Case Summary (G.R. No. 248401)
Petitioners-in-Intervention and Additional Parties
A substantial number of cities (e.g., City of Tarlac, City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, City of Iriga, City of Cadiz, City of Oroquieta, among others) participated as petitioners-in-intervention, expressing interest particularly in the fiscal effects (IRA shares) of recognizing the challenged cityhood enactments.
Key Dates and Procedural History
- Original en banc Decision (majority) of 18 November 2008 declared 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
- Motions for reconsideration were filed; on 31 March 2009 the Court (majority) denied the first motion; on 28 April 2009 a split vote denied the second motion for reconsideration and an entry of judgment was recorded on 21 May 2009.
- On 21 December 2009 the Court (by a later majority) reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.
- Petitioners filed ad cautelam (precautionary) motions for reconsideration and a motion to annul the 21 December 2009 Decision; the Court, upon reexamination, granted reconsideration and reinstated the 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
Applicable Law
- 1987 Constitution (applicable because the decision date is post-1990).
- Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 (Section 450 being central).
- Republic Act No. 9009 (amendatory law that raised the income requirement for cityhood under Section 450).
- Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution (criteria for creation of local government units).
- Section 7, Rule 56, Rules of Court and the Court’s A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC en banc Clarificatory Resolution (governing tie votes on motions for reconsideration).
Primary Legal Questions Presented
- Whether the Cityhood Laws that exempted certain municipalities from the income requirement set by RA 9009 violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution by placing creation criteria outside the Local Government Code.
- Whether the exemptions in the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause by creating an unreasonable or arbitrary classification (i.e., privileging municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending in a particular Congress).
- Whether the operative fact doctrine could validate or otherwise sustain the Cityhood Laws notwithstanding a finding of unconstitutionality.
- The legal effect of a tied en banc vote on motions for reconsideration and whether a tie could overturn an earlier majority decision.
Court’s Analysis — Section 10, Article X (Creation Criteria Must Be in the Local Government Code)
- The Court emphasized the plain language of Section 10, Article X: creation of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays must be “in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.” The provision means the Local Government Code must contain all criteria for creation/conversion of local government units.
- RA 9009 expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement for cityhood from P20 million to P100 million, effective 30 June 2001. The amended Section 450 contains no exemption clause.
- The Cityhood Laws at issue were enacted after RA 9009 and explicitly exempted the respondent municipalities from the P100 million income requirement. The Court held that Congress cannot write such an exemption in laws other than the Local Government Code; doing so contravenes the Constitution. Consequently, the exemption provisions in the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they place criteria or exceptions outside the Local Government Code.
Court’s Analysis — RA 9009 and Its Nature
- The Court characterized RA 9009 as an amendment to the Local Government Code (not a separate, distinct law) because its Section 1 expressly amends Section 450 of RA 7160. RA 9009 thus embodied the prevailing income requirement in the Local Government Code, which must be the exclusive repository of creation criteria.
- Given the clarity and lack of ambiguity in RA 9009’s text (raising the income threshold and containing no exemptions), the Court declined to read any exemption into the amendatory statute or to create an exemption judicially.
Court’s Analysis — Operative Fact Doctrine
- The Court reaffirmed the operative fact doctrine as a rule of equity: declaration of unconstitutionality renders a law void, but the court may, in the interests of equity and fair play, leave undisturbed certain consequences produced while the law was in force (e.g., salaries paid, licenses issued, contracts executed).
- The Court rejected a novel minority theory that implementation of an unconstitutional law (i.e., functioning of the municipalities as cities) could retroactively constitutionalize that law. The majority held that the operative fact doctrine cannot be used to validate or retroactively constitutionalize an unconstitutional statute; rather, it can only affect or preserve certain effects arising before the judicial declaration of invalidity to prevent undue hardship or injustice to third parties.
Court’s Analysis — Equal Protection Clause
- The Court found the classification created by the Cityhood Laws — i.e., exempting municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending in the 11th Congress — to be unreasonable and violative of equal protection.
- Rationale:
- Pendency of a bill is not a substantial or material distinction in relation to the constitutional purpose of preventing fiscally non-viable municipalities from becoming cities; it is not rationally related to the fiscal viability (income) criterion.
- The exemption was limited to a specific existing condition (filed/pending during the 11th Congress) that cannot recur, running afoul of the requirement that a valid classification not be limited to existing conditions only.
- The exemption disadvantaged other similarly situated municipalities (those with similar incomes but without pending bills) and therefore failed the equal protection test because the classification did not apply equally to all similarly situated local government units.
Court’s Analysis — Tie-Vote on Motion for Reconsideration and Effect on Finality
- The Court invoked Section 7, Rule 56, Rules of Court and its en banc clarificatory Resolution (A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC) to hold that where an en banc vote on a motion for reconsideration results in a tie, the motion is deemed denied and the prior majority action stands.
- The Court concluded that the 6–6 tie-vote on the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration (28 April 2009 Resolution) operated as a denial of that motion and therefore left the 18 November 2008 Decision — which had been reached by majority vote — intact and final for purposes of enforcement.
