a request for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against the Provincial Government of Southern Leyte (Southern Leyte) and Philson Construction and Development Corporation (Philson Construction), docketed as Civil Case No. R-2896. They alleged, among other matters, that they were the absolute owners of a parcel of commercial land in Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1089; that they had paid real property taxes; and that Southern Leyte had annotated an adverse claim. They further claimed that Philson Construction had built a multi-purpose center on the property without their consent and without proper licenses from concerned local government offices, which they asserted created a cloud on their ownership.

Southern Leyte denied the Spouses Yniguez’ ownership. It traced the land covered by TCT No. T-1089 to TCT No. 150 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 35. Southern Leyte maintained that the lot had been sold to the Province of Leyte by Felix Aya-ay, as guardian of then minors Josefina and Asuncion Oppus y Garces, and that the Province of Leyte had paid property taxes since 1918. After it was created as a separate province, Southern Leyte asserted it was given the lot and had remained in continued peaceful possession since then. According to Southern Leyte, the Spouses Yniguez based their claimed ownership on a deed of donation executed by Asuncion Oppus on May 28, 1986, but Southern Leyte insisted the lot involved was different from its own. It also alleged that the Spouses Yniguez secured TCT No. T-1089 that eventually covered its lot through fraud and misrepresentation.

Compromise Agreement and RTC Judgment Approving the Settlement

While the RTC case proceeded, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. On April 13, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment approving the compromise agreement and enjoining strict compliance by the parties, without special pronouncement as to costs. The compromise recognized Southern Leyte’s withdrawal of an “offensive” resolution and acceptance of the Spouses Yniguez’ proposal in a settlement involving the property covered by TCT No. 1089. Under the terms, the Spouses Yniguez undertook to donate only the land and the building over which a Provincial Library was erected, as a usufruct. The compromise further provided that if the Provincial Government ceased to use the property for the specified functions, ownership and structures would automatically revert to the Spouses Yniguez and/or their heirs and successors-in-interest, with immediate right of possession. It also required Southern Leyte to be responsible for subdivision subject to concurrence and to bear related fees. The RTC judgment effectively embodied these terms.

Post-Judgment Events: Annulment Action, Donation by the Spouses, and Writ of Execution

Southern Leyte, contending that the compromise agreement had been entered into without authority of the Provincial Governor, later initiated in the CA an action for annulment of judgment in C.A.-G.R. CEB S.P. No. 03398. Meanwhile, the Spouses Yniguez donated the disputed property to petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias and Alfredo O. Yniguez by virtue of a deed of donation. As a result, TCT No. 1089 was cancelled, and TCT No. T-9542 was issued in the names of petitioner and Alfredo O. Yniguez by the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte.

While Southern Leyte’s action for annulment of judgment remained pending in the CA, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to execute the compromise judgment. The motion sought, among others, Southern Leyte’s vacating of the property and delivery to the victors in the suit. The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.

CA Proceedings and the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction

To prevent the execution of the compromise judgment, Southern Leyte applied in the CA for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. CEB S.P. No. 03398 to enjoin the RTC and its sheriff from enforcing the judgment by compromise. In a resolution dated March 30, 2009, the CA issued a TRO enjoining execution for 60 days. After further proceedings and hearing, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by Southern Leyte upon the posting of a bond amounting to P200,000.00, effective until further orders.

The CA reasoned that Southern Leyte had a clear right to be protected, grounding such right on its asserted ownership since 1918 and on its alleged actual possession, which the CA said gave rise to a disputable presumption of ownership. The CA further held that the adjudication of ownership in petitioner’s favor did not automatically entitle petitioner to possession, because Southern Leyte allegedly still enjoyed a right that must be protected.

After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 29, 2010, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, asserting that the CA’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Parties’ Contentions on Certiorari

Petitioner argued that the CA’s issuance of the writ was tainted with grave abuse of discretion because Southern Leyte failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. She maintained that Southern Leyte’s ownership claim rested on tax declarations dating back to 1918, while her ownership was supported by a Torrens title. Petitioner also contended that there was no evidence that Southern Leyte had actual possession of the property. She further argued that, since her ownership was beyond dispute, Southern Leyte could not obtain injunctive protection. Finally, she asserted that irreparable injury was not shown and that there was no necessity for the issuance of the writ.

The central question posed by the petition was whether the writ of preliminary injunction had been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Applicable Standards for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction

The Court applied the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction issues only upon established requisites. Under Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be granted when the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the acts complained of are restrained or controlled; when the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the acts during litigation would probably work injustice; or when a party is doing, threatening, or attempting acts probably violating the applicant’s rights and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Beyond the textual grounds, the Court emphasized that the applicant must prove the following requisites: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, (2) that the right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined, (3) that the invasion is material and substantial, and (4) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

The Court highlighted that the existence of a clear and unmistakable right is of utmost importance. Injunction does not protect contingent, abstract, or future rights. It does not issue where the right is doubtful or where an existing actual right has not been demonstrated. While injunction does not require overwhelming evidence, jurisprudence requires at least prima facie proof showing clearly that the applicant’s right exists with no lingering doubt as to its existence. Where the applicant’s right is uncertain or disputed, the issuance of preliminary injunction is improper. The Court cited the doctrinal framework in Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank for the proposition that proof of an actual existing right is indispensable and that the possibility of irreparable damage without such proof cannot justify injunctive relief.

Legal Reasoning: Lack of Clear and Unmistakable Right

The Court found that Southern Leyte’s right to be protected by injunction was not established. Southern Leyte’s claim of ownership since 1918 rested primarily on a tax declaration. In contrast, petitioner’s ownership was supported by a Torrens title, TCT No. T-9542. The Court ruled that Torrens registration should be preferred because the Torrens certificate evidences an indefeasible title in favor of the person whose name appears thereon, and such registration quieted the title to the land in question. Accordingly, petitioner’s ownership was neither doubtful nor disputable but certain and settled. The Court added that an indefeasible Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack, and is challengeable only through direct attack.

The Court further relied on Southern Leyte’s own admissions in the record. Southern Leyte had admitted petitioner’s ownership in the compromise agreement and in Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 070, Series of 2003. The Court held that such admission precluded Southern Leyte from asserting the contrary, including disputing petitioner’s right to enforce the compromise judgment through the writ of execution. The Court also considered that the mere fact that Southern Leyte challenged the compromise agreement in the CA did not diminish the admitted right for purposes of the injunctive relief.

The Court then addressed the CA’s reasoning that Southern Leyte’s actual possession gave rise to a disputable presumption of ownership. The Court declared that this reasoning was inherently erroneous because such presumption could not arise in the face of petitioner’s registered ownership under the Torrens system. The Court likewise rejected the CA’s declaration that Southern Leyte could remain in occupation of the property because its “right of occupation” had to be protected. The Court ruled that even if Southern Leyte’s occupation existed, such oc

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