Title
Lavides vs. Pre
Case
G.R. No. 127830
Decision Date
Oct 17, 2001
Unregistered pacto de retro sale by Lavides deemed inferior to Vimarco, Inc.'s registered attachment; SC upheld CA ruling, denying Lavides' claims.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 127830)

Factual Background

Lavides’ claimed title originated from two pacto de retro sale documents executed by the Castro spouses: (a) the deed dated March 8, 1975 relating to land under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34702, and (b) the deed dated April 1, 1975 covering parcels under TCT Nos. T-88030, T-104900, T-75611, T-83936, and T-97768. These deeds were not registered nor annotated on the corresponding Torrens titles.

On May 10, 1976, Vimarco, Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch XXXVIII a complaint for sum of money with damages and with a petition for preliminary attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. 5122-P. On May 28, 1976, the CFI issued an ex parte order for a writ of preliminary attachment. Pursuant to the writ, Vimarco caused the registration of the attachment on the certificates of title with the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province.

On June 25, 1976, the Castro spouses moved to dissolve the writ. The record showed no resolution was issued on that motion. On October 13, 1976, the CFI rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 5122-P, favoring Vimarco and against the Castro spouses, acting on Vimarco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The decision was appealed by the Castro spouses, but on June 3, 1977, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision upholding Vimarco. The Castro spouses then sought relief from the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari and mandamus, and on July 29, 1983, the Supreme Court dismissed that petition, thereby rendering the Civil Case No. 5122-P judgment final and executory.

After finality, the RTC of Pasay City, upon Vimarco’s application, issued an order of execution dated November 29, 1983. Deputy Sheriff Ernesto B. Pre, representing the City Sheriff of Pasay City, caused the issuance and publication of a Sheriff’s Notice of Auction Sale on Execution Upon Real Properties, published on December 16, 23, and 30, 1983. An auction sale on the attached properties was initially set for January 10, 1984, but Lavides served a third-party claim with the deputy sheriff, covering the six parcels intended for sale. The auction sale was postponed to January 17, 1984.

Before the auction sale could proceed as to the claimed properties, Lavides filed a separate action, Civil Case No. 1719-6, before the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61, seeking to assert his claim and praying for a preliminary injunctive writ to maintain the status quo. A restraining order dated January 16, 1984 was issued and served on the deputy sheriff on January 17, 1984, prior to the scheduled auction sale. The auction proceeded only as to properties not covered by the third-party claim.

On March 20, 1984, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court then received evidence to resolve which held legal precedence: (1) the levy by virtue of a duly registered writ of attachment, or (2) the unregistered pacto de retro deeds executed by Lavides’ predecessors-in-interest before the levy.

Trial Court Proceedings and Outcome

On August 31, 1984, the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61 rendered judgment against Lavides. It dissolved the preliminary injunction, directed that the City Sheriff of Pasay City or any deputy could proceed with the auction sale of the subject properties, and dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim.

Lavides appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 47710. On October 10, 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto and dismissed the appeal. Lavides’ motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated January 21, 1997.

The Parties’ Contentions and Issues Raised

In the present petition, Lavides assigned four errors, attacking the appellate court’s rulings on: (i) the conclusion that Vimarco had a superior right of claim; (ii) the finding that Vimarco’s alleged actual knowledge was not equivalent to registration and thus did not establish bad faith; (iii) the proposition that the prior attachment order in Civil Case No. 5122-P had become final with finality; and (iv) the failure to award damages and attorney’s fees.

The Court treated the controversy as pivoting on whether a levy on execution, pursuant to a decision that had been affirmed up to the Supreme Court, was superior to a prior unregistered pacto de retro sale over the same properties.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Court

The Court found four material facts undisputed: the deeds on which Lavides relied were unregistered; the properties were registered lands under the Torrens System; the writ of attachment was duly recorded and annotated; and the Supreme Court decision dated July 29, 1983 in G.R. No. L-47410 had become final and executory.

The Court applied Section 50 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), substantially reproduced in Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Under Section 50, although an owner may convey registered land as fully as if it were not registered, no voluntary instrument purporting to convey or affect registered land takes effect as a conveyance or binds the land with respect to third persons unless it is registered; instead, such unregistered instrument operates only as a contract between the parties and as authority to the register of deeds.

Applying these provisions, the Court held that the pacto de retro deeds in Lavides’ favor did not bind Vimarco because they were neither registered nor annotated. Since the parcels were Torrens lands, the Court emphasized that registration is the operative act that validates transfers or creates liens on such property.

The Court relied on controlling doctrine, including Villasor v. Camon, Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, all affirming that validity against third parties in the Torrens system turns on the act of registration with the Register of Deeds. It acknowledged an exception recognized in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals: where a party had actual knowledge of the claimant’s actual, open, and notorious possession at the time the levy or attachment was registered, actual notice could be treated as equivalent to registration to prevent the Torrens system from being used to shield fraud.

Lavides invoked that exception by asserting Vimarco’s actual knowledge. The Court rejected the assertion for lack of evidentiary support. It found that Vimarco’s knowledge of Lavides’ claim arose only when Lavides filed the third-party claim with the deputy sheriff on January 10, 1984. In contrast, the attachment and levy had been not only recorded but also annotated on the titles as early as 1976.

The Court further explained the legal consequence of prior registration. It held that a prior registration of a lien creates a preference. It also stated that subsequent registration of the prior sale cannot defeat this preference, which retroacts to the date of the levy. The Court reasoned that otherwise the preference would be rendered nugatory and meaningless, citing Defensor v. Brillo. It added that the attachment or levy creates a lien, which cannot later be destroyed except by the very dissolution of the attachment or levy.

Consequently, because Lavides’ pacto de retro deeds were unregistered, his rights were held subordinate to the duly recorded and annotated attachment and levy. The Court also rejected Lavides’ contention that the CFI’s order of preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 5122-P had not become final. It held that when a decision had been rendered, the court in effect denied all pending motions. It also noted that the attachment remained effective. The Court added that treating the attachment otherwise would lead to undue delay in the payment of a debt already admitted and ov

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