Title
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran
Case
G.R. No. 191667
Decision Date
Apr 22, 2015
Agoo Municipality's loan agreements for plaza redevelopment were challenged as ultra vires; SC ruled Municipality indispensable, remanded case for inclusion.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 191667)

Petitioner

Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) — lender in two loan transactions challenged as ultra vires and invalid.

Respondent

Eduardo M. Cacayuran — resident/taxpayer who filed suit invoking taxpayer standing to annul the loans and enjoin commercialization of the Public Plaza.

Intervenor

Municipality of Agoo, La Union — borrower in the loan agreements, owner of the Public Plaza and improvements thereon, later sought leave to intervene asserting status as an indispensable and real party-in-interest.

Key Dates

  • Resolutions authorizing loans: 2005 (P4,000,000) and 2006 (P28,000,000).
  • Complaint filed by Cacayuran: December 18, 2006.
  • Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision: April 10, 2007.
  • Court of Appeals (CA) decision: March 26, 2010.
  • Supreme Court decision denying LBP’s petition: April 17, 2013.
  • Motions for reconsideration and motions to intervene filed 2013–2014; amended Supreme Court resolution issued April 22, 2015. (All applicable proceedings were adjudicated under the 1987 Philippine Constitution.)

Applicable Law

Primary statutory and procedural authorities relied upon in the proceedings included: the 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and the Rules of Court (notably Section 7, Rule 3 on compulsory joinder of indispensable parties and Section 2, Rule 3 defining real party-in-interest). Precedent cited by the Court on indispensable-party doctrine and remand practice was also applied.

Facts

The Municipality obtained two loans from LBP to finance redevelopment works at the Public Plaza: a P4,000,000 loan for construction of ten kiosks and a P28,000,000 loan for construction of the “Agoo People’s Center.” The Municipality used, among other things, a 2,323.75-square meter lot within the Public Plaza (Plaza Lot) as collateral. A group of residents led by Cacayuran opposed the redevelopment and the loans as irregular and detrimental to public interest. Cacayuran requested documents from municipal officers but did not receive them, then filed a taxpayer’s complaint against LBP and certain municipal officers (in their personal capacity), but did not implead the Municipality itself as a defendant. During litigation the commercial building was completed and the Sangguniang Bayan later declared the area patrimonial property by ordinance.

Procedural History

The RTC declared the Subject Loans null and void, found the related resolutions highly irregular and ultra vires, held that the Municipality was not bound by the loans, imposed personal liability on the municipal officers, and ruled the Plaza Lot (public use property) could not be used as collateral. The municipal officers’ appeal to the CA was dismissed as abandoned; LBP’s appeal proceeded. The CA affirmed the RTC with modification (excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from personal liability), holding inter alia that Cacayuran had locus standi as a taxpayer, that the resolutions were invalid for non-compliance with the Local Government Code (which requires an ordinance for such loan agreements), that the Plaza Lot was public dominion and could not be collateralized, and that the loans were ultra vires. LBP petitioned to the Supreme Court, which denied the petition in an April 17, 2013 Decision affirming the CA on standing, invalidity of resolutions (ordinance required), and municipal officers’ ultra vires liability. LBP moved for reconsideration; the Municipality moved to intervene and filed a motion for reconsideration-in-intervention asserting indispensable-party status.

Issue Presented

Whether the Municipality of Agoo is an indispensable party and thus must be impleaded in the action seeking annulment of the loans and injunction of the commercialization of the Public Plaza, and whether non-joinder of the Municipality requires remand for impleading and further proceedings.

Court’s Analysis

The Court applied Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court: indispensable parties are those without whom no final determination can be had because their interest in the subject matter and relief sought is inextricably intertwined with other parties. The Court reiterated that non-joinder of an indispensable party does not automatically warrant dismissal; the proper remedy is impleading the missing parties and proceeding with the case, and dismissal is warranted only if the plaintiff refuses to comply with an order to implead.

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