Case Summary (G.R. No. 176951)
Characterization of the April 29, 2011 filing as a prohibited second motion for reconsideration
The Court found that the April 29, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration was essentially a second motion for reconsideration because it reasserted issues identical to those already raised in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2011. The resolution demonstrates the sameness of issues between the two motions, showing that the subsequent motion did not present materially new grounds that would distinguish it from the prior motion.
Governing rule forbidding second motions for reconsideration and the requisite exception
Section 2 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides unqualifiedly that a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall not be entertained. The Court reiterated its settled rule that only extraordinarily persuasive reasons and express leave first obtained will permit a second motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court’s Internal Rules (Section 3, Rule 15) further affirms that the Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration except in the higher interest of justice, and such exception requires an En Banc vote of at least two-thirds of actual membership; a second motion for reconsideration may be entertained only before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.
Finality of the April 12, 2011 Resolution and consequence for the Motion for Reconsideration
The Court noted that the April 12, 2011 Resolution had declared the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration denied with finality. Because the ruling sought to be reconsidered had already been declared final by the Court, the procedural prerequisites for entertaining a second motion for reconsideration were absent. Consequently, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration and the attached Motion for Reconsideration.
Distinction from earlier allowance of a second motion and application to the present request
Petitioners argued that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration in a different phase of the litigation. The Court distinguished the earlier instance—where the Court en banc had expressly allowed the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration (resolution of June 2, 2009)—from the present case. No similar en banc declaration or grant of leave existed for petitioners’ filing; thus the present filing remained a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
Disposition: denial of leave and grant of entry of judgment
Because the petitioners’ motion was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration and the issues raised were repetitive, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration and the attached Motion for Reconsideration. The Court granted respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment and directed the Clerk of Court to issue the Entry of Judgment forthwith. The Court ordered that no further pleadings or submissions by any party would be entertained.
Dissent (Justice Carpio): overview and principal conclusion
Justice Carpio dissented from the majority’s resolution, maintaining that the sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. His dissent focuses on substantive constitutional arguments under the 1987 Constitution: violation of Article X, Section 10 (creation of local government units must follow criteria established in the Local Government Code), violation of the Equal Protection Clause, failure to comply with the P100 million income requirement under the amended Local Government Code (RA 9009), and violation of Article X, Section 6 (just share in national taxes). He concluded that the Cityhood Laws must be struck down and would have granted the League of Cities’ motion for reconsideration.
Carpio dissent: Section 10, Article X and the Local Government Code
Justice Carpio emphasized the constitutional command that creation of local government units “shall be in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code,” and he reasoned that the Cityhood Laws are laws separate and distinct from the Local Government Code and therefore may not legitimately create exceptions to the statutory criteria. He concluded the Cityhood Laws did not amend the Local Government Code and thus cannot lawfully circumvent the uniform criteria required by the Constitution.
Carpio dissent: equal protection, P100 million requirement, and Section 6, Article X (IRA allocation)
Justice Carpio argued that using the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress as the classification criterion is not rationally related to the legislative purpose of ensuring fiscal viability. He held that RA 9009’s increased income requirement of P100 million (as an amendment of Section 450 of the LGC) is the prevailing statutory standard and must be strictly complied with; reliance on the old P20 million threshold is compliance with a repealed provision and unconstitutional. He also maintained that the Cityhood Laws undermine fair distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment (Section 6, Article X) because exempting certain municipalities skews IRA allocation and creates economic inequities with existing cities.
Carpio dissent: on the Legislature’s policy choices and practical consequences
While rejecting the majority’s characterization that the P100 million requirement was arbitrary, Justice Carpio stated that legislative judgments on thresholds are political and the Court should not invalidate them absent constitutional violation. He also noted existing cities need not comply retroactively with RA 9009 but that exemptions for the sixteen municipalities nevertheless create unfair classification and economic consequences that justify invalidation of the Cityhood Laws.
Dissent (Justice Sereno): stability of law, institutional concerns, and procedural critique
Justice Sereno’s separate dissent addressed the broader institutional and rule-of-law implications of
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 176951)
Procedural Posture and Case Context
- The case appears in 668 Phil. 119, en banc, and consolidates multiple G.R. Nos. (No. 176951; No. 177499; No. 178056) with an en banc resolution dated June 28, 2011.
- Petitioners are the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) represented by national president Jerry P. Treaas; the City of Calbayog represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treaas in his personal capacity as taxpayer.
- Respondents include the Commission on Elections and multiple municipalities (Baybay, Bogo, Catbalogan, Tandag, Borongan, Tayabas, Lamitan, Tabuk, Bayugan, Batac, Mati, Guihulngan, Cabadbaran, Carcar, El Salvador, Naga) and the Department of Budget and Management.
