Title
Legaspi vs. Cebu City
Case
G.R. No. 159110
Decision Date
Dec 10, 2013
Cebu's Ordinance No. 1664, allowing vehicle clamping for illegal parking, upheld by SC as a valid exercise of police power, ensuring traffic regulation and due process.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 159110)

Ordinance No. 1664 — Principal Provisions

Ordinance No. 1664 (amending and supplementing the Traffic Code) establishes a policy to immobilize motor vehicles violating parking prohibitions or restrictions to ensure smooth traffic flow. Key operative provisions: Section 2 authorizes traffic enforcers (regular PNP personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) to immobilize violating vehicles by clamping a tire (using a “denver boot” or similar device). Section 3 prescribes penalties and release conditions: release requires payment of accumulated unpaid traffic penalties plus an administrative immobilization surcharge of P500 to the City Treasurer via the Traffic Violations Bureau, presentation of receipts, and an authorizing release order from specified city officials (Chairman, CITOM; Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology; or designated Assistant City Fiscal). Section 3 also penalizes tampering with clamps (criminal and civil liability), authorizes towing of unattended immobilized vehicles that obstruct traffic, and prescribes potential imprisonment or fines upon conviction for violating the ordinance.

Factual Antecedents and Private Suits

Petitioners alleged concrete incidents of clamping and impounding under the ordinance. The Jabans alleged multiple clamping incidents (e.g., June 23, 1997 for Bienvenido Jaban Sr.; May 19, 1997 for Jaban Jr.), compulsory payments to secure release without judicial hearing, and resulting inconvenience and loss. Legaspi alleged clamping on July 29, 1997 while his vehicle was temporarily left outside his residence, followed by towing even though the vehicle did not obstruct traffic. The petitioners sued the City and responsible officials in separate suits for invalidation of the ordinance, recovery of property, and damages; the cases were consolidated for trial.

Trial Court Ruling and Remedies Awarded

The Regional Trial Court (Branch 58, Cebu City) after trial declared Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional for violating due process. The RTC emphasized that the ordinance allowed traffic enforcers, at their sole determination, to immobilize vehicles and required owners to pay prescribed amounts before release, effectively making the enforcers “arresting officer, prosecutor, judge and collector” and depriving owners of use of their property without a hearing. The RTC held the ordinance penal in nature and violative of due process, and it awarded damages (including specific amounts for Legaspi and the Jabans) against the City of Cebu.

Court of Appeals Reversal

The City appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed and upheld Ordinance No. 1664. The CA reasoned that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power delegated to local governments by the Local Government Code. Citing Section 458 (powers of the sanggunian to regulate streets and traffic) and Section 16 (general welfare clause) of the LGC, the CA found that the ordinance addressed a legitimate and substantial public welfare objective—reducing traffic congestion caused by illegal parking—and that it was reasonable, non‑discriminatory, and consistent with national law.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court raised two principal issues: (1) whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the legislative/police powers of the City of Cebu; and (2) whether the ordinance satisfied constitutional and statutory limitations, specifically whether it complied with due process requirements and other substantive tests for validity.

Legal Tests for Validity of Local Ordinance

The Court reiterated established tests for the validity of an ordinance: in the formal dimension, the ordinance must be within the corporate powers of the LGU and enacted according to required procedures; in the substantive dimension, the ordinance must (1) not contravene the Constitution or statute; (2) not be unfair or oppressive; (3) not be partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not be unreasonable. These formal and substantive tests frame the Court’s review.

Formal Compliance: Delegation of Police Power to LGUs

The Supreme Court affirmed that Ordinance No. 1664 was within the corporate/police powers delegated to the City under the LGC. The Court relied on Section 458’s specific authority for the sanggunian to regulate streets, traffic, and remove encroachments or obstacles, and on Section 16’s general welfare clause. The LGC’s delegation and the broad function of police power support municipal measures addressing traffic congestion. The Court presumed proper compliance with enactment formalities in the absence of challenges on that ground.

Substantive Compliance: Due Process Analysis — Overview

The substantive due process analysis was central. The Court emphasized that due process comprises procedural and substantive components: procedural due process concerns notice and hearing requirements; substantive due process concerns the adequacy of government justification for restricting life, liberty, or property. The petitioners argued that clamping and withholding release without a prior judicial hearing, and vesting enforcement/release discretion in traffic officers and specified city officials, amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process and an unlawful aggregation of enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial, and collection functions.

Substantive Compliance: Court’s Reasoning and Conclusion on Due Process

The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ due process challenge. It found that Ordinance No. 1664 served a compelling government purpose — immediate mitigation of traffic congestion caused by illegal parking — and that the clamping/remedy was reasonably and substantially related to that purpose. The Court addressed key points:

  • Vagueness: The ordinance’s terms were sufficiently clear in scope and application; any residual ambiguity could be resolved by ordinary rules of statutory construction.
  • Administrative escape/relief: Section 3 provided an administrative remedy to obtain release without payment by allowing protest to and release orders from designated city officials (Chairman, CITOM; Committee chair; Assistant City Fiscal), which the Court regarded as an adequate administrative avenue to protect owners’ rights.
  • Necessity of clamping: Clamping was appropriate when the driver or owner was absent and the vehicle could otherwis

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