Title
L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. vs. McDonald's Corp.
Case
G.R. No. 233073
Decision Date
Feb 14, 2018
McDonald's sued L.C. Big Mak Burger for trademark infringement over "Big Mak." Despite a 2004 Supreme Court ruling favoring McDonald's, the petitioner changed to "Super Mak," avoiding contempt charges due to good faith compliance.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 233073)

Petitioner and Respondent Positions

Respondent alleged continued use of the words “Big Mak” in petitioner’s stalls and products and refusal to fully pay the judgment debt, prompting a petition for contempt. Petitioner maintained it complied with the injunction by ceasing the standalone use of the mark, instead using its corporate name “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” and, in many locations, the trade name “Super Mak”; it also asserted attempted payment via sheriff and relied on a final SEC decision upholding its corporate name.

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

Important procedural dates and events in the record include: August 16, 1990 — preliminary injunction issued by the Infringement Court; September 5, 1994 — RTC decision made the injunction permanent and awarded damages; November 26, 1999 — CA reversed the RTC; August 18, 2004 — Supreme Court reinstated the RTC decision; November 14, 2005 — Writ of Execution issued; May 5, 2008 — respondent filed Petition for Contempt; April 7, 2014 — RTC (Branch 59) dismissed contempt petition and awarded damages to petitioner and Francis Dy; February 2, 2017 — CA reversed and found petitioner guilty of indirect contempt; July 26, 2017 — CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; Supreme Court review followed.

Procedural History (Concise)

McDonald’s filed Civil Case No. 90-1507 for trademark infringement and unfair competition. The Infringement Court issued a preliminary injunction (Aug. 16, 1990) and later rendered judgment (Sept. 5, 1994) making the injunction permanent and awarding damages. The CA initially reversed, but the Supreme Court reinstated the RTC judgment in G.R. No. 143993 (Aug. 18, 2004). After issuance of the writ of execution, McDonald’s filed a contempt petition (2008) alleging continued use of “Big Mak” and nonpayment. The Contempt Court dismissed the petition and awarded compensatory and exemplary damages to petitioner; the CA reversed and found indirect contempt, imposing a fine and ordering compliance; the Supreme Court then reviewed the CA decision.

Injunction Order: Scope and Terms

The August 16, 1990 injunction (made permanent by final judgment) prohibited petitioner from: (a) using for its fast-food business the name “Big Mak” or any mark/word/device whose colorable imitation would confuse the public into believing petitioner’s goods or services originate from or are affiliated with respondent’s, particularly targeting the mark “BIG MAC”; (b) selling, distributing, advertising, offering for sale, or otherwise disposing of articles purporting to be manufactured by respondent; and (c) directly or indirectly using any mark or doing acts likely to induce belief of connection with respondent’s goods and services within the National Capital Judicial Region. The injunction contained an express geographic limitation.

Contempt Petition: Allegations

Respondent asserted that, despite service of the writ of execution, petitioner continued to use the words “Big Mak” in stalls and products both within and outside Metro Manila and refused to fully pay the damages awarded in the underlying judgment. The contempt proceeding alleged disobedience of the writ and the court’s judgment.

Petitioner’s Defenses in Contempt Proceedings

Petitioner alleged it had tendered payment via the sheriff but respondent refused to accept such payment and demanded direct payment; it contended it had desisted from using the proscribed mark “Big Mak” and had employed its corporate name and “Super Mak” in many stalls; it emphasized the geographic limitation of the injunction (National Capital Judicial Region); and it relied on an earlier, final Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decision (Jan. 3, 1994) which had rejected McDonald’s effort to cancel petitioner’s corporate name, finding no confusing similarity and granting priority in right to petitioner’s corporate name.

RTC (Branch 59) Decision on Contempt (2014)

The Contempt Court dismissed the contempt petition for lack of merit. It also awarded damages to petitioner and to Francis Dy: P500,000.00 to L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. for reputational injury, P500,000.00 to Francis Dy as moral damages, P100,000.00 exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 for attorneys’ fees; costs were taxed against respondent. The Contempt Court concluded petitioner had not committed indirect contempt.

Court of Appeals Reversal (2017)

The CA reversed the Contempt Court, holding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The CA’s findings included that (1) Francis Dy allegedly admitted in a judicial affidavit that the company complied with the court’s order only in 2009 (after the contempt petition was filed), and (2) petitioner’s continued use of its corporate name was, in CA’s view, an infringement of respondent’s mark and therefore a defiance of the injunction.

Issue Presented to the Supreme Court

The sole issue for the Supreme Court’s resolution was whether petitioner was guilty of indirect contempt.

Governing Legal Standard on Indirect Contempt

Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court defines indirect contempt and prescribes the procedure: after a written charge and opportunity to comment and be heard, a person may be punished for acts including disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court; any abuse or unlawful interference with court processes; and conduct tending to impede or obstruct the administration of justice. Jurisprudence emphasizes that contempt requires willful disregard or disobedience; intent to defy the court is the gravamen of the offense, and good faith is a relevant defense because contempt must be willful and for an illegitimate purpose.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Compliance Timing and Evidence

The Supreme Court rejected the CA’s interpretation that Francis Dy’s affidavit admitted belated (2009) compliance. The Court analyzed the affidavit and the photographs dated 2009 and concluded that the photographs’ dates do not establish that compliance commenced only in 2009; rather, the affidavit stated that by early 2009 the stalls and vans reflected “Super Mak” and the corporate name, and the photographs were proof of their state at the time taken. The record contained evidence that changes (e.g., wrappers and bags reflecting the corporate name) had been implemented earlier during trial. Thus, the CA’s inference of deliberate late compliance was unwarranted.

Supreme Court’s Analysis — Corporate Name vs. Proscribed Mark

The Co

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