Title
Lastimosa vs. Vasquez
Case
G.R. No. 116801
Decision Date
Apr 6, 1995
Ombudsman's authority upheld: can investigate, prosecute public officials for crimes unrelated to duties, deputize prosecutors, and enforce orders via contempt.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 116801)

Factual Background

On February 18, 1993, Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, a public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, lodged a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036. A graft investigation officer recommended dismissal for lack of prima facie evidence, but Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez disapproved that recommendation and directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape. By letter dated May 17, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for filing an appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court. The matter was assigned to petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa, who conducted a preliminary investigation and concluded that only acts of lasciviousness were established; with the Provincial Prosecutor’s approval she filed an information for acts of lasciviousness in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe on July 4, 1994.

Proceedings Before the Ombudsman and Department of Justice

After petitioner filed the information for acts of lasciviousness, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica sent inquiries to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11 and July 22, 1994 regarding compliance with the Ombudsman’s directive to charge for attempted rape. When no information for attempted rape had been filed, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica issued a show-cause order dated July 27, 1994 directing Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner to explain why they should not be punished for contempt for refusing to obey the Ombudsman’s directives. Concurrently, complaints alleging violation of the Code of Conduct and of anti-graft provisions were filed against the two prosecutors. On August 15, 1994, in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for six months without pay pursuant to Rule III, 9 of Administrative Order No. 7 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770; Ombudsman Vasquez approved the order on August 16, 1994. Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag implemented related indorsements and designated Eduardo Concepcion as Acting Provincial Prosecutor.

Petition and Relief Sought

On September 6, 1994 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside several orders and indorsements by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice, including the May 17, 1994 referral, the July 27, 1994 show-cause order for contempt, the August 9 and August 18, 1994 indorsements of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag, the August 15, 1994 preventive suspension order, and Department Order No. 259 designating an acting provincial prosecutor. Petitioner sought annulment of the contempt proceedings and the preventive suspension and sought to prohibit the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice from directing or supervising the filing and prosecution of the attempted rape charge.

The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner argued that once the Office of the Ombudsman assumed cognizance of the matter it did so to the exclusion of the Provincial Prosecutor’s office; that the Ombudsman should complete the preliminary investigation and file the information itself and may not delegate that duty to the Provincial Prosecutor; that the Office of the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction because the alleged rape was not committed in relation to a public office; and that the preventive suspension was invalid because she had not been afforded prior hearing and because the evidence was not “strong” as required under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. Respondents maintained that the Ombudsman had authority under Section 31 to designate or deputize prosecutors to assist in investigations and prosecutions and that such deputies served under the Ombudsman’s supervision and control; that contempt powers under Section 15(g) of R.A. No. 6770 authorized the Ombudsman to punish contempt; and that Section 24 authorized preventive suspension where the Ombudsman, in his judgment on the evidence before him, found the evidence of guilt to be strong and one of the statutory grounds to be present.

Issues Presented

The principal legal questions were whether the Office of the Ombudsman had the power to call upon and to deputize the Provincial Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution of an offense committed by a public official even if the Provincial Prosecutor had conducted a preliminary investigation and whether the Ombudsman could lawfully punish for contempt and impose a preventive suspension when prosecutors refused to comply with such direction. Subsidiary questions included whether the preventive suspension violated due process because no prior hearing was afforded and whether the six-month maximum suspension specified in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 exceeded permissible limits applicable under other statutes.

Ruling of the Court

The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and denied the motion to lift the preventive suspension. The Court held that the Ombudsman possesses the authority to call on and to deputize prosecutors under Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770, and that those deputized prosecutors are subject to the Ombudsman’s supervision and control. The Court further held that the Ombudsman had the power to punish for contempt under Section 15(g) and to impose preventive suspension under Section 24, and that the preventive suspension for six months without pay complied with the statutory prescription.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reasoned that Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman authority to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer when such act appears illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, and that jurisprudence had already recognized the Ombudsman’s power to investigate crimes committed by public officials even when such acts were unrelated to official duties. The Court relied on Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 to sustain the Ombudsman’s power to “designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor” and emphasized that those designated serve “under his supervision and control,” thereby permitting the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify a deputized prosecutor’s decisions. On contempt, the Court observed that Section 15(g) expressly empowered the Ombudsman to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and that the quasi-judicial character of the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation rendered contempt proceedings appropriate for defiance or disobedience to lawful orders. Concerning preventive suspension, the Court cited Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 which allowed suspension pending investigation if the Ombudsman judged the evidence of guilt to be strong and one of the enumerated circumstances was present; the Court affirmed that prior notice and hearing were not required for a preventive suspension because suspension is a preliminary administrative measure rather than a penalty. The Court applied its prior decisions, including Nera v. Garcia, Buenaseda v. Flavier, and Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, to conclude that the Ombudsman’s discretionary determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong is permissible and that the six-month ceiling in Section 24 governed the duration of suspension under the Ombudsman’s authority.

Disposition

The petition for

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