Title
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Planta
Case
G.R. No. 152324
Decision Date
Apr 29, 2005
Landowner rejected DAR's land valuation; writ of execution issued despite pending judicial review. SC ruled certiorari proper remedy, reinstating LBP's petition.
certiorari
dismissal
writ of execution
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 152324)

Factual Background

Respondent Faustino B. Tobia owned, as registered owner, a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24310 located in Viga, Angadanan, Isabela, with an area of approximately ten point nine zero four four (10.9044) hectares, referred to in the decision as the subject property. Tobia voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the Government under R.A. No. 6657.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, petitioner LBP determined the land’s valuation at P107,962.83 per hectare, or a total of P1,145,075.41. On that basis, the Government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), offered to buy the property at the purchase price of P1,145,075.41. Tobia rejected the offer after finding the valuation too low. In response to Tobia’s rejection, summary administrative proceedings were conducted before respondent Pepito Planta, as Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB, docketed as JCR-II-511-ISA 2000.

After the proceedings, respondent Provincial Adjudicator issued a decision dated November 14, 2000, setting aside LBP’s valuation and fixing the land valuation at P250,000.00 per hectare. The decision as originally issued had fixed the amount at P250.00 per hectare, but the record showed the adjudicator later acknowledged it as a typographical error and amended the valuation to P250,000 per hectare. LBP sought reconsideration, but respondent Provincial Adjudicator, in an order dated January 25, 2001, denied it.

Thereafter, respondent Tobia filed a Manifestation and Motion dated April 16, 2001 praying for issuance of a writ of execution due to LBP’s alleged failure to appeal the November 14, 2000 decision. LBP opposed by asserting that the decision had not attained finality because it had filed a seasonable petition for judicial determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as a SAC, in Agrarian Case (A.C.) No. 0634, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Faustino Tobia.

DARAB Writ of Execution and LBP’s Response

Despite the pending SAC case A.C. No. 0634, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a Writ of Execution dated June 27, 2001, addressed to the DARAB Sheriff to implement the decision dated November 14, 2000. LBP received a copy of the writ on July 6, 2001 and promptly moved for reconsideration. Respondent Provincial Adjudicator denied LBP’s motion in an order dated August 8, 2001.

The Provincial Adjudicator reasoned that the right to elevate the valuation to the SAC was reserved to the landowner alone, not to LBP. On that premise, the adjudicator concluded that LBP was not entitled to file the original action for judicial determination of just compensation, and therefore the November 14, 2000 decision had become final and executory. Consequently, execution proceeded.

In the meantime, proceedings in A.C. No. 0634 before the SAC reached the pre-trial stage.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals and the Remedy Question

On August 30, 2001, LBP moved in the Court of Appeals for an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari to assail the Writ of Execution dated June 27, 2001. In its motion, LBP stated that it received the order denying reconsideration on August 21, 2001. LBP asserted that Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 allowed it fifteen (15) days from receipt of the writ of execution to question the interlocutory order by filing a petition for certiorari with the appellate court, with the period purportedly expiring on August 30, 2001. It also argued that under Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Section 4, Rule 65, it had sixty (60) days from notice of the order sought to be assailed within which to file its petition for certiorari, which would extend to October 14, 2001.

To reconcile the two periods and account for counsel’s workload, LBP requested an additional forty-five (45) days from August 30, 2001 or until October 14, 2001 to file the petition for certiorari against the writ of execution.

The Court of Appeals did not act on the request for extension by either granting or denying it. Instead, it dismissed due course to the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. In its Resolution dated September 19, 2001, the CA stated that LBP was assailing the writ of execution and that its recourse was a petition for review under Rule 43, not a petition for certiorari.

LBP moved for reconsideration and sought admission of the petition for certiorari and prohibition on October 12, 2001, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated February 12, 2002. The CA found no compelling reason to disturb its dismissal.

Issue and Parties’ Position Before the Supreme Court

LBP elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, presenting a single issue: whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari. LBP insisted that it correctly invoked certiorari as the remedy because the assailed writ of execution and the DARAB adjudicator’s action were not encompassed by Rule 43 review of final orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies. It also maintained that, in any event, the CA acted precipitately by dismissing its petition on an alleged remedy defect despite the seasonable filing of a motion for extension within the reglementary period.

The respondents maintained the CA’s position that LBP had availed itself of the wrong remedy.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright. The Court rejected the CA’s premise that Rule 43 governed the situation. The decision explained that Rule 43 applies to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. A writ of execution, however, did not constitute a final order or resolution within Rule 43 because it was issued to carry out a final order or judgment. The decision characterized execution as a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party and thus not generally appealable. Consequently, the CA’s invocation of Rule 43 was doctrinally misplaced.

The Court further explained that certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It then referenced the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, specifically Rule XIII, Section 11, which then provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation was not appealable to the Board, but had to be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice. In harmony with that, Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 provided that any party disagreeing with the summary administrative decision on valuation may bring the matter to the court for final determination of just compensation.

At the time LBP filed the petition for certiorari with the CA, the Court reasoned that remedy by appeal was not available either to question the valuation decision or to assail the writ directing execution. Even assuming an appeal could have been available, it would not have provided a speedy and adequate remedy against execution.

The Court then addressed LBP’s invocation of Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that decisions, orders, awards, or rulings of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on matters pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy thereof. The decision emphasized that Section 54 prevails because it is a substantive, special law designed for agrarian cases, even though it sets a shorter filing period than the general provisions under Rule 65.

Crucially, the Court ruled that the fifteen-day period under Section 54 was extendible, but any extension under Section 54 could not be made to extend beyond the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65, as a matter of procedural reconciliation. Applying those principles to the facts, the Court noted that LBP received the writ on July 6, 2001 and filed a motion for reconsideration forthwith. It received on August 21, 2001 the order denying reconsideration of the writ’s assailed issuance. Under Section 54, LBP therefore had fifteen days from receipt of the order within which to file its petition for certiorari with the CA, and it seasonably filed a motion for extension on August 30, 2001.

Despite the seasonable motion for extension, the CA dismissed the petition outright. The Court held this action to be reversible error because it was both premised on an erroneous understanding of the proper remedy and executed in a precipitous manner. The Court reasoned that the CA dismissed even when the petition had not yet been filed, and it did so without reserving judgment until the actual petition was submitted.

The Court found guidance in De Dios v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127623, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 520), where it had criticized the CA for being hasty in concluding the intended remedy defect solely on the petitioner’s allegation that it would file a petition for certiorari. In that precedent, the Court required the CA to reserve judgment until the petition was actually received, particularly

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