Title
Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Department of Energy-Attorney General Joint Task Force, and Secretary Angelo Reyes vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
Case
G.R. No. 209216
Decision Date
Feb 21, 2023
A challenge to the constitutionality of Section 14(e) of RA 8479, allowing DOE to control oil operations during emergencies, deemed unconstitutional for improper delegation of legislative power.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 112182)

Key Dates and Instruments

  • Natural disaster events: Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng (September–October 2009).
  • Proclamation of state of calamity and issuance of E.O. No. 839 (October 2009).
  • E.O. No. 845 (issued shortly after) lifted E.O. No. 839; the lifting affected the temporary relief but not the broader constitutional challenge to Section 14(e).

Applicable Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

  • 1987 Constitution (applicable): Article VI, Section 23(2) (Congress may, in times of war or other national emergency, by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to restrictions, to exercise necessary powers); Article XII, Section 17 (in national emergency the State may, under reasonable terms, temporarily take over or direct operation of privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest).
  • Statute: Republic Act No. 8479, Section 14(e) (authorizing the Department of Energy to, in national emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct operations of persons or entities in the industry).

Procedural History

Pilipinas Shell filed a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Injunction in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking, among other reliefs, a declaration that E.O. No. 839 and Section 14(e) of R.A. No. 8479 were unconstitutional. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order, then dismissed the petition as moot after the lifting of E.O. No. 839, but later (upon motion for reconsideration and after the filing of an amended petition) reversed the dismissal and eventually declared Section 14(e) void. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed a Rule 45 petition to the Supreme Court.

Procedural Issues: Mode of Appeal and Admission of Amended Petition

  • Mode of appeal: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ appeal from the RTC for being taken via the wrong procedural remedy when the issues raised were pure questions of law; such issues should be elevated by petition for review under Rule 45.
  • Admission of Amended Petition: The RTC properly admitted Pilipinas Shell’s Amended Petition as a matter of right under Rule 10, Section 2, because no responsive pleading had been served. Petitioners’ “Opposition with Motion to Admit Comment” did not constitute an admitted responsive pleading; a motion is ineffective to produce an admitted pleading unless the court acts on it. The Supreme Court upheld the RTC’s admission of the Amended Petition.

Justiciability and Mootness

  • Mootness of E.O. No. 839: The question over the validity of that specific executive order became moot when it was lifted.
  • Justiciability of statutory challenge: The constitutional challenge to Section 14(e) was not moot because the provision remained operative and could give rise to future executive orders; moreover, the case presented a demonstrable contrariety of legal rights (adequate to satisfy the actual case-or-controversy requirement) and implicated matters of public importance and potential repetition yet evading review. The Court thus proceeded to adjudicate the constitutionality of Section 14(e).

Res judicata and Prior Decisions

The Court rejected petitioners’ argument that prior Supreme Court jurisprudence (e.g., Garcia v. Corona) precluded this challenge by res judicata. The prior case involved a different provision (Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479) and different parties/issues; therefore the identity-of-claims requirement for res judicata was not satisfied.

Standard for Delegation of Emergency Powers

The Constitution authorizes Congress, in times of war or other national emergency, to by law authorize the President to exercise necessary emergency powers for a limited period and subject to restrictions. The Court read Article XII, Section 17 and Article VI, Section 23(2) together: Section 17’s reference to “the State” contemplates legislative action (Congress) prescribing reasonable terms; whether the President may exercise a particular takeover power depends on a valid legislative delegation.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency and Non‑delegable Presidential Powers

The Court applied the doctrine of qualified political agency: heads of executive departments act as the President’s alter egos and, in the ordinary course, their acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly disapproved or repudiated. However, certain exceptional presidential powers (e.g., declaring martial law, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardoning) require personal exercise by the President and are non‑delegable. The Court concluded that the temporary takeover of businesses affected with public interest during emergencies does not belong to that exceptional class.

Substantive Rationale: Constitutionality of Section 14(e)

  • Delegation questioned: Pilipinas Shell argued that Section 14(e) improperly delegated takeover authority to the Department of Energy rather than preserving delegation exclusively to the President as the constitutional text suggests.
  • Court’s conclusion: Section 14(e) is a constitutionally permissible delegation. Congress may vest the takeover authority in the executive branch and, consistent with the doctrine of qualified political agency, may vest operational authority in a department

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