Title
Lamco vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission
Case
G.R. No. L-43575
Decision Date
Jul 31, 1978
Employee Marciano Lamco suffered a stroke during employment, filed for disability benefits; employer contested, claiming resignation. Supreme Court ruled in favor, citing compensability presumption, employer-employee relationship, and procedural leniency, awarding permanent total disability benefits.
stroke
compensable
disability benefits
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-43575)

Factual Background: Employment and the Stroke

Petitioner’s duties for respondent firm were substantial and managerial. He designed furniture, supervised the purchase of the correct raw materials, maintained inventory records, and oversaw the production of quality-controlled finished products. He worked six (6) days a week. On December 5, 1974, petitioner suffered a stroke and was rushed to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, then transferred to the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, where he remained confined from December 7, 1974 to January 25, 1975. The physician’s report diagnosed “Cerebral Infarction, Right”, with sudden onset of left hemiparesis and slight slurring of speech, absent seizure and loss of consciousness. It also noted that he was found hypertensive and was treated as such, undergoing physiotherapy.

After recovery, petitioner sought to resume working. Respondent refused on the ground that his position and the pressure of his work might induce a recurrence of his illness. Petitioner later filed his compensation claim on March 7, 1975.

The Claim and Initial Ruling of the Acting Referee

Petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits before the Workmen’s Compensation Section, Regional Office No. 4, Manila. In an Employer’s Report filed on May 13, 1975, respondent denied liability, asserting the absence of an employer-employee relationship at the time of the stroke. Respondent insisted that petitioner had resigned effective November 9, 1974, based on a resignation letter dated October 30, 1974.

In a decision dated October 28, 1975, the Acting Referee ruled in petitioner’s favor as to compensation. The Acting Referee directed respondent to pay P6,000.00 as compensation pursuant to Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, P300.00 as attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 31 of the Act, and P61.00 as decision fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, while denying reimbursement of medical expenses for lack of proof of receipts.

Review by the Commission and Dismissal for Lack of Employer-Employee Relationship

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. The case then proceeded to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review. On January 22, 1976, the Commission reversed the Acting Referee and dismissed the claim for lack of employer-employee relationship. The Commission’s dispositive portion rested solely on that ground, rejecting petitioner’s compensation entitlement based on respondent’s asserted resignation prior to the stroke.

Procedural Issue: Jurisdiction and Perfection of Review

Petitioner filed the present petition for review with the Court on April 23, 1976, which the Court noted as occurring two days after the expiration of the extension of time granted for filing the petition. The Court also observed that the petition lacked proper verification because it was not subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

The Court first addressed whether petitioner properly perfected his appeal and whether the petition’s defects were jurisdictional. For the failure to file a notice of appeal with the Commission, the Court applied its ruling in Vargas v. Philippine American Embroideries, Inc. (34 SCRA 680). It held that filing the notice of appeal was no longer compulsory under the new Rules of Court (specifically noting that the earlier rule making notice a condition precedent was eliminated in Rule 43), that the notice serves only to inform the Commission of the losing party’s intent to contest, and that the adverse private party need not be served with such notice since the petition itself must be served on the Commission and the adverse party with proof attached.

As to lack of proper verification, the Court ruled that the defect was not fatal to jurisdiction. It relied on the principle in Rule 1, Sec. 2 requiring liberal construction of procedural rules to secure just, speedy, and inexpensive determinations. Citing Quimpo v. Dela Victoria (46 SCRA 139) and Villasanta v. Bautista, 36 SCRA 160, the Court held that verification requirements were not jurisdictional but merely formal, particularly where meritorious reasons warranted relaxation.

Finally, the Court held that filing beyond the extended period likewise did not automatically deprive it of authority, invoking Rule 11, section 7, which allows the filing of pleadings after the time fixed by the rules at the court’s discretion. The Court stated that workmen’s compensation cases warranted less insistence on technicalities when the issues were clear and where good reasons for delay were interposed. It cited Chief Justice Moran’s observation that rules are intended to secure an orderly presentation of issues and should not defeat adjudication on the merits through technicalities.

Core Issues on the Merits

Petitioner sought reversal on two principal grounds. First, he argued that the Commission erred in finding a lack of employer-employee relationship because the resignation was not accepted and he continued working until the stroke on December 5, 1974. Second, he argued that the dismissal of the claim lacked both factual and legal basis. The Court found the petition meritorious and proceeded to resolve the compensation issues based on the established facts.

Whether Resignation Defeated Employer-Employee Relationship

The Court found petitioner’s claim that resignation was not acted upon to be supported by documentary evidence. It cited Annex B, a xerox copy of the Social Security and Medicare Contributions Payment Return filed by “Employer A. J. Barreto Enterprises” covering half of April 1974 up to the whole month of November 1974. It also cited Annex C, a xerox copy of an SSS sickness notification form which required the employer’s completion and was accomplished by Alvaro Barreto as company executive. Lastly, it cited Annex D, an SSS voucher payable to A. J. Barreto Enterprises reimbursing P360.00 advanced by respondent for sickness benefits accruing to employee Marciano Lamco, Jr. for confinement from “12-07-74 to 01-05-75”.

The Court concluded that the sole basis for respondent’s controversion—lack of an employer-employee relationship—had been rebutted by petitioner’s evidence, making the Commission’s dismissal erroneous.

Compensability of the Stroke and the Presumption under the Workmen’s Compensation Act

Having established that petitioner’s stroke supervened during employment, the Court resolved compensability. The physician’s report indicated that hypertension was probably aggravated by employment because petitioner was under constant pressure and tension. The Court treated that medical finding as sufficient but also emphasized broader compensability principles in workmen’s compensation. It stated that the illness did not become less compensable merely because the causal connection was framed as possible aggravation rather than direct causation. The Court reiterated a consistent line of rulings that when injury or death supervenes in the course of employment, the claimant need not show that the cause was directly brought about by employment or directly aggravated by the nature of the work.

The Court invoked the presumption of compensability in Section 43(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (No. 3428) as amended by Republic Act 772. Under this presumption, it is enough that employment contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. The claimant is not required to prove the case to the point of demonstration, and the law presumes compensability unless the employer clearly establishes that the mishap was not caused or aggravated by the employment. The Court further explained that credible evidence is required to negate traceability to the employment; mere absence of evidence that the mishap was traceable is insufficient.

The Court also noted that respondent failed to file a notice of controversion within the period prescribed by law. It held that this failure operated as an admission of compensability and constituted a waiver of the employer’s right to controvert, amounting to a renunciation of all defenses.

Temporary Versus Permanent Total Disability

With compensability resolved, the Court then addressed the nature and extent of benefits. The Commission had dismissed the entire claim, but petitioner had previously received an award for permanent total disability from the Acting Referee. Respondent argued before the Court that petitioner was not permanently and totally disabled, pointing to answers in the physician’s report: the physician allegedly indicated that temporary total disability would last 41 days, that petitioner could resume his former occupation right away after that period, and that permanent total disability was marked as “not applicable.”

Petitioner countered that respondent’s refusal to accept him for resumption of work after he presented himself constituted an implied admission that he was permanently and totally disabled for work. Petitioner relied on Marcelino v. Seven-Up Bottling Company of the Philippines and WCC (47 SCRA 43), where the Court had held the petitioner totally and permanently disabled under similar circumstances. In that earlier case, the employer had refused admission to work on the ground that the illness might recur, and the Court treated repeated refusals as showing that the employer considered the claimant incapacitated to perform not only his

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