Case Summary (G.R. No. 113216)
Secretary of Justice’s Review and Trial Court Proceedings
On January 27, 1993, Secretary Drilon reversed the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, deeming the letter a privileged communication in good faith and directing withdrawal of the information. The trial prosecutor moved to withdraw; Judge Asuncion denied the motion (Feb 22, 1993) and also denied reconsideration (Mar 5, 1993), citing solely Crespo v. Mogul (151 SCRA 462).
Issues Presented
Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error or grave abuse of discretion by refusing to withdraw the information despite the Secretary of Justice’s resolution finding no probable cause.
Probable Cause Determination as Executive Function
Preliminary investigation to determine probable cause for filing an information is a function of the prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and implementing jurisprudence. It is distinct from a judge’s determination of probable cause for an arrest warrant. Judicial precedent (Crespo v. Mogul; Roberts v. CA) holds that the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in filing or withdrawing charges is subject to supervisory review but not to automatic judicial override.
Secretary of Justice’s Supervisory Power and Effect of Appeal
Under the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. 5180, Rule 112 § 4, and DOJ Circulars/Orders, the Secretary of Justice may affirm, reverse, or modify prosecutorial resolutions. An appeal to the Secretary suspends arraignment but does not divest the RTC of jurisdiction once acquired. The trial court must independently assess the merits of any motion to dismiss or withdraw information, even if based on the Secretary’s directive.
Judicial Review of Executive Acts
While the filing or withdrawal of criminal information lies primarily within executive discretion, courts retain power to review for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such review does not substitute judicial judgment for executive discretion but ensures that delegated powers are exercised within constitutional bounds.
Independent Assessment Required of Trial Court
Jurisprudence (Crespo; Marcelo v. CA; Martinez v. CA; Roberts v. CA) mandates that upon a motion to withdraw an information—whether grounded in a prosecutor’s motion or the Secretary’s resolution—the trial court must conduct its own evaluation of probable cause and state reasons in a written order. A denial or grant cannot rest solely on the executive recommendation.
Application to Dr. Ledesma’s Case
An examination of the information and ancillary papers reveals that the June 1991 letter:
• Was a
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 113216)
Antecedent Facts
- In April 1992, Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. filed a libel complaint (I.S. No. 92-5433A) against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office; petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit.
- On July 6, 1992, the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, finding a “sufficient legal and factual basis,” filed an Information for libel against petitioner in RTC Quezon City, Branch 104.
- The Information accused petitioner of sending a letter dated June 27, 1991 to Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Philippine Heart Center Director, containing allegedly slanderous and defamatory remarks against Dr. Torres, Jr., publicly exposing him to ridicule.
Procedural History
- Petitioner sought review of the prosecutorial resolution under P.D. No. 77 (as amended by P.D. No. 911); the Department of Justice (DOJ) took up the petition and directed deferment of trial court proceedings.
- On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted a Motion to Defer Arraignment; private complainant moved to lift the order, and the court reset arraignment for January 18, 1993.
- Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, in a January 27, 1993 resolution, reversed the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, held the letter privileged and directed withdrawal of the Information.
- Trial Prosecutor Gavero filed a Motion to Withdraw Information (Feb. 17, 1993); Judge Asuncion denied it (Feb. 22, 1993) and likewise denied reconsideration (Mar. 5, 1993).
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court; the case was referred to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction to overturn the trial court’s reliance on Crespo vs. Mogul.
- Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues for Resolution
- Main issue: Did the trial court and the Court of Appeals commit reversible error in denying the Motion to Withdraw Information?
- Petitioner’s counsel reiterated trial court errors, contending that:
- Crespo vs. Mogul is inapplicable and infringes on separation of powers.
- The rule in Crespo diminishes substantive rights, violates non-delegation, due process, and equal protection.
- It encourages docket clogging, unnecessary trial burdens, misuse of judicial power and may lead to corruption among prosecutors.
- Even if Crespo applied, Judge Asuncion abused discretion by refusing to r