- The majority rejected any argument that the tie-vote somehow produced an indeterminate result that permitted later reversal of the prior majority decision without a new majority vote.
Holding and Disposition
- The Court GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and REINSTATED the 18 November 2008 Decision.
- The Court declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL the sixteen Cityhood Laws listed in the resolution (Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491).
- The Court noted petitioners’ motion to annul the 21 December 2009 Decision and ordered accordingly.
Justices’ Concurrences and Dissent
- Justices Carpio Morales, Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, and Sereno concurred in the reinstatement of the 18 November 2008 Decision.
- Chief Justice Corona, Justices Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and Perez joined the dissent authored by
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 248401)
Case Caption and Participating Parties
- Multiple consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056) captioned by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treaas, City of Iloilo represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treaas, City of Calbayog represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento, and Jerry P. Treaas in his personal capacity as taxpayer, as petitioners.
- Respondents in the consolidated matters include the Commission on Elections and various municipalities (Baybay, Bogo, Catbalogan, Tandag, Borongan, Tayabas; Lamitan, Tabuk, Bayugan, Batac, Mati, Guihulngan; Cabadbaran, Carcar, El Salvador) which sought cityhood under individual Cityhood Laws.
- A number of cities filed as petitioners-in-intervention (City of Tarlac; City of Santiago; City of Iriga; City of Ligao; City of Legazpi; City of Tagaytay; City of Surigao; City of Bayawan; City of Silay; City of General Santos; City of Zamboanga; City of Gingoog; City of Cauayan; City of Pagadian; City of San Carlos; City of San Fernando; City of Tacurong; City of Tangub; City of Oroquieta; City of Urdaneta; City of Victorias; City of Calapan; City of Himamaylan; City of Batangas; City of Bais; City of Cadiz; City of Tagum) and other intervening petitioners (Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, Oroquieta City) who later filed ad cautelam motions for reconsideration.
Procedural History
- 18 November 2008: Supreme Court En Banc, by majority vote, struck down the subject sixteen (16) Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.
- 31 March 2009: En Banc, by majority vote, denied respondents’ first motion for reconsideration.
- 28 April 2009: En Banc, by split (6-6) vote, denied respondents’ second motion for reconsideration; the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
- 21 December 2009: En Banc, by subsequent action (Decision of 21 December 2009), reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws (later the subject of motions for reconsideration and a motion to annul).
- Upon reexamination in the present Resolution, the Court found the motions for reconsideration meritorious and reinstated the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the sixteen Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
Issues Presented to the Court
- Whether the Cityhood Laws that converted certain municipalities into cities violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution by providing criteria for city creation outside the Local Government Code.
- Whether the exemptions from Section 450 (income requirement) of the Local Government Code contained in the Cityhood Laws violated the equal protection clause.
- Whether RA 9009’s amendment of Section 450 (increasing the income requirement) applied to municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending, and whether exemptions in subsequent Cityhood Laws were valid.
- Whether the operative fact doctrine could be invoked to validate or otherwise preserve the effects of Cityhood Laws found unconstitutional.
- The effect of a tie (6-6) vote on a motion for reconsideration by the Court en banc under Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court and A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC.
- Whether the Court properly reconsidered and reversed its prior en banc decision (and the procedural consequences of the entry of judgment recorded on 21 May 2009).
Text and Interpretation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
- The Court reproduced Section 10, Article X: “No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
- Key interpretive points adopted by the majority:
- The Constitution requires that the creation of local government units follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and not in any other law.
- There is only one Local Government Code; the criteria for creation of cities must be embodied exclusively therein.
- Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code by other laws violates Section 10, Article X.
RA 9009 and Section 450 of the Local Government Code
- RA 9009 amended Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) to increase the income requirement for city creation from P20 million to P100 million.
- RA 9009’s amendment took effect on 30 June 2001.
- Section 450, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
- The Cityhood Laws at issue were enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009 and explicitly exempted the respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement.
- The majority’s legal characterization:
- RA 9009 expressly amended Section 450 and is not a law different from the Local Government Code; it embodies the new and prevailing Section 450.
- Because RA 9009 contains no exemption, Congress did not grant exemptions to municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending, and the Cityhood Laws’ exemptions thus contravene Section 10, Article X.
Majority Holding on Violation of Section 10, Article X
- The Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for violating Section 10, Article X because they provided exemptions from the income criterion outside of the Local Government Code.
- To be valid, any exemption must be written in the Local Government Code itself and not in other laws such as the Cityhood Laws.
- Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power by enacting Cityhood Laws that granted exemptions contrary to the express language of the Constitution.
- Relief granted by the majority:
- The motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision were granted.
- The 18 November 2008 Decision was reinstated, declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
- The Court noted petitioners’ motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.
Operative Fact Doctrine — Nature and Application
- The operative fact doctrine as stated in the Resolution:
- An unconstitutional law is void and generally produces no legal effect.
- The operative fact doctrine is an equitable exception: while the law remains unconstitutional, effects produced by the law prior to judicial declaration of nullity may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play.
- The doctrine never va