Title
Lamera vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 93475
Decision Date
Jun 5, 1991
Driver convicted of abandonment for failing to aid victims after reckless imprudence collision; double jeopardy claim denied as charges involve distinct offenses.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 93475)

Facts of the Case

On March 14, 1985, at approximately 8:30 PM, Antonio A. Laméra allegedly drove his owner-type jeep negligently and collided with a tricycle driven by Ernesto Reyes along Urbano Street, Pasig. The accident caused damage to the tricycle and resulted in physical injuries to Ernesto Reyes and two other passengers, Paulino Gonzal and Patricio Quitalig. Subsequently, two separate criminal informations were filed against Laméra: (a) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (R.A. 3815); and (b) abandonment of one’s victim under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same Code.

Charges and Proceedings

  1. Reckless Imprudence (Article 365): Filed on September 10, 1985, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, docketed as Criminal Case No. 64294. The charge stated that petitioner drove the jeep in a careless and negligent manner causing the collision and resulting damages and injuries.

  2. Abandonment (Article 275, par. 2): Filed on November 14, 1985, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2793. This charge alleged that petitioner abandoned the injured parties without providing assistance or help.

The MeTC rendered judgment on June 29, 1987, convicting petitioner for abandonment and sentencing him to six months of arresto mayor and fines. Petitioner appealed and the RTC affirmed the conviction but reduced the penalty to two months’ imprisonment. Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the appeal on November 9, 1989. His motion for reconsideration was denied on May 17, 1990.

Legal Issue

Whether a valid charge for abandonment under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code can be filed and prosecuted against petitioner when he was already charged with reckless imprudence under Article 365 for the same act of causing injury to another.

Petitioner’s Argument

Petitioner contended that the two charges—reckless imprudence and abandonment—arising from the same act of vehicular collision cannot coexist. He reasoned that recklessness involves culpable negligence while abandonment requires proof of "accidental" injury, thus the charges are incompatible. He argued that charging him for both offenses violates principles against double jeopardy because one could not be indicted simultaneously based on both accident and recklessness for the same incident.

Respondent’s Position

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that Articles 365 and 275 penalize distinct and separate offenses. The principle of double jeopardy does not apply because the offenses, although arising from the same set of facts, have different essential elements and objectives under the law. Accordingly, prosecution for reckless imprudence is not a bar to prosecution for abandonment.

Court’s Analysis on Double Jeopardy and Distinction of Offenses

The Supreme Court emphasized that the principle of double jeopardy protects an accused only from subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It outlined the essential elements for double jeopardy to attach, including valid indictment, arraignment, plea, and termination of the prior case. Importantly, proof of "same offense" requires identity or substantial overlap of elements.

The Court distinguished the two offenses:

  • Reckless Imprudence (Article 365): A quasi-offense committed by culpa (negligence). Failure to help the victim, if alleged, only increases the penalty by one degree but is not a separate offense by itself. The information must specifically allege failure to assist for this enhancement.
  • Abandonment (Article 275, par. 2): A crime against personal security committed with dolo (intent), penalizing the failure to render assistance to a person accidentally wounded or injured. This constitutes a distinct offense separate from reckless imprudence.

The Court found that the two informations charged petitioner with separate offenses that arise from different legal grounds and elements:

  • Reckless imprudence deals with negligence causing injury or damage.
  • Abandonment penalizes willful failure to provide aid to an injured person.

Thus, an acquittal, conviction, or dismissal in one case does not bar prosecution in the other despite arising from the same incident.

Procedural Bar to Double Jeopardy Claim

The Court also held that the petitioner failed to invoke double jeopardy at the proper stages of the proceedings. Notably, when conviction was rendered in the abandonment case by the MeTC in June 1987, petitioner had not yet been arraigned in the reckless imprudence case (April 1989). One of the requisites for double jeopardy to attach is a prior arraignment in the earlier case. Since this condition was unmet, double jeopardy did not apply.

Jurisprudential Support

The Court cited precedents:

  • People vs. Bocar—legal jeopardy attaches only after arraignment and plea in a valid case.
  • People vs. Doriquez and People vs. Bacolod—prosecution for separate offenses arising from the same act is not prohibited by do

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