Title
Lacap vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 198162
Decision Date
Jun 21, 2017
Former mayor Corazon Lacap convicted for refusing to act on a business permit application, violating anti-graft laws due to personal bias against the applicant.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 198162)

Factual Background

The case arose from the alleged deliberate failure of Corazon M. Lacap, as Municipal Mayor, to act on the business permit application of private complainant Fermina Santos for 1999 and 2000. The prosecution alleged that the application and complete documentary requirements were forwarded to the Mayor, that the Mayor, after due demand and notwithstanding a transmittal letter from the Office of the Ombudsman’s Public Assistance Bureau, neglected or refused to act within a reasonable time, and that the omission was motivated by retaliation and discrimination because Santos had filed complaints against the Mayor and her husband.

The Charge and Statute

The Information charged Corazon M. Lacap with violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. 3019, alleging that during February 1999 to March 2000 she willfully, unlawfully and criminally neglected or refused, after due demand, to act within a reasonable time on Santos’ application for a Mayor’s Permit, despite repeated demands and complete documentary requirements, and that the refusal was to spite and retaliate against Santos, thereby discriminating against her. The essential elements of the offense were recited by the Court as: public officer status; neglect or refusal to act after due demand without sufficient justification; reasonable time elapsed; and purpose of obtaining benefit or discriminating against an interested party.

Trial Court Proceedings

The accused pleaded not guilty at arraignment and proceeded to trial after pre-trial. The prosecution presented six witnesses including the complainant and officials from the Office of the Ombudsman and the Municipal Treasurer. The defense presented two witnesses including Corazon M. Lacap and a former municipal bookkeeper. The Sandiganbayan found the prosecution’s evidence sufficient and convicted the accused. The accused moved for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied, and then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

Prosecution Evidence

The prosecution established that Santos had operated a variety store since 1975 and customarily applied for a Mayor’s Permit annually. For 1999 she prepared an Application (Exh. A) and attached documentary requirements. Atty. Julita Manalac Calderon of the Ombudsman’s Public Assistance Bureau forwarded the application and supporting documents to Mayor Lacap by letter requesting that action be taken with dispatch. Witnesses testified that the Mayor refused or failed to act, that prior closures of Santos’ store had occurred during the incumbency of the accused’s husband and later under the accused, and that Santos sought Ombudsman intervention because her application remained unacted upon and her store had been padlocked and closed, causing damage to her merchandise.

Defense Evidence

Corazon M. Lacap testified that the store had been closed prior to her incumbency and that she never ordered its closure; that she had consulted counsel upon receipt of Atty. Calderon’s transmittal letter because multiple cases involving Santos were already pending before other tribunals; and that her lawyer replied to the Ombudsman indicating that the application had been withdrawn and thus there was no formal application before the Mayor’s Office. The former bookkeeper issued certifications stating that no application by Santos for certain years appeared in municipal records and that a missing SSS clearance prevented approval.

Sandiganbayan Decision

The Sandiganbayan found that the transmittal letter from the Ombudsman together with the attached application and supporting documents were received by Mayor Lacap, that they requested action with dispatch, and that the only official action required of the Mayor was to approve or disapprove the application. The court held that referral of the matter to a private lawyer instead of taking the statutorily expected action constituted inaction. The Sandiganbayan also concluded that the lawyer’s letter claiming withdrawal of the application was unsubstantiated and that the accused’s motive to discriminate could be inferred from the prior hostilities and admissions that Santos had filed cases against the accused and her husband. The Sandiganbayan imposed the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day to ten years imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office.

Issues Presented on Review

In the petition for certiorari Corazon M. Lacap raised three issues: whether the Sandiganbayan misapprehended facts in finding official inaction under Section 3(f), R.A. 3019; whether referring the Ombudsman’s letter to counsel constituted a felony; and whether the Sandiganbayan wrongly inferred criminal intent to discriminate in the absence of categorical evidence.

Parties’ Contentions

The petitioner contended that she acted appropriately by referring the Ombudsman’s transmittal letter to her retained counsel because of pending cases involving the complainant; that counsel’s reply demonstrated that there was no application to act upon because it had been withdrawn; and that the prosecution failed to prove intentional discrimination. The People and the Sandiganbayan maintained that the Mayor received the application and attachments, that action was requested with dispatch, that referral to counsel did not satisfy the Mayor’s duty to approve or disapprove, and that motive to discriminate was evidenced by prior incidents and the accused’s admissions.

Supreme Court’s Analysis

The Court examined the four elements of Section 3(f), R.A. 3019 and found the first element — public officer status — undisputed. The Court then focused on the second and third elements and concluded that receipt of the Ombudsman’s transmittal letter with the application and supporting documents imposed upon the Mayor the duty to act expeditiously by either approving or disapproving the permit. The Court held that referral to personal counsel when no law or ordinance required legal consultation amounted to inaction. The Court found that the lawyer’s reply did not address the attachment or the Ombudsman’s plea for dispatch and that the asserted withdrawal of the application was not substantiated by verifiable sources.

Intent and Motive

On the question of motive, the Court accepted the Sandiganbayan’s inference that the deliberate refusal to act was tied to discriminatory intent. The Court reasoned that motive could be deduced from established facts, including prior complaints filed by Santos against the accused and her husband, documented administrative and criminal actions in the records, and testimony that other vendors operated without similar interference. The Court emphasized that public officers must rise above personal conflicts a

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