Legaspi vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 216572
A mayoral candidate challenges disqualification of opponents for alleged vote-buying; SC reinstates COMELEC division ruling after en banc fails to reach majority vote.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 216572)

Factual Background

Feliciano Legaspi and Alfredo D. Germar both ran for mayoralty of Norzagaray, Bulacan, while Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. ran for councilor in the May 13, 2013 elections. Legaspi alleged massive vote-buying by private respondents occurring from May 11, 2013 until election day, with political leaders distributing envelopes containing Php 500.00 and sample ballots from an office of the North Hills Village Homeowners Association. Police efforts purportedly foiled distribution, and four boxes containing undistributed envelopes with an estimated aggregate amount of Php800,000.00 were intercepted by concerned citizens. Legaspi presented sworn statements of numerous voters, police reports, and other documentary and photographic evidence to support the vote-buying allegations. Private respondents denied the allegations and proffered alibis that they were attending a political rally on May 11, 2013.

COMELEC Division Proceedings

The COMELEC Special First Division evaluated the evidentiary submissions and, by a 2-1 vote on October 3, 2013, disqualified private respondents from the 2013 electoral race and referred the criminal aspect for preliminary investigation. The dispositive resolution directed implementation in accordance with succession rules under R.A. 7160.

COMELEC En Banc Proceedings and Vote Breakdown

Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. On July 10, 2014 the en banc issued a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration and affirming the Special First Division’s October 3, 2013 Resolution; that Resolution carried a vote recorded as 3-2-1-1 — three commissioners voted to deny the motion, two dissented, one took no part, and one did not vote due to an expired ad interim appointment. Because the Resolution did not obtain the concurrence of four (4) votes, the en banc conducted a re-deliberation pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. The re-deliberation produced an Order dated January 28, 2015 with a vote described as 3-2-2, and the en banc invoked the procedural rule to dismiss the administrative aspect of the petition for failing to obtain the necessary majority votes after re-deliberation.

Petition to the Supreme Court and September 1, 2015 Decision

Aggrieved, Feliciano Legaspi filed a Rule 64 petition in the Supreme Court challenging the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en banc Order. In the Court’s September 1, 2015 Decision, the petition was dismissed after the Court applied the Mendoza doctrine and construed Sec. 6, Rule 18 to require dismissal of an action originally commenced before the COMELEC whenever the en banc, after rehearing, failed to obtain the necessary majority; the Court there treated the election case as an action originally commenced with the Commission and concluded that the en banc’s failure to reach a four-vote majority mandated dismissal.

Issue Presented on Reconsideration

The narrow but consequential issue on reconsideration was the proper interpretation and constitutionality of Sec. 6, Rule 18, COMELEC Rules of Procedure when the COMELEC en banc fails to garner four (4) votes on reconsideration: whether the en banc’s failure after rehearing should result in dismissal of the original action, affirmance of the division ruling, or denial of the incidental motion — and whether the Mendoza doctrine comported with the voting requirement of Section 7, Article IX-A and the adjudicatory allocation of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on Reconsideration

The Court granted Legaspi’s motion for reconsideration, reversed and set aside the September 1, 2015 Decision, and granted the petition. The Court vacated the COMELEC en banc Order of January 28, 2015 and reinstated and affirmed the COMELEC Special First Division’s October 3, 2013 Resolution disqualifying private respondents. The Resolution was declared immediately executory.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court examined the language of Section 6, Rule 18 which prescribes three distinct effects when the en banc is equally divided or the necessary majority cannot be had: (1) dismissal where the action was originally commenced in the Commission, (2) affirmance in appealed cases, and (3) denial in incidental matters. The Court rejected the broad application of Mendoza insofar as Mendoza had been read to permit dismissal of an election case after the en banc failed to reach a majority on reconsideration even though the division had rendered a prior decision. The Court reasoned that when a division has already decided an election case, the matter actually pending before the en banc on a motion for reconsideration is not a separate original action but an application to review the division decision. The Court held that a motion for reconsideration filed with the en banc in that context is an incidental matter and not an “action or proceeding” within the enumerated items of Part V (“Particular Actions or Proceedings”) of the COMELEC Rules. The Court invoked the doctrine applied in League of Cities v. COMELEC and the clarificatory A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC resolution concerning Rule 56, Sec. 7, Rules of Court, observing the near-identical phrasing of the respective rules and the principle that similarly phrased rules should be harmonized. Under the Court’s interpretation, when the en banc, after rehearing, fails to secure the required majority, the motion for reconsideration — as an incidental matter — shall be deemed denied and the division’s prior valid action subsists and is affirmed. The Court further held that the Mendoza reading of Sec. 6, Rule 18 produced constitutional difficulties: it subverted the four-vote threshold required by Section 7, Article IX-A and attenuated the adjudicatory authority of the COMELEC divisions under Section 3, Article IX-C by allowing reversal without a valid en banc decision. The Court therefore modified the Mendoza doctrine and concluded that where an election case was decided by a division, the failure of the en banc to attain the required majority on reconsideration results in denial of the incidental motion and affirmation of the division ruling.

Disposition and Relief

The Court ordered the September 1, 2015 Decision reversed and set aside; the Rule 64 petition was granted. The COMELEC en banc Order of January 28, 2015 was set aside. The COMELEC Special First Division’s October 3, 2013 Resolution disqualifying Alfredo D. Germar and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. was reinstated and affirmed. The decision was declared immediately executory.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Perez filed a dissent joined by other justices, defending the original September 1, 2015 Decision and the Mendoza rationa

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