Title
Lacurom vs. Tienzo
Case
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075
Decision Date
Oct 9, 2007
Judge Tienzo found guilty of gross ignorance for failing to clearly state facts and law in an unlawful detainer case; replevin case charge dismissed. Fined P20,000.
facts and law
fine
warning

Case Summary (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075)

Factual Background

The complaint assailed the RTC’s issuance of the writ of replevin in Civil Case No. 4971, captioned Roy G. Claudio and Michael Allan Parungao v. Carlos Dy and John Doe. The complainant argued that the writ was issued in violation of Rules of Court, Rule 60, Sections 2(a), 6, and 7. He asserted that plaintiff Claudio failed to prove that he was the owner of the subject vehicle, which the writ sought to recover. He further stated that Claudio admitted the sale of the vehicle to defendant, and that the vehicle had been the subject of several conveyances to third persons. According to the complainant, the respondent judge delayed the release of the property despite a third-party claim, allegedly without compliance with the time requirements under Section 6, Rule 60, including the five-day period for proper disposition after taking.

The complainant alleged that the respondent judge granted plaintiffs an extension of time to post the required indemnity bond, causing the vehicle to remain with the sheriff beyond the five-day period. He then claimed that, instead of ordering the vehicle’s return to the third-party claimant, the respondent judge issued an order that both granted plaintiffs’ motion for delivery of the vehicle and set aside a prior order requiring plaintiffs to post an indemnity bond.

The Second Charge: Civil Case No. 4884 and the Alleged Defective Decision

As to Civil Case No. 4884, the complainant alleged that the respondent judge rendered a decision that violated the constitutional requirement to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it was based, and likewise violated Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. The complainant also criticized that the decision was written in English in a manner he claimed did not befit an RTC judge, evidencing incompetence and lack of diligence. The complainant disclosed that the inclusion of this matter in the administrative complaint was at the behest of Feliciano Buenaventura, a retired presiding judge of the same RTC branch.

Respondent Judge’s Defense and Motion to Dismiss

Respondent judge opposed the complaint and sought outright dismissal, asserting that the complainant lacked legal personality and cause of action to commence the administrative complaint. She also challenged the complainant’s locus standi to raise the second issue because he was not the person directly affected by the decision in Civil Case No. 4884. She further argued that her decision dated July 21, 2005 was rendered in accordance with Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines of BP Blg. 129 and in line with Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006 (May 12, 1989), which she relied upon to sustain the validity of memorandum decisions. She contended that, since the writ of replevin and the challenged acts were part of her discharge of judicial functions, her actions should be presumed regular absent malice, dishonesty, or corrupt motive.

Respondent judge maintained that the complainant was not the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 4971, asserting that the proper parties were the defendants-litigants allegedly aggrieved by the order of release to the plaintiffs-applicants. She also argued that any remedy for an erroneous order was to file the appropriate judicial recourse, such as certiorari or an appeal, and not to institute an administrative case. Finally, she argued that the complaint included false statements because the complainant had allegedly strongly opposed the release of the property to plaintiff Claudio, and that her decision in the unlawful detainer case was consistent with Francisco v. Permskul. Respondent judge also noted that Buenaventura did not appeal the decision to the appellate court, and thus questioned the basis for challenging it.

Complainant’s Reply and the OCA’s Initial Evaluation

In reply, the complainant argued that the real party in interest rule did not apply to administrative cases in the same manner as in ordinary civil disputes. He relied on Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which allows a person with personal knowledge of the alleged facts to lodge administrative charges against an erring judge. He reiterated the allegations in the complaint.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) evaluated the complaint partly meritorious. On the first charge concerning the issuance of the writ of replevin in Civil Case No. 4971, the OCA found that the error imputed to the respondent judge was of a judicial character, arising mainly from the complainant’s attack on the respondent judge’s interpretation of the law and the rules of procedure on replevin. The OCA concluded that the proper corrective remedy lay with the courts and not through an administrative complaint. On the second issue concerning the decision in Civil Case No. 4884, the OCA observed that if the decision had become final without appeal, the lack of an appeal indicated satisfaction with the judgment; otherwise, a challenge should have been brought to higher courts. The OCA therefore believed the complainant lacked standing to question that decision. Still, despite these procedural reservations, the OCA concluded that respondent judge was administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, specifically for her disregard of the constitutional mandate that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on the First Charge: Judicial Error Not Properly Cognizable in Administrative Proceedings

The Court sustained the OCA’s evaluation and agreed that the challenge to the writ of replevin in Civil Case No. 4971 was clearly judicial in nature. The Court held that the administrative complaint was not the proper remedy to assail the legality of the respondent judge’s order, particularly where sufficient judicial remedies existed. The Court reiterated that not every error committed by judges in the performance of official duties gives rise to administrative liability. It emphasized that, absent fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, acts done in official capacity—even if erroneous—do not automatically constitute misconduct. For administrative liability to attach, the respondent judge must be shown to have acted with bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or similar motives. In the absence of such elements, judges could not be held administratively liable for erroneous judicial acts committed in good faith.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the first charge for lack of merit.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Second Charge: Violation of Article VIII, Section 14 and Section 1, Rule 36

As to Civil Case No. 4884, however, the Court found respondent judge administratively liable. The Court examined the text of the decision rendered on July 21, 2005, which stated, in substance, that after a cursory study the procedural due process requirements were complied with under the Summary Procedure, that the lower court’s decision could not be disturbed by the appellate court, and it then affirmed “en toto” without further factual articulation. The Court held that this form did not meet the constitutional requirement under Article VIII, Section 14, nor the rule under Section 1, Rule 36 that judgments and final orders must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based.

Respondent judge defended her decision by invoking Francisco v. Permskul, where the Court had sustained the validity of memorandum decisions. The Court rejected that defense. It acknowledged that memorandum decisions may be valid in proper cases, but only if strict requirements are observed. The Court held that a valid memorandum decision must not merely incorporate the lower court’s findings and conclusions by remote reference. The decision must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, contained in an annexed statement attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. The Court explained that these requirements aim to dispel suspicion that the judge did not properly study the record and merely aff

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