Title
Lamb vs. Phipps
Case
G.R. No. 7806
Decision Date
Jul 12, 1912
Former official Lamb sought mandamus to compel Auditor Phipps to issue a clearance certificate after arbitrary refusal and unlawful seizure of property; Court granted mandamus, ruling refusal baseless and seizure illegal, but denied damages.
certificate of clearance
public officer
discretion
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 7806)

Factual Background

Relator alleged that he had served for four years as superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and had, prior to January 1, 1912, resigned for health reasons; his resignation was accepted January 2, 1912 effective December 31, 1911. He averred that he had rendered accounts for all government funds and property coming into his possession and that the records of the Auditor’s office showed those accounts to be balanced. Relator produced an auditor’s certificate dated March 11, 1911, covering earlier periods, and alleged that for the period from March 11, 1911 to December 31, 1911 he had likewise properly accounted for all funds and property. The Auditor, relator alleged, refused to issue a final clearance for that later period because of a supposed risk of a probable civil suit by one Fernandez, despite records showing Fernandez had signed vouchers acknowledging prior payments. Relator claimed that without the clearance he could not collect accrued leave, salary, and transportation and that, under Act No. 1605, he could not lawfully leave the Philippine Islands; he also alleged seizures of personal papers and the institution (and later dismissal) of criminal charges for malversation.

Procedural History

On March 18, 1912 relator filed an application in this court for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court ordered the Auditor to show cause promptly why the writ should not issue. Respondent appeared and interposed a demurrer asserting: (1) lack of jurisdiction of the court to issue mandamus directed to the Auditor for the Philippine Islands; and (2) that the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The cause was submitted on the pleadings. On March 30, 1912 the court entered a brief order sustaining the demurrer in part and granting leave to amend within five days; no amendment was filed. The court later issued a fuller opinion disposing of the questions presented and dismissed the petition with costs.

Issues Presented

The court framed and decided the following questions: whether the courts had jurisdiction to issue mandamus to the Auditor for the Philippine Islands; whether the petition alleged facts sufficient to require issuance of a peremptory mandamus to compel issuance of a clearance; whether the Auditor’s duty to issue a clearance was purely ministerial or involved judicial discretion; and whether the statutory appeal under Act No. 1792 to the Governor‑General and to the Secretary of War constituted another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy barring mandamus.

Meaning and Consequences of Auditor’s Certificate or Clearance

The court explained that Act No. 1605 prohibits every bonded officer or bonded employee of the Insular Government from leaving the Philippine Islands without first securing from the Auditor a certificate showing that his accounts have been finally settled by that office, and that violation is punishable by imprisonment or fine. The court observed that the petition did not expressly allege relator’s bonded status but, for present purposes, the Auditor’s certificate was assumed necessary to avoid criminal liability and to permit collection of final pay.

Duty of the Auditor in Approving Accounts

The court held that the Auditor is not bound to accept a mere paper balance as conclusive when he has reason to doubt its accuracy. Auditors routinely verify accounts by examination of vouchers, inspection of funds and property, and other investigation. The law does not require immediate approval of every tendered account; verification should be made as soon as practicable, and under Sec. 29, Act No. 1792 accounts may be reopened within three years for fraud, collusion, error in calculation, newly discovered material evidence, or when the interests of the Government require it. The petition contained no allegation showing unreasonable delay by the Auditor in this case.

Jurisdiction, Powers, and Legal Duties of the Auditor

The opinion surveyed the statutory scheme. The Auditor’s jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle all accounts of the Insular Government and of subordinate governmental entities is exclusive in the first instance; his decisions upon such accounts are final and conclusive upon executive branches of the Government except where an appeal is taken within one year under Sec. 36, Act No. 1792. The Governor‑General may confirm or disapprove and, in the latter event, must forward the appeal to the Secretary of War whose decision is final. The court compared the Auditor’s functions to those of state auditors and the Comptroller of the United States Treasury and treated the office as one invested with quasi‑judicial powers to pass upon facts and law in auditing claims.

Mandamus and the Distinction Between Ministerial and Discretionary Duties

The court reiterated established principles governing the writ of mandamus. Where an official duty is purely ministerial and clear, mandamus will command specific performance. Where a duty involves judgment or discretion, mandamus will compel action but not substitute a particular decision. The court surveyed authority showing that accounting officers exercise judicial discretion in scrutinizing claims and certifying balances, and that their determinations cannot be reviewed by mandamus so long as they act within the jurisdiction conferred by law. The court cited decisions such as Decatur v. Paulding, other United States authorities, and standards from leading treatises to support its view that auditors are entitled to untrammelled independence in auditing unless the law provides an appeal.

Availability and Adequacy of the Statutory Administrative Remedy

Applying the foregoing principles to the statutory scheme, the court held that the remedy of appeal provided by Act No. 1792 to the Governor‑General and ultimately to the Secretary of War is a statutory remedy which the legislature intended to be exclusive and which is, in general, plain, speedy, and adequate. Because an administrative appeal lay from the Auditor’s actions, mandamus was not the proper vehicle to control the Auditor’s substantive exercise of discretion in allowing or withholding a clearance.

Court’s Disposition and Reasoning

The court concluded that mandamus will lie to compel an auditor to act when he wholly fails to decide a matter and unreasonable delay deprives a person of rights and leaves no other adequate remedy, but that mandamus will not lie to compel an auditor to give a particular decision when the duty involves discretion. Applying those rules, the court held that the petition, as pleaded and admitted by demurrer, did not present facts sufficient to warrant directing the Auditor to issue the clearance sought. The court therefore overruled the demurrer ground asserting lack of jurisdiction, sustained the demurrer upon the ground that the petition did not state a cause of action, and dismissed the petition with costs because relator had not amended as permitted.

Dissent of Justice Trent

Justice Trent dissented. He accepted the principles that mandamus will not control the

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