G.R. No. 129472 - Lasoy vs. Zenarosa

Case Summary (G.R. No. 129472)

Parties, Venue, and Material Dates

An information dated 03 July 1996, signed and filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero, charged the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-66788 for selling or offering for sale 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops in Quezon City. The case was raffled to RTC Branch 103 in Quezon City.

On arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty. The RTC entered judgment on 16 July 1996, sentencing them to a jail term of six (6) months and one (1) day, confiscating the evidence and ordering turnover to the Dangerous Drugs Board. On the same date, the accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

On 28 August 1996, the People, through Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed motions (i) to admit an amended information and (ii) to set aside the arraignment and the judgment of 16 July 1996. The trial court denied the motion to admit the amended information in an Order dated 03 September 1996, and later granted the motion to set aside arraignment and the decision on the jurisdictional theory that small-quantity drug cases should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, with the penalty range affecting jurisdiction.

Following the proceedings, the amended information was assigned to RTC Branch 76 and docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572. The RTC Branch 76 denied a motion to quash in an assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997 and denied reconsideration on 16 April 1997, prompting the accused to file a petition for certiorari with injunction and temporary restraining order.

Filing of Charges and Conviction Under the First Information

The information in Criminal Case No. 96-66788 alleged, in substance, that on or about 02 July 1996 in Quezon City, the accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, and without legal authority, willfully sold or offered for sale 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act 6425.

After arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty with counsel and were convicted. The RTC’s judgment described the evidence as 42.410 grams of marijuana fruiting tops and applied the applicable statute and rules on detention deduction. The record then shows that the accused applied for probation immediately after conviction.

Prosecution’s Motions to Admit an Amended Information and to Set Aside the Conviction

After conviction, on 28 August 1996, the People filed two motions. First, it sought admission of an amended information, asserting that “for some unknown reason” the accused were charged under Section 4 of Republic Act 6425 despite an alleged factual setting where the accused “should be charged for transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain,” involving forty-five pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila. The People maintained that it was “imperative” to file an amended information to make it conformable to the evidence.

Second, the People sought to set aside the arraignment and the decision dated 16 July 1996, effectively inviting the trial court to vacate the plea and conviction.

RTC Branch 103 Ruling: Denial of Amendment and Grant of Setting Aside on Jurisdictional Grounds

When the RTC addressed the motions on 03 September 1996, it denied the motion to admit the amended information, reasoning that the case had already been decided on the basis that the accused were arrested in possession of 42.410 grams and that it was too late to amend at that stage.

However, the same RTC, through another Order dated 03 September 1996, granted the motion to set aside arraignment and the decision. The court relied on a published Supreme Court resolution in G.R. No. 119131 (Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon. Francisco H. Escano, Jr.), and concluded that jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as in the case should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court. It further reasoned that, under RA 7659 (as effective 31 December 1993), the penalty range and the indeterminate penalty depended on the maximum penalty attached by statute, thus affecting jurisdiction.

This led to the filing and use of an amended information charging the accused in terms consistent with the prosecution’s claim of a different quantity and resulting jurisdictional consequences.

The Amended Information, the Motion to Quash, and the Certiorari Petition

The amended information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 under the amended theory. The accused filed a motion to quash before RTC Branch 76, which the People opposed. While the motion to quash was unresolved, the accused filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. They later moved to withdraw the petition to allow RTC Branch 76 to act on their motion to quash. The Court of Appeals noted the withdrawal in a resolution dated 15 November 1996.

In RTC Branch 76’s now-assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997, the motion to quash was denied and arraignment under the amended information was scheduled. The accused moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on 16 April 1997.

Hence, the accused filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, raising two principal grounds. They argued, first, that the amendment and re-arraignment violated the right against double jeopardy because they had already been arraigned, had pleaded guilty, and had been convicted. They also argued, second, that RTC Branch 103 had jurisdiction over the case under the first information, and that jurisdiction could not be shifted after conviction.

Issues Before the Court

The Court framed the case by reference to requisites for double jeopardy: (i) the existence of a valid complaint or information; (ii) jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter; (iii) plea by the accused; and (iv) conviction, acquittal, dismissal, or termination of the case without the accused’s express consent.

The core questions became whether the first information was valid despite the claimed alteration of the weight of marijuana and whether RTC Branch 103 had jurisdiction over the case as tried under Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788.

Validity of the First Information: Sufficiency Under Rule 110

As to the validity of the information, the prosecution insisted that the information was invalid due to alleged tampering that resulted in a lesser quantity (42.410 grams) than what was supposedly correct. The RTC had also treated the proceedings as tainted.

The Court rejected the conclusion that the original information was invalid. It relied on Rule 110, emphasizing that an information is valid if it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof, and if it sufficiently informs a person of ordinary intelligence of the nature of the charge and allows the court to decide according to law. It further invoked that the sufficiency requirements include the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by statute, the acts complained of as constituting the offense, the offended party, approximate time, and place.

Applying these standards, the Court held that the first information sufficiently alleged the manner by which the crime was committed. It stated the offense under Section 4 of Republic Act 6425 and alleged conduct constituting the statutory offense. Thus, the first information was not fatally defective merely because the quantity stated later proved, according to the prosecution, to be inconsistent with the evidence.