- The Court entertained and resolved two principal motions in the en banc resolution: (a) petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration (filed April 29, 2011) which attached a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of April 12, 2011; and (b) respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
Reliefs and Disposition by the Court en banc (Bersamin, J.)
- The Court considered: (a) the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of April 12, 2011 (with attached Motion for Reconsideration dated April 29, 2011); and (b) the respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
- The Court denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and granted the respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment.
- The Court directed the Clerk of Court to forthwith issue the Entry of Judgment in this case and declared that no further pleadings or submissions by any party shall be entertained.
- The dispositive posture of the earlier resolution of April 12, 2011 (which the petitioners sought to have reconsidered) read: “WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality. SO ORDERED.” (cited by the Court)
Nature and Characterization of Petitioners’ Motion
- The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration sought reconsideration, reversal, or setting aside of the April 12, 2011 resolution.
- The Court characterized the petitioners’ April 29, 2011 filing as effectively a second motion for reconsideration in relation to the February 15, 2011 Decision and the April 12, 2011 resolution which denied reconsideration.
- The Court observed that the Motion for Reconsideration raised issues “entirely identical” to those already raised in the petitioners’ Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (filed March 8, 2011) of the February 15, 2011 Decision.
- The Court provided a tabular demonstration in the resolution showing the sameness of issues between the two petitioners’ motions, mapping arguments raised in the April 29, 2011 motion to corresponding arguments in the March 8, 2011 Ad Cautelam Motion.
Tabulation of Identical Issues Between Petitioners’ Motions (as found by the Court)
- The petitioners’ arguments in the April 29, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration track and reassert the same points raised earlier in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2011, including:
- Claims that the Court acted contrary to the Rules of Court and internal procedures by taking cognizance of respondents’ multiple motions.
- Assertions that the Court’s resolutions contravene the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant Supreme Court issuances.
- Contentions that the controversies were already finally resolved; that principles of immutability of judgment and res judicata apply and deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
- Claims that the Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no longer any actual case or controversy.
- Allegations that the Cityhood Laws violated Article X, Sections 6 and 10 of the 1987 Constitution and that the Resolution erred in ruling the Cityhood Laws constitutional.
- An argument on the (non-)relevance of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9009, with the petitioners asserting it is not an issue in the case (though the petition included reference to RA 9009 for discussion).
Legal Rule Applied: Prohibition on Second Motions for Reconsideration
- The Court applied Section 2 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court which states: “No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.”
- The Court relied further on the Supreme Court’s Internal Rules (Section 3, Rule 15) which states:
- “The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership.”
- The Internal Rule defines reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” and conditions when a second motion may be entertained (before the ruling becomes final by operation of law or Court declaration) and prescribes division/en banc mechanics.
- The Court held the petitioners’ Motion was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration and thus not entertainable under the unqualified language of Section 2 of Rule 51 and the Internal Rules’ restrictions.
Application of the Rule to the Present Motion
- The Court emphasized that a second motion for reconsideration may be entertained only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after express leave has been obtained.
- The Court noted the April 12, 2011 resolution made the ruling sought to be reconsidered final by the Court’s express declaration; because of that finality, the petitioners’ motion could not be elevated or entertained.
- The Court distinguished the petitioners’ situation from an earlier instance where respondents’ second motion for reconsideration had been treated as “no longer a prohibited pleading” by the Court in the June 2, 2009 resolution; the Court pointed out that no similar en banc declaration existed to favor the petitioners’ Motion.
- The Court observed that the petitioners merely rehashed issues already finally passed upon and declined to re-discuss the same issues “to avoid repetition and redundancy.”
Conclusion and Directives of the Majority (Bersamin, J.)
- The Court denied the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of April 12, 2011 and the attached Motion for Reconsideration dated April 29, 2011.
- The Court granted respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011 and directed the Clerk of Court to immediately issue the Entry of Judgment.
- The Court declared that no further pleadings or submissions by any party should be entertained.
- Justices Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Abad, Perez, and Mendoza concurred in the resolution.
- Separate views: Justice Carpio filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Brion maintained his dissent; Justice Peralta maintained his vote; Justice Del Castillo took “no part”; Justice Villarama, Jr. joined Justice Carpio in dissent; Justice Sereno filed and joined a dissenting opinion in the main dissent of Justice Carpio.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio — Main Legal Arguments (I–VII)
- Core stance: Justice Carpio maintained that the sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional and reiterated his dissent.
- I. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution:
- Quoted Section 10, Article X: “No province, city, municipality, or