Title
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan Development Company
Case
G.R. No. 167886
Decision Date
Oct 25, 2005
Dispute over just compensation for 274.9-hectare land; SC ruled LANDBANK's appeal valid, reversing lower courts' denial due to attorneys' presumed authority.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 167886)

Factual Background

DARAB rendered a decision dated April 27, 2004, in DARAB Case No. 1204-0545-2003, preliminarily determining just compensation for TCT No. T-4972, a 274.9037 hectare parcel owned by respondent, at P58,237,301.68. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied; petitioner received the order denying reconsideration on June 11, 2004. Prior to receipt of that denial, petitioner caused a Notice of Entry of Appearance to be filed on June 4, 2004 by Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, and within the period to appeal filed a Notice of Appeal via registered mail on June 15, 2004, accompanied by a certification signed by Loreto B. Corotan, Head of petitioner’s Agrarian Operations Center.

Proceedings before DARAB

Respondent opposed giving due course to the Notice of Entry of Appearance and the Notice of Appeal, contending that Attys. Montarde and Mesa had not shown authorization to represent petitioner. The purported new counsels produced a Special Power of Attorney executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of petitioner, authorizing Loreto B. Corotan to represent petitioner and designating Attys. Montarde and Mesa as counsel; petitioner later appended two memoranda from Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, Department Manager and Head, CARP Legal Services Department, confirming authority for Atty. Montarde to file the notice of appeal.

DARAB Order and Rationale

On August 2, 2004, DARAB denied due course to the Notice of Entry of Appearance and the Notice of Appeal on the ground that Attys. Montarde and Mesa lacked authority because there had been no valid substitution of the former counsel of record, the law firm Piczon, Beramo & Associates. DARAB concluded that the April 27, 2004 decision had become final and executory because the notice of appeal filed by the purported new counsels did not toll the reglementary period to appeal.

Motions and Court of Appeals Action

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before DARAB, which was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition and affirmed DARAB’s finding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa were not authorized to file the notice of appeal. Petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court and secured a temporary restraining order enjoining execution of the DARAB decision.

Issue Presented

The central issue was whether DARAB abused its discretion in refusing to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Entry of Appearance and Notice of Appeal filed by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, in light of the presumption of an attorney’s authority to appear and the documentary and testimonial material submitted to establish authorization.

Legal Analysis and Authority

The Court examined Section 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court, which presumes that an attorney who appears in a cause is properly authorized and does not require a written power of attorney to appear; the presiding tribunal may require proof of authority on reasonable grounds. The Court reaffirmed the strong presumption in favor of counsel’s authority to appear and noted that a lawyer need not present written authorization to validate appearances or pleadings. The Court found that the Notice of Entry of Appearance by Attys. Montarde and Mesa produced the presumption of authority and that, when challenged, the SPA executed by Gilda E. Pico together with the memoranda of Atty. Beramo constituted sufficient proof of authorization. The Court further explained that an unauthorized appearance may be ratified by a client, expressly or impliedly, and that ratification retroacts to validate earlier acts of counsel.

Precedent and Doctrinal Application

The Court distinguished the case from authorities that treat substitution of counsel differently. It held that the situation did not involve a substitution of counsel but the employment of additional or collaborating counsel, a circumstance addressed in Ong Ching v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-35356, May 18, 1973, 51 SCRA 13, and relied on the principle that the filing of pleadings by a second counsel does not, by itself, operate as withdrawal of the first co

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