G.R. No. L-409 - Laurel vs. Misa

Key Individuals and Context

Petitioner: Anastacio Laurel, detained on charges of treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
Respondent: Eriberto Misa, warden entrusted with petitioner’s custody
Background: During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines (1942–1945), petitioner allegedly adhered to the enemy by giving aid and comfort, leading to his prosecution for treason after liberation

Petitioner’s Arguments on Suspended Allegiance

Allegiance to the legitimate Philippine government was suspended during enemy occupation because sovereignty and governmental exercise were interrupted.
A new de facto government under Japanese military control supplanted the Commonwealth, meaning no “qualified and permanent” loyalty existed to warrant prosecution for treason.

Principle of Permanent Allegiance and Sovereignty

Citizenship imposes an absolute, permanent allegiance to one’s sovereign that cannot be abrogated by occupation.
Occupation may suspend the exercise of governmental authority but cannot transfer or suspend sovereignty itself, which remains vested in the legitimate government de jure.

Application of International Law on Occupation

Hague Regulations (Articles 23, 44, 45, 52) distinguish between sovereignty (which subsists) and its exercise (which may be suspended).
Military occupation grants only the occupant’s de facto authority over territory, not sovereignty; inhabitants’ allegiance to their government endures under established rules of contemporary international law.

Implications of Suspended Sovereignty Theory

If allegiance truly suspended, occupiers could conscript inhabitants to fight their own country without criminal liability, undermine independence, and force political suicide on the populace.
Such a doctrine would devastate small states and violate both humanitarian law and public conscience.

Sovereignty under the Commonwealth Constitution

The Commonwealth Government of 1935 was recognized by both U.S. Congress and Executive as exercising sovereign authority vested in the Filipino people under the 1935 Constitution.
Upon independence, the same government simply changed its name to “Republic of the Philippines” (Constitution, Art. XVIII), preserving continuity of sovereignty in the Filipino people.

Court Disposition

The petition for habeas corpus was denied. The Court held that treason charges under Article 114 remained enforceable because allegiance and sovereignty were never suspended by the Japanese occupation.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Perfecto

Treason is a war crime, dormant in peacetime and activated by war as a matter of national self-defense.
The law punishing treason is an emergency measure that cannot be suspended during war, for any relaxation would invite fifth-column sabotage and jeopardize national survival.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Hilado

Petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel to quash treason charges under Article 114, Revised Penal Code.
Supreme Court considered whether wartime occupation and later political changes affected treason liability.
Relief sought: declaration that petitioner cannot be prosecuted for treason.

During World War II Japanese forces occupied parts of the Philippines under martial law.
Petitioner Anastacio Laurel was accused of giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
After liberation and establishment of the Republic in 1946, treason prosecutions under Article 114 resumed.

Did Japanese occupation suspend the sovereignty of the Philippine government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens?
Did the proclamation of the Republic of the Philippines in 1946 sever treason liability for wartime acts?

Sovereignty of legitimate Philippine government was suspended; only occupier exercised control.
Allegiance of Filipino citizens was consequently suspended (“temporary allegiance” to occupier).
Proclamation of the Republic effected a change of sovereignty, rendering Article 114 inapplicable to wartime acts.
Lack of governmental protection relieved citizens from their duty of allegiance and treason obligations.
All political laws, including treason statutes, lay in abeyance during enemy occupation.

Citizenship entails absolute and permanent allegiance to de jure sovereign; cannot be severed by occupation.
Enemy occupation does not transfer nor suspend sovereignty of legitimate government (Co Kim Cham, Peralta).
Hague Regulations recognize that only the exercise of sovereign rights is suspended, not sovereignty itself.
Oppenheim and U.S. precedents (United States v. Rice) confirm that displaced sovereign’s allegiance and laws subsist.
Military occupant cannot abrogate treason law or compel inhabitants into aiding occupier without exceeding its powers.

Hague Regulations (Arts. 23, 43–45, 52): occupant must respect existing laws, cannot claim sove