Title
Lee vs. Rodil
Case
G.R. No. 80544
Decision Date
Jul 5, 1989
Rosemarie Lee, representing C.S. Lee Enterprises, violated a trust receipt by failing to account for proceeds or return goods, leading to estafa charges under P.D. No. 115, upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 80544)

Factual Background

The information alleged that Rosemarie M. Lee, as authorized representative of C.S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., effected Letter of Credit No. 63251 dated July 26, 1982 for PHP 154,711.97 to purchase twenty‑three cartons of laboratory culture media. The bank released the necessary documents and the goods to petitioner who executed a trust receipt dated July 26, 1982 obligating her to hold the merchandise in trust, to have liberty to sell the same in cash for the account of the bank, and to account for the proceeds or return the goods by October 24, 1982.

Criminal Information

The People charged petitioner with estafa for having, upon possession of the merchandise, allegedly misappropriated or converted the goods or their value to her own use and benefit, and for failing, despite repeated demands, to turn over the proceeds of any sale to the Philippine Bank of Communications, to the prejudice of the bank in the amount of PHP 154,711.97.

Motion to Quash and Trial Court Disposition

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense because a breach of a trust receipt agreement, she contended, gave rise only to civil liability, and because P.D. No. 115 allegedly violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated August 21, 1987 and denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration in an order dated October 12, 1987.

Issue Presented

The sole legal issue presented to the Court was whether the violation of a trust receipt agreement constituted the crime of estafa.

Petitioner’s Contentions

Petitioner argued that breach of a trust receipt created only civil liability and did not constitute estafa, relying on the holdings in People v. Cuevo and Sia v. People. Petitioner further argued that Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 115 was unconstitutional insofar as it purported to criminalize what was essentially non‑payment of a debt and thus implicated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non‑payment of debt.

Government and Respondent Position

The Solicitor General and the respondents maintained that Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 115 expressly provided that the failure of an entrustee to turn over proceeds of sale of goods under a trust receipt, or to return unsold goods, shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. They further pointed out that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved acts committed prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 115 and therefore did not govern violations occurring after January 29, 1973.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Court affirmed the trial court’s orders. It held that the violation of a trust receipt after the effectivity of P.D. No. 115 constituted the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code by virtue of the explicit penal clause of Sec. 13, P.D. No. 115. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court observed that Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 115 explicitly declared that failure to turn over proceeds or to return goods covered by a trust receipt constituted estafa, punishable under Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, Paragraph One (b) of Act No. 3815. The Court treated the decree as a clarifying and confirmatory legislative statement that misappropriation of proceeds or conversion of goods received in trust falls within the scope of Article 315(1)(b), which penalizes conversion of property received in trust or on commission. The Court noted prior jurisprudence holding that conversion by an entrustee of goods covered by a trust receipt constituted estafa and concluded that the statutory penal clause removed any residual doubt.

Distinction from Cited Precedents

The Court distinguished People v. Cuevo and Sia v. People on temporal and factual grounds. It noted that the acts in those cases occurred in the 1960s, before P.D. No. 115 took effect, and that the Sia decision adopted the view favoring civil liability only because the questioned acts predated the decree. The Court further observed that the majority in People v. Cuevo had in fact held that violation of a trust receipt could constitute estafa, but that earlier procedural circumstances produced a different result in that case.

Constitutionality and Policy Considerations

Addressing the constitutional objection, the Court upheld P.D. No. 115 as a valid exercise o

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