Double Jeopardy and the Effect of Alleged Tampering

The Court also addressed the RTC’s view that accused could not claim double jeopardy because they allegedly “participated/acquiesced to the tampering.” The Court held that there was no hard evidence in the record to support this assumption.

More importantly, the Court underscored that the accused had already been arraigned, pleaded guilty, and were convicted under the first information. Even assuming tampering occurred, the Court ruled that it did not justify setting aside the judgment dated 16 July 1996 after conviction and after the case had proceeded to the probation stage.

The Court invoked principles of finality and amendment timing under Rule 110, specifically Section 14 on amendment. The rule allows amendment without leave of court only before the accused pleads, and afterwards only as to matters of form during trial, by leave and discretion of the court, without prejudice to the rights of the accused. The rule also contemplates dismissal and filing of a new information for a mistake in charging the proper offense if this would not place the accused in double jeopardy. The Court held that the prosecution’s belated attempt to amend after conviction and after the accused applied for probation was contrary to procedural rules and to constitutional protections.

Finality of Criminal Conviction After Probation Application and Constitutional Protection

In discussing why the prosecution’s course was procedurally impermissible, the Court cited jurisprudence that treated convictions as becoming final, subject to the circumstances enumerated, and that an amendment request after the conviction and after probation application could not lawfully undo the conviction and subject the accused to a second prosecution for the same offense.

The Court further held that the only recognized situation where double jeopardy would not attach involved grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as when the prosecution was denied a fair opportunity to present its case or when the trial was a sham. It rejected the prosecution’s invocation of Galman v. Sandiganbayan as it relied on a mock trial caused by an authoritarian president who rigged the proceedings and ensured a predetermined result. The Court distinguished those facts and held that the alleged irregularities here did no

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 129472)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were the petitioners seeking certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order.
Hon. Monina A. Zenarosa, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 76, Quezon City, was the respondent in the amended-information proceedings.
The People of the Philippines were the respondent, defending the validity of the later proceedings.
The case began in the RTC, Br. 103, Quezon City, where an original information was filed and the accused pleaded guilty and were convicted.
After conviction and while the accused were applying for probation, the prosecution sought to admit an amended information and to set aside the earlier arraignment and decision.
The RTC branch handling the amended information denied the accused’s motion to quash and scheduled arraignment under the amended charge.
The accused challenged the amended proceedings through Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals’ assigned procedural route, which was treated by the Supreme Court as the present petition.
The Supreme Court ultimately granted the petition, set aside the RTC orders, and dismissed the amended case.

Key Factual Allegations

The original charge alleged that on or about July 2, 1996 in Quezon City, the accused, conspiring together, sold or offered for sale 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug.
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 and was raffled to Branch 103 of the RTC of Quezon City.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information.
On July 16, 1996, the RTC convicted the accused for Violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425, and imposed a jail term corresponding to the penalty stated in the decision.
On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
After conviction, the prosecution sought to admit an amended information asserting that the correct quantity should have been in kilos and not in grams, alleging transportation and delivery with intent to sell and to gain of Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.
The prosecution’s justification for the amendment relied on the claimed discrepancy between the alleged target quantity in inquest and the quantity stated in the information.
The RTC and the Supreme Court records reflected inquest and affidavit references stating that the accused were apprehended with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops.

Trial Court Rulings

The RTC denied the prosecution’s motion to admit the amended information on September 3, 1996, reasoning that it had already decided the case based on the arrest quantity stated as 42.410 grams and that it was too late to amend.
On the same date, the RTC granted the prosecution’s motion to set aside the arraignment and the decision, relying on published resolution(s) addressing jurisdictional issues over drug cases of small quantity.
The RTC set aside the earlier decision and proceeded as if a revised information was warranted, and the amended information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC.
The prosecution’s amended information proceeded to charge a sale or offer for sale of 42.410 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops.
The amended case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 and was presided over by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa.
The accused filed a Motion to Quash which was opposed by the prosecution.
While the motion to quash remained unresolved, the accused sought certiorari before the Court of Appeals, later withdrawing to permit Branch 76 to rule on the motion to quash.
The RTC denied the motion to quash and set arraignment under the amended information through the resolution dated February 14, 1997.
The accused sought reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 16, 1997, prompting the present petition.

Issues Framed

The Supreme Court identified the requisites for invoking double jeopardy and focused on whether those requisites were present.
The Court treated the principal issues as: (a) whether the first information was valid, and (b) whether RTC Branch 103 had jurisdiction to try the case under the first information.
A secondary but related issue involved whether the prosecution’s attempt to amend after conviction could be allowed without violating Art. III, Sec. 21, 1987 Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

The accused argued that the first information was valid and that the amended proceedings should be barred.
The accused asserted that double jeopardy protected them after they were arraigned, pleaded guilty, were convicted, and applied for probation.
The People argued that alteration/tampering occurred because the information reflected 42.410 grams when the “true” quantity should have been in kilos, rendering the first information invalid.
The People further defended the prosecution’s later move by tying the dispute to jurisdiction and the proper forum to try drug cases.
The trial court adopted the prosecution’s view that fraudulent alteration vitiated the earlier proceedings and prevented the attachment of double jeopardy.
The prosecution maintained that the alleged tampering involved a deceitful maneuvering that should deprive the accused of protection against a second prosecution.

Validity of the Information

The Supreme Court held that an information is valid if it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting the offense.
The Court reaffirmed that under Rule 110, Sec. 4, an information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.
The