Title
Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Case
G.R. No. 84297
Decision Date
Dec 8, 1988
Election dispute between Lazatin and Timbol for Pampanga's congressional seat; HRET upheld jurisdiction, ruling protest timely filed under its rules.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 84297)

Key Dates

May 11, 1987 — Election day.
May 19, 1987 — COMELEC ordered suspension of proclamation.
May 26–27, 1987 — COMELEC ordered canvass to proceed; petitioner proclaimed May 27, 1987.
June 30, 1987 — Petitioner assumed office.
September 15, 1987 — COMELEC declared petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio.
January 25, 1988 — Supreme Court in G.R. No. 80007 set aside COMELEC’s revocation of the proclamation (petition challenging COMELEC).
January 28, 1988 — Petitioner served with copy of Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 80007.
February 8, 1988 — Private respondent filed his election protest with the HRET (Case No. 46).
May 2, 1988 and July 29, 1988 — HRET resolutions holding protest timely and denying reconsideration, respectively.
December 8, 1988 — Decision of the Supreme Court in the present petition (G.R. No. 84297).

Applicable Law and Rules

  • 1987 Constitution: Art. VI, Sec. 17 (each House shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of contests regarding election, returns, and qualifications of their Members); Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2) (COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction limited to regional, provincial and city offices).
  • Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881): Sec. 249 (COMELEC as sole judge for certain contests under prior framework) and Sec. 250 (ten-day period to file election contests for members of Batasang Pambansa and certain officials).
  • HRET Rules: Sec. 9 — prescribes filing periods for election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections (fifteen days from effectivity of Rules, Nov. 22, 1987, where proclamation made prior thereto; otherwise within 15 days from proclamation).
  • Executive Orders specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections: E.O. No. 134 and E.O. No. 144 (among other executive orders referenced).

Factual and Procedural Background

During canvassing, private respondent objected to certain returns; municipal canvassers did not rule, so private respondent went to COMELEC. COMELEC initially suspended proclamation, then later ordered canvassing and proclamation; petitioner was proclaimed May 27, 1987 and later assumed office. Private respondent filed actions with COMELEC to annul the proclamation and to prohibit assumption of office; COMELEC initially revoked the proclamation but the Supreme Court, in an earlier case (G.R. No. 80007), set aside that revocation on January 25, 1988 (service of decision on January 28, 1988). Private respondent filed an election protest with the HRET on February 8, 1988. Petitioner moved to dismiss for being filed late under Sec. 250, Omnibus Election Code; HRET denied the motion, ruling the protest timely under Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner sought extraordinary relief in the Supreme Court, challenging HRET’s jurisdiction.

Primary Legal Issue

Whether Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (ten-day filing rule) governs the filing period for election protests in the HRET — thereby rendering private respondent’s protest late — or whether Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules controls, making the protest timely and conferring jurisdiction on the HRET.

Court’s Analysis on Applicable Filing Period and Jurisdiction

  • Interpretation of Sec. 250: The Court observed Sec. 250’s plain language confines it to petitions filed before COMELEC contesting elections of Members of the Batasang Pambansa and certain local officials; thus it presupposes the institutional framework of jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution.
  • Constitutional shift and its implications: The 1987 Constitution reallocated exclusive jurisdiction over contests involving Members of the Senate and the House to their respective Electoral Tribunals (Art. VI, Sec. 17). The Batasang Pambansa was abolished; the COMELEC’s jurisdiction was narrowed to regional, provincial and city offices and appellate jurisdiction over municipal and barangay contests (Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)). Because of this constitutional reallocation, Sec. 250 cannot be read as governing contests properly within the original jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
  • Rule-making power of the HRET: The Court held that the HRET, as the constitutionally-created and sole judge of contests regarding members of the House, necessarily possesses the power to promulgate rules governing procedures before it, including the period for filing protests. The Court relied on the doctrine that a general constitutional power to judge such contests carries with it the incidental power to prescribe procedural rules (citing the reasoning in Angara v. Electoral Commission).
  • Application to the present case: Given the HRET’s rule (Sec. 9) establishing a fifteen-day filing period tied to the Rules’ effectivity or to the proclamation date, the Tribunal properly applied Sec. 9. The HRET also correctly treated the COMELEC’s September 15, 1987 resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio as having nullified the proclamation until the Supreme Court reinstated it by decision served January 28, 1988; therefore HRET calculated the 15-day filing period from the effective reinstatement of the proclamation and found private respondent’s filing of February 8, 1988 within that period.

Court’s Conclusion on Main Petition

The Supreme Court concluded that the HRET acted within its jurisdiction in finding the protest timely under Sec. 9 of its Rules. Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code was inapplicable to the HRET’s exercise of its constitutional authority. Because the HRET had jurisdiction to hear the protest, petitioner’s certiorari and prohibition petition was dis

